Sympathy for the ‘devil’? Voting for populists in the 2006 and 2010 Dutch general elections

What motivations do voters have to vote for populist parties? How do their motivations differ from those of voters for mainstream parties? Analyzing new empirical material – the Dutch elections of 2006 and 2010 – we demonstrate that policy preferences, protest attitudes and evaluations of party leaders are important reasons to vote for populist parties. Yet only protest attitudes distinguish voters for populist parties from voters for mainstream parties; evaluations of party leaders turn out to be equally important for both. We theorize how protest attitudes and party leader evaluations overlap and employ an exploratory simulation technique to test this. We find that populist parties differ strongly from each other with regard to the specific patchwork of motivations of their voters.     

The comparative effectiveness of populist rhetoric in generating online engagement

Worldwide, voters are supporting populist candidates who promise to upend “politics as usual.” Despite all we know about populism, we still do not know how individuals respond to populist content during campaigns, particularly compared to other common content in liberal democracies. This paper adapts framing theory to an online electoral context to argue that populist campaign messages will generate more online engagement compared to three alternative conceptions of the relationship between the people and the elites: pluralism, technocracy, and neutral messages. The paper adapts Snow and Benford's seminal 1988 theory of resonance to studies of populist communication and assess whether populism resonates more with online social media users. An original dataset using the campaign Tweets of 22 national-level actors across five countries is used to test the theory: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, and Spain (N = 1777). The findings suggest that citizens on Twitter engage with populism more than its alternatives in certain contexts.     

台湾电视政论节目:两极化“收编”与民主的畸变——以“反服贸运动”的政论节目为个案

由于惨烈的市场竞争、特殊的政治脉络及族群撕裂的观众基础,台湾电视政论节目形成了蓝绿两极化收编和对决的格局,可谓是“台湾奇观”。在轰轰烈烈的“反服贸运动”中,电视政论节目基于朋党化的格局,表现出排他主义和鼓噪悲情民粹主义的突出特点,电视政论节目并非人们所期待的“公共论坛”,反而造成社会认同的分裂,阻滞了两岸和谐共进的步伐,形成了台湾民主的畸变。     

Public campaign financing and the rise of radical-right parties

While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to “level the playing field” of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.     

Is Populism Bad For Business? Assessing The Reputational Effect Of Populist Incumbents

This article seeks to assess whether populist incumbents affect their country’s perceived political stability and business climate. Existing evidence contends that populist governments in European democracies produce more moderate policy outcomes than their agendas would suggest. However, populist parties are still regarded as disruptive, as they are perceived to not conforming to the politics of negotiation and compromise that are central to liberal democracies. Therefore, their presence in government may generate political uncertainty and negatively affect the business climate. Drawing on a sample of 26 European democracies between 1996 and 2016, we find that populist incumbency initially generates market uncertainty, but after about two years in office, the negative effect on the business climate vanishes.     

Checking Executive Personalism: Collegial Governments and the Level of Democracy*

The world is facing a tide of “cult‐of‐personality” governments that threaten liberal democracy (e.g., Trump, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Orbán). Collegial executives are a long‐established institutional alternative, predicated upon disarming this very shortcoming in the practice of democracy. These are regimes in which multiple people share power, limiting executive excess. Historiographic accounts regard the collegial executive as inimical to resolute decision‐making and responsible for democratic deterioration. Despite being used since antiquity, there is no empirical research on how collegial executives influence democracy. This paper tests, for the first time, whether collegial executives are substantially worse for democracy than single‐leader executives. The focus is on the only robust polyarchy to have alternated twice between single‐person and collegial‐executive governments: Uruguay. Using the Synthetic Control Method, the paper creates a fictional Uruguay to compare with the country’s real experience. The results show that multiple‐executive governments have had no impact on Uruguay’s level of democracy.     

Populism in election times: a comparative analysis of 11 countries in Western Europe

Abstract

The article comparatively examines the levels of populism exhibited by parties in Western Europe. It relies on a quantitative content analysis of press releases collected in the context of 11 national elections between 2012 and 2015. In line with the first hypothesis, the results show that parties from both the radical right and the radical left make use of populist appeals more frequently than mainstream parties. With regard to populism on cultural issues, the article establishes that the radical right outclasses the remaining parties, thereby supporting the second hypothesis. On economic issues, both types of radical parties are shown to be particularly populist. This pattern counters the third hypothesis, which suggests that economic populism is most prevalent among the radical left. Finally, there is no evidence for the fourth hypothesis, given that parties from the south do not resort to more populism on economic issues than those from the north.     

The resurgence of populism in Latin America

Contemporary manifestations of “neopopulism” are situated in an analysis of the role of political institutions in capitalist societies, and the idea of structural and institutional crisis. It is argued that “populist” and “neopopulist” discourse alike must be understood in terms of their relationship to specific conjunctural projects for the reorientation of capitalist reproduction. This approach directs attention back to the contrasting conjunctures in which classical populist and contemporary neopopulist political projects were launched. It also provides a basis on which contemporary projects which adopt elements of populist strategy and discourse can be compared and evaluated.     

An unjustified bad reputation? The Dark Triad and support for populism

While research concludes that populist leaders stand out for their “dark” personalities, studies on the psychological underpinnings of citizens’ populist attitudes are scant and inconclusive, with some agreement on the association between disagreeableness and populist attitudes. By bringing the Dark Triad personality traits of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism into the picture, we aim to answer whether populist citizens -like populist leaders-score higher in this dark traits, and whether the addition of the Dark Triad helps to better understanding the populist personality. Using an online Spanish sample, our analyses find that using the Dark Triad does indeed add to our understanding of populist attitudes. In opposition to widespread intuitions about the character of populists, we find that psychopathy and Machiavellianism are negatively associated with support for populism, with only narcissism being positively related to the people-centric dimension of populist attitudes.