Reviews

Books reviewed:
Salomon and Schwartz, (eds.) The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas. Volume III. South America
Lovell, A Beauty That Hurts: Life and Death in Guatemala
Beardsell, Europe and Latin America: returning the gaze
Gómez de Avellaneda, Sab: Hispanic Texts
Rowe, Poets of Contemporary Latin America: History and the Inner Life
Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design: the Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups
Naro, A Slave's Place, a Master's World: Fashioning Dependency in Rural Brazil
Campbell, Mexican Memoir: A Personal Account of Anthropology and Radical Politics in Oaxaca
Javier, Poor People's Politics. Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Duke
Petras, The Left Strikes Back: Class Conflict in the Age of Neoliberalism
Molyneux, Women's Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and Beyond     

Populisms old and new: the Peruvian case⋆

President Fujimori is often seen as exemplary of the Latin American “neopopulist”. Having inherited a country in crisis, he managed to engineer profound changes in the economic sphere, legitimising his government through a direct rapport with the mass of the population that marginalised representative institutions. This article seeks to place this “neopopulism” in an historical context by focusing on the socio‐economic and political characteristics that have sustained a tradition of populism in Peru. It argues that “top‐down” styles of political mobilisation have long had a debilitating effect on the development of a representative party system, and that populist traits can be traced through regimes of widely differing ideological orientations.     

Global populism and its 1890s Southern United States antecedent: the vexing case of Thomas E. Watson and William Faulkner’s literary intervention

ABSTRACT

Contemporary global populism combines systemic critique of power inequities with a politics of resentment. This conjunction under conditions of modernity gives rise to populisms whose twenty-first-century manifestations markedly exhibit features of Southern variants of the 1890s populism that briefly convulsed United States politics. Volatile mixtures of systemic critique and resentment politics, of progressive and proto-fascist tendencies, are vividly illustrated in the career of Thomas E. Watson (1856–1922), a prominent Georgia lawyer and politician whose populist rhetoric moved from advocating racially inclusive class solidarity to embracing virulent racist nativism. This trajectory, revelatory of susceptibilities to nativist authoritarianism also prominent in many currents of contemporary global populist politics, raises the question of whether and how literary art and humanities scholarship might work to disentangle justified revolt from reactionary resentments. William Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses (1942) and The Hamlet (1940) offer diverse models of such efforts.     

Lock them up! Punitive aggression and populism as political vigilantism

Populist leaders and movements are incredibly diverse, but one factor that most share is the tendency to pick fights. Populists often stir up conflict and use aggressive rhetoric that would destroy the reputation of mainstream politicos. Furthermore, many of these fights have little material benefit for base-level supporters, and often actively harm them. Yet populist militants generally reward combative behavior. Why is populism so conflict prone? And why do populists so often escape negative consequences for provoking damaging dustups? I argue that these sorts of conflict are driven by an emotional impulse that lies at the heart of populism: punitive aggression. Populists view political problems as the result of malign actions by hostile outgroups, and they perceive the state as either negligently allowing or actively abetting these actions. The failure of the state to punish the guilty breeds an intense and deep-seated desire to harm those seen as violating norms and values, regardless of the cost. Observational and experimental data are consistent with the hypothesis that, while the never-ending conflict typical of populism may harm its adherents’ interests, it continues because it satisfies much more basic emotional and psychological needs. This paper suggests that confronting and challenging populists may be difficult because forceful responses will reinforce the bond between the leader and his or her followers.     

From chasing populists to deconstructing populism: A new multidimensional approach to understanding and comparing populism

This paper challenges some widespread theoretical assumptions and practices in the study of populism and proposes a new multidimensional approach to generate and analyse data on this latent construct. Rather than focusing on categorising subjects as populists or not, it recommends reaching a better understanding of what populism is, the salience and relative weight of its attributes and how they interact creating an inner populist logic. Despite the increasing media and academic attention, historical discrepancies in how to conceptualise and operationalise populism have hindered cumulative progress in the literature. Initially most efforts were devoted to the study of specific movements, without a clear comparative angle, and the concept of populism was often conflated with that of nationalism. When the literature started to pay more attention to the analysis of the attributes associated with populism serious disagreements emerged concerning its true essence. Populism has been conceptualised as an ideology, a cynical strategy, a performative style and a discursive logic of articulation. The disputes between these competing interpretations have arguably slowed down the generation of comparative data. Although this article is meant to be a critique of the current state of the field and a call to make it pivot into a slightly different direction, it does not adopt an iconoclast stance and largely tries to reconcile the different existing research traditions – ideational, discursive, performative and strategic. It shows that their efforts are to a great extent complementary but mostly operating on different rungs of the ladder of abstraction. This paper argues that shifting from minimal definitions into a multidimensional approach may stimulate the generation of comparative data on a wider range of attributes and facilitate the identification of degrees and varieties within populism. This paper develops a new analytical framework which deconstructs populism into five dimensions: (1) depiction of the polity, (2) morality, (3) construction of society, (4) sovereignty and (5) leadership. These dimensions, that synthesise the most influential conceptualisations of populism, are empirically and theoretically interconnected and encompass ideational, discursive and performative attributes suggested in the literature. These dimensions are in turn composed of lower order attributes forming a multilayered network structure. This multidimensional framework provides a heuristic template that can be adapted and operationalised in diverse ways depending on the hypotheses, type of data and subjects of the analysis. Some examples of how to turn these dimensions into variables to capture supply- and demand-side populism are introduced. Future empirical research could help map and better understand the network of interactions and intersections among these dimensions and attributes. This could be the key to settle some of the current conceptual debates about populism and its varieties.     

Do populist parties support referendums? A comparative analysis of election manifestos in Europe

Earlier research refers to populist parties as being advocates of a greater use of referendum. Yet, there has been no large-scale systematic test of this claim. This article addresses this gap in the literature and tests the relationship between populism and greater use for referendums in party manifestos. It analyzes 824 manifestos of 187 populist and non-populist parties in 27 Member States of the European Union between 1994 and 2018. We test if populist parties are virtually all in favor of a greater use of referendums and whether they would talk about referendums much more than non-populist parties.     

Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left,right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019

Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.     

Economic crisis and the variety of populist response: evidence from Greece,Portugal and Spain

Abstract

Greece, Portugal and Spain are among the countries worst hit by the 2008 Great Recession, followed by significant electoral and political turmoil. However, one of the dimensions in which they differ is the presence and varieties of populism in parties’ political proposals. Drawing on holistic coding of party manifestos, we assess the varying presence of populist rhetoric in mainstream and challenger parties before and after the 2008 economic downturn. Our empirical findings show that populism is much higher in Greece compared to Spain and Portugal. We do not find a significant impact of the crisis as the degree of populism remains rather stable in Greece and Portugal, while it increases in Spain, mainly due to the rise of new populist forces. The study confirms that populist rhetoric is a strategy adopted mainly by challenger and ideologically radical parties. In addition, inclusionary populism is the predominant flavour of populist parties in new Southern Europe, although exclusionary populism is present to a lesser extent in the Greek case. We contend that the interaction between the national context – namely the ideological legacy of parties and the main dimensions of competition – and the strategic options of party leadership is crucial for explaining cross-country variation in the intensity of populism and the specific issues that characterise populist discourse.     

Five Stars and a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics

The article focuses on a new political player: the Five Star Movement led by the comedian Beppe Grillo. The party lies at the junction between different organisational models and conceptions of democracy: it combines an online and an offline presence; it has ‘horizontal’ structural elements, but a top-down decision-making process; it is positioned ‘beyond’ ideologies, while its electorate comes from various political families. The work considers the history, message, leader, organisation and electoral base of the movement, as well as the political opportunity structure that facilitated its growth in 2012 and the challenges it faces in the delicate phase of institutionalisation.     

The right-wing populism of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (and why comparativists should care)

Despite the vast amount of comparative research on right-wing populist parties over the past decade, there has been little work on non-European parties (as opposed to leaders). In this article, we argue that the international literature on populist parties has largely overlooked a significant non-European case: India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian People’s Party). Following the ideational approach to understanding populism, we examine whether the three distinguishing features of right-wing populism – its conceptions of “the people”, “elites” and “others” – are reflected in the views from interviews we conducted with BJP officials and representatives. We find that they are and so then consider whether they have been manifest in actions and statements while in power or whether, as some scholars claim, governing parties like the BJP moderate their populism. We conclude that the BJP can be very fruitfully included in comparative research on right-wing populist parties and propose a series of concrete ways in which this could be pursued.