Motives Driving the Creation of Professional and Business Associations: Evidence from Russia

ABSTRACT

Our knowledge of associations is scarce, requiring a multidisciplinary approach that has been rarely used to investigate this multifaceted phenomenon that cuts across the confines of a single discipline. This study investigates the motives that drive the founding of associations in the Russian context, analyzing original data and applying a mixed-methods research design. An empirical typology of motives is developed to obtain a more accurate range of time- and value-driven motives beyond what is currently understood. The findings shed light on the complexity and multidimensionality of the motivational factors driving the establishment of associations in a transitional context.     

Russian Central Government Budgeting and Public Sector Reform Discourses: Paradigms,Hybrids, and a “Third Way”

ABSTRACT

This study explores how public sector reform discourses are reflected in Russian central government budgeting. Through the lenses of institutional logics, Russian central government budgeting is considered to be a social institution that is influenced by rivaling reform paradigms: Public Administration, New Public Management (NPM), the Neo-Weberian State, and New Public Governance. Although NPM has dominated the agenda during the last decade, all four have been presented in “talks” and “decisions” regarding government budgeting. The empirical evidence illustrates that the implementation of management accounting techniques in the Russian public sector has coincided with and contradicted the construction of the Russian version of bureaucratic governance, which is referred to as the vertical of power. Having been accompanied by participatory mechanisms and a re-evaluation of the Soviet legacy, the reforms have created prerequisites for various outcomes at the level of budgeting practices: conflicts, as in the UK, and hybridization, as in Finland.     

Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge,then stabilize?

This paper seeks to explain the surprising decline in Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating in 2011. During the previous 10 years, Putin's rating had correlated closely with Russians' perceptions of the state of the economy. Yet the fall in his approval – from 79% in December 2010 to 63% a year later – occurred despite roughly stable economic perceptions. Comparing Levada Center polls from late 2010 and 2011, the paper explores both who (what types of respondents) grew disenchanted with Putin, and why (what issues or grievances prompted this switch). It finds that (a) the fall in support for the Kremlin – although faster among members of the “creative class,” women, the rich, and residents of provincial cities – was broad-based, occurring among all social groups examined; (b) attitudes toward immigration, the West, and Russia's international status, as well as assessments of public service quality, changed little during 2011; (c) Putin's declining popularity most likely reflected stronger – not weaker – economic concerns; although the proportion judging economic performance to be poor did not increase, those who saw economic weakness became much less supportive of the Kremlin. Russians appear to have increasingly blamed their political leaders for unsatisfactory economic and political outcomes.     

Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin

This article investigates how hybrid regimes supply governance by examining a series of dilemmas (involving elections, the mass media, and state institutions) that their rulers face. The authors demonstrate how regime responses to these dilemmas – typically efforts to maintain control while avoiding outright repression and societal backlash – have negative outcomes, including a weakening of formal institutions, proliferation of “substitutions” (e.g., substitutes for institutions), and increasing centralization and personalization of control. Efforts by Russian leaders to disengage society from the sphere of decision-making entail a significant risk of systemic breakdown in unexpected ways. More specifically, given significantly weakened institutions for interest representation and negotiated compromise, policy-making in the Russian system often amounts to the leadership's best guess (ad hoc manual policy adjustments) as to precisely what society will accept and what it will not, with a significant possibility of miscalculation. Three case studies of the policy-making process are presented: the 2005 cash-for-benefits reform, plans for the development of the Khimki Forest, and changes leading up to and following major public protests in 2011–2012.     

Local democracy in a hybrid state: pluralism and protest in Volzhskiy,Russia

The standard narrative of Russia's “authoritarian backsliding” fails to grapple with the tremendous variation in subnational politics that emerged over the past two decades. This article offers a case study of the industrial city of Volzhskiy, which, although once a stalwart supporter of the Communist Party (KPRF), has evolved into a highly pluralistic system with democratic municipal institutions. Drawing upon analysis of local publications, protest data, and interviews with local politicians, this article traces the interplay of formal institutions and informal political processes in Volzhskiy's local-level transition to democracy. Volzhskiy's pluralism and local democratic outcome can largely be explained by (1) the emergence of a more diverse set of economic and political interests and constituencies, and (2) a KPRF organization that was strong and provided robust competition that created the conditions for cooperation among the competitors to form fair and open local political institutions, which fostered the city's pluralism.     

Faking performance together: systems of performance evaluation in Russian enforcement agencies and production of bias and privilege

A specialist on Russian law enforcement examines a critical source of prosecution and conviction bias in that country – the system by which prosecutors, police, judges, and other legal professionals are evaluated. More specifically, she demonstrates how that system (exclusive of any inherent corruption or bias) institutionalizes incentives for the prosecution of large numbers of defendants in routine cases for the purpose of meeting informal quotas. Officials from a variety of law enforcement agencies, seeking to “hit their numbers,” develop techniques of selecting the “right” cases (and avoiding “wrong” ones), manipulating charges depending on the victim's and defendant's statuses.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

Let's have more Russian babies. How anti-immigrant sentiment shapes family leave policy in Russia

This paper builds on scholarship of welfare chauvinism in Europe to present evidence of the relationship between xenophobia and family leave policies in contemporary Russia. I argue that popular anti-immigrant moods pressure government into providing more generous family benefits to Russian families while proposing restrictions to migrants. Findings are based on elite interviews, as well as content analysis of mass media, policy documents, public speeches, and party manifestos. I show that xenophobia is widespread in Russia among the public and policymakers alike, and find that xenophobia is embraced by policymakers to guide decisions regarding the allocation of social benefits.     

Historical origins of the party-army relations in the Soviet Union and China

It is established that Party-army relation followed a "separated" pattern in the Soviet Union as opposed to an "infused" pattern in China. This article explores the historical origin of this difference in the revolutionary periods. By analyzing the biographies of communist military elites, it argues that this discrepancy took shape before the revolutionary takeover and resulted from the differentiated intensities of warfare across Russia and China. In China, the numerous civil wars and military defeats, radicalized the old military structure and boosted societal militarization; thus, eroding the mutual exclusion between the military and revolutionaries. The effect was lesser in Tsarist Russia than in prerevolutionary China, making the old military a conservative and professional corporate that the Bolsheviks could not completely subordinate to Party control.     

“But it is our duty!” Exploring Gazprom’s reluctance to Russian gas sector reform

Reform of the Russian domestic natural gas sector has been discussed for several decades but has not been carried out. The state-controlled energy company Gazprom holds a dominant position in the domestic market, supplying the population with gas, carrying out societal functions, and in return getting privileges from the state. Recently, however, independent gas producers have increased their market shares and are lobbying for liberalization. While Gazprom might gain from reform, it continues to warn against the dangers of altering the gas market structure too abruptly. Analyzing Gazprom’s reasoning through an ideational analytical lens, this article finds that Gazprom’s reluctance to change can be explained not only by its interests but also by norms and beliefs. Reform studies should take note of Gazprom’s idea of “keeping the country together,” not least because the company has a sounding board in the President, who makes the final decisions.