Policy Advocacy in Transitioning Regimes: Comparative Lessons from the Case of Harbour Protection in Hong Kong

Current research on policy advocacy relies exclusively on established regimes where instability is largely contained. Using the harbour protection advocacy in Hong Kong as an exploratory case, the article documents how conservationists exploited the unique opportunities arising from the transfer of sovereignty to advance heritage protection policy. Three new strategic choices in policy advocacy are identified. First, policy advocates strategically switched between issue frames instead of becoming strongly identified with any issue frame. Second, they avoided prolonged involvement by pursuing modest, programme-level adjustments. Third, they circumvented the restrictions on scope and focus by creating new venues outside of the policy subsystem.     

Identity,procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule

ABSTRACT

Constructing convincing legitimacy claims is important for securing the stability of authoritarian regimes. However, extant research has struggled to systematically analyse how authoritarians substantiate their right to rule. We analyse a novel data set on authoritarian regimes’ claims to legitimacy that is based on leading country experts’ assessments of 98 states for the period 1991–2010. This analysis provides key new insights into the inner workings and legitimation strategies of current non-democratic regimes. Closed authoritarian regimes predominately rely on identity-based legitimacy claims (foundational myth, ideology and personalism). In contrast, elections fundamentally change how authoritarian rulers relate to society. In their legitimacy claims, electoral authoritarian regimes focus on their ‘adequate’ procedures, thereby mimicking democracies. All regimes also stress their purported success in proving material welfare and security to their citizens.     

Electoral impacts of a failed uprising: Evidence from Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement

Do anti-regime protests in electoral autocracies benefit the opposition by shifting the political preference of the bystanders? We seek an answer to this question by examining the electoral impact of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement. Analyzing the election outcomes at the polling-station level shortly after the movement, we find that protest exposure, as measured by spatial proximity to protest sites, is positively correlated with the decline of electoral support for the opposition. Individual level surveys indicate that the adverse influences of protest exposure manifest themselves in elevating by-standing citizens' sense of economic insecurity, even though the movement causes no persistent income loss, while enhancing political efficacy.     

Value is Simple. Valuation is Complex

Value can appear so complicated that it is not only a terribly intimidating topic, but actually fruitless to pursue. That is, the concept of value is either a dead end or best left to the experts. We disagree. At the most general level, having value can be understood as having the capacity to be measured and compared against another thing (or a standard). This is consistent with Marxian concepts (which are elaborated with special reference to the capitalist value form), but it is also simple and general enough to provide a transportable frame for discussing the role of value and measurement in any context imaginable, whether it be a discussion of spiritualism, collective action, economic data, or physical science. Marx directs our attention to the political constitution of systems of measure on the very first page of Capital, and there is now a great deal of work in geography and in science and technology studies on the social constitution of systems of valuation. We believe a crucial topic deserves an accessible approach that reveals unities rather than barriers, and thus supplement them with the moral and critical political-economic critique made possible by Marxian value theory.     

EU Regulation of Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals in Comparative Perspective

This paper provides a comparison of European Union regulatory policy for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The discussion highlights key similarities and differences in regulatory approach for the two sectors. More importantly, it explores the balance that has been struck between public health, health care, and industrial policy as “competing” objectives within the respective regulatory regimes. It is argued that, despite both sectors being affected by the same institutional rules and constraints at the EU level, and both being central to the delivery of high-quality health care in Europe, there are a surprising number of differences between the regulatory frameworks. That this stems in part from their different “launch” times, hence different institutional conditions of regulation, and commensurate political climates, as well as reflecting different aims and goals among member-state and EU-level policy makers, are among the paper's main conclusions.     

“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies

This article contributes to current discussions on state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. Our analysis demonstrates that the J-curve argument (“good institutions” in autocracies as compared to hybrid and transitional regimes) may not be generic and is not well supported by empirical evidence from the sample of post-Soviet countries. An explanatory model of the “King of the Mountain” is instead provided. Its focus is on the monopoly of political rent as a precondition for extraction of economic rent. It demonstrates an inverse correlation between the quality of institutions and the extraction of political and economic rent, and explains why an autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that may make his/her monopoly vulnerable, and rather would prefer to preserve a low quality of institutions and “bad enough governance.” An analysis of a variety of external and domestic factors that may endanger this monopoly is provided. Finally, the autocrat's alternative strategic choices are analyzed. It is argued that better payoffs for the autocrat – paradoxically – may result from partial reforms and improvement of the quality of institutions. However, for various reasons, this is not occurring in post-Soviet autocracies.     

Authoritarian backsliding and the concentration of political power

This article introduces the concept of authoritarian backsliding as a class of strategies for the concentration of incumbent political power in hybrid regimes. Such actions include manipulating elections, violating civil liberties, creating an extremely uneven playing field for the opposition, and reducing the institutional constraints on executive power. While often falling short of a full regime change, backsliding can significantly alter the level of political competition in a country and reduce the quality of its political life. This article develops a theoretically-grounded strategy to identify and measure backsliding events since 1989, showing that they have been much more common than is typically appreciated. The article also shows the utility of the concept of backsliding for better understanding regime stability. Using cross-national analysis of backsliding events from 1989–2004, we find that threats such as opposition electoral gains or economic crises in resource-dependent regimes create incentives for authoritarian backsliding.     

汇率制度选择理论综述

传统汇率制度选择理论的关注点为固定汇率制和浮动汇率制的优劣之争,而新兴汇率制度选择理论的关注点则为中间汇率制度和两极汇率制度的优劣之争,由此派生出了各种汇率制度选择理论。近年来,经济学家开始从可维持性和危机预防的角度出发来研究汇率制度的选择和安排,汇率制度选择理论的研究也从静态视角转向动态视角。     

The Global Climate Regime: Explaining Lagging Reform

There have been growing calls for reform of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). How have governments met the demand for action on climate change despite the lagging pace of UNFCCC reform? New qualitative data demonstrate that the institutional, sectoral, and technical characteristics of multilateral institutions have guided government choices in managing climate change issues. Institutional resources and sectoral participation in multilateral institutions have enabled governments to handle climate change issues outside the UNFCCC, reducing the need to invest in its reform as demand for action has grown. These specialized institutions are able to mitigate political disputes and facilitate greater efficacy in handling specific issues such as financing and emissions mitigation. They have mandates that overlap with the cross‐cutting nature of climate change, requiring no new mandates, which mitigates political disputes in managing specific climate issues.