Ripening Within? Strategies Used by Rebel Negotiators to End Ethnic War

This article explores what strategies rebels use to prepare their ethnic community for negotiated peace. Proposed strategies are distilled from relevant theory and systematically investigated in case analyses of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegal. The empirical findings indicate that although a coercive military capacity underpinned claims to ethnic representation, coercion did not dominate during the prenegotiation phase. During negotiations, noncoercive persuasion, as well as collective and selective incentives, clearly dominated. Moreover, the most important measures were internal to the negotiating rebel group. The successful rebel negotiator appeared to “mobilize in reverse” by initially targeting the core of military leaders followed by competitor groups and constituents. The article systematically examines across cases what measures rebel negotiators have used to “ripen” their own community, how these measures have been sequenced, and against whom they have been directed. The findings have important implications for the concepts of ripeness and prenegotiation and their requirements. The study underscores in particular the relevance of rebels' nonviolent commitment signals, something that has been largely overlooked in the research on nonstate armed actors. The policy implications suggest the possible benefits of third‐party assistance to efforts to promote communication, public outreach, and procedural transparency on the nonstate side in connection with peace talks.     

Playing games of governance: How and why Fair Trade pioneers evade corporate capture

The concept of power in political governance has traditionally focused on domination and the preservation of the status quo. In an economic context, institutional and organizational studies have expressed growing interest in the dynamics of agency and institutional change, captured in the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship.” In the context of global free trade, the Fair Trade movement's experience shows that ongoing institutional entrepreneurship is important for entrepreneurs to transcend absorption by corporate hegemony. In this article I examine the capacity for agency in market institutions through the lens of “defiance” to illuminate the imaginative “game players” who evade institutional capture in the evolution of market governance.     

To share is fair: The changing face of China's fair use doctrine in the sharing economy and beyond

Copyrighted works are greatly entwined with the concept of the sharing economy because of their status as informational public goods. Unlike commercial sharing models that address tangible goods such as bikes and houses, the sharing of which is limited by their physical nature, sharing models for intangible copyrighted works such as Google Books and live game webcasting must account for the comparatively unfettered ability for these to be shared. Accordingly, these models are more focused on exploiting such works to their full commercial potential. However, these sharing models are to a large extent based on the unauthorised exploitation of copyrighted works and will be unworkable if the related copyright issues cannot be solved. The interest that copyright owners have in exclusivity must thus be balanced with the public's interest in further exploitation of copyrighted works. Article 22 of the Copyright Law of China outlines an exhaustive list of copyright exceptions; such a restrictive list is incompatible with the sharing economy. The Chinese courts have realised this problem and have gone beyond the law in their judgments, taking a cue from their US counterparts. However, many of these decisions appear to be inconsistent with one another.To address the aforementioned problems, this paper examines the latest proposed amendment to the Copyright Law of China and proposes several legislative and judicial actions that could help promote the sharing economy. At the legislative level, enacting legislation based on a refined open-ended fair use model is necessary to promote the development of the sharing economy. At the judicial level, Chinese courts should employ the concept of transformative use to correctly interpret legislation based on the proposed open-ended model. With transformative use as the cornerstone of copyright policy, the public gains the freedom to share others’ works, participate in the innovation process, and create works with new value. Moreover, authors would retain an incentive to create works under such a legal regime because market substitution will not occur if a work is used for a different expressive purpose than that for which the work was originally created. Thus, a balance can be achieved between promoting the sharing economy and protecting the exclusivity of copyright in China.     

金融信用缺失的博弈论分析

目前,我国严重的金融信用缺失造成了金融信用资源供给不足,交易成本提高,制约着经济的持续稳定健康发展.本文试图运用博弈论分析工具,从契约经济学和信息经济学角度,揭示我国金融信用缺失的微观机理.要从根本上解决当前的金融信用缺失,必须建立金融信用的整体制度安排,具体包括建立企业声誉机制和完善的信息披露制度、转变政府职能、完善信用立法、实施产权制度改革、引入第三方治理和重构信用文化等方面.     

契约为何必须遵守

在法学和伦理学领域 ,“契约必须遵守”一直被视为是不能继续追问的先验性命题。本文利用博弈论的分析工具 ,为初级形态的社会秩序的生成 (从冲突到和平的过程 )提供一种模型化解释 ,并对侵犯行为的发生以及和平契约的缔结进行了细致的分析 ,进而在逻辑上回答了“契约为何必须遵守”的问题。     

绑架现场人质解救的博弈策略

绑架者一般是不完全信息博弈者 ;在绑架现场人质解救中 ,绑架者会面临博弈困境。解救者应在人质解救的“纳什均衡”出现期间 ,解决绑架者的博弈困境。为有利于人质解救 ,解救者应有选择地向绑架者提供相关信息 ,应审慎开出“空头支票”。     

博弈格局中的政府信息公开

纵观世界各国,政府信息公开制度的建立阻力重重,阻力的背后均与政府内部官僚的信息保密行为有关。官僚基于各种动机,有着强烈的保守信息的倾向。建立信息公开制度是官僚集团内部、官僚集团与外部多元利益集团博弈的结果。     

腐败生成、腐败传染与腐败遏制:一种博弈解释

腐败问题一直是政治学、行政学研究的热点话题 ,本文力求用博弈论作为一种解释途径。文章认为 ,腐败实际上并不是孤立的、静止的单个权力拥有者的行为 ,而往往是公共权力的授予者 (以监督者为代表 )与权力执行者 (以官员为代表 )之间 ,以及权力执行者 (官员 )之间的一次或多次博弈的结果。要遏制腐败 ,一方面要强化对监督者的监督以免使监督者“打盹” ,另一方面从外部环境上加大对各博弈方的奖惩力度 ,改变官员策略选择的收益值 ,形成新的“纳什均衡”解 ,这样就从腐败生成与腐败传染两个源头上遏制了腐败的产生     

博弈问题的哲学分析

自纳什以来,非合作博弈理论已经广泛应用于经济学、政治学、社会学、生物学等领域.本文从哲学角度分析了博弈中的理性和合作问题,试图指出,博弈论关于理性和合作的理解是非常单薄的,基本上局限于经济学的理解,而这可能误解人类行为.     

Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan concluded an "easier" FTA with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved on to negotiate with Singapore. In this article, I analyze these cases and review the literature on bargaining and two-level games to develop a model of how these differences in sequence account in part for the relative differences in each country's bargaining strength in their more difficult negotiations. The preexistence of the Singapore FTA eased domestic pressures to reap the benefits of entry into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no-agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure to get into the free trade "game." This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korea conceded more internationally at the expense of higher side payments domestically.