Progress and challenges of consolidating the African state: “consolidation indicators” and the African Charter on Democracy,Elections and Governance

Since independence, there have been some improvements in political development in African states in respect to the prevalence of democracy, recognition of the rule of law, reduction in unconstitutional changes of governments, regular, transparent, free and fair elections, and a conducive environment for doing business. This article proposes a range of “consolidating indicators” that can be used to measure the consolidation of the African State in light of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Consolidation indicators examined include the level of internal integration/disintegration of the state, the degree and nature of peace, the nature of democracy and elections and of governance systems, levels of capacity, the social fabric of the state as well as issues concerning women and youth. The use of consolidation indicators is a new effort to address issues of contingency and preventive planning, with the aim of having more peaceful and progressive African states. Characterising African states, based on various consolidation indicators, is an important and relevant endeavour, especially because the concept of the “consolidation of the African State” is under-researched, with a paucity of a clear assessment. The discussion highlights the importance of the ACDEG and notes the increasing recognition by African states of the importance of democratic values and practices to the continent. Understanding the progress and challenges of consolidating the African State will help policy makers to strengthen the implementation of ACDEG, in pushing African states towards realising the African Union (AU) Africa Agenda 2063. This article takes an Afrocentric approach by discussing the positive role of regional and continental institutions in promoting and strengthening democracy and governance in Africa.     

Turning your back on the EU. The role of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections

This paper analyses how disaffection with the EU influenced individuals' likelihood of turning out to vote and of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party in the 2014 EP elections, and how these relationships were moderated by the Eurosceptic partisan supply of each country. We argue that the degree to which political parties oppose European integration, as well as the ideological leaning of Eurosceptic parties, should influence both the likelihood of disaffected citizens turning out to vote, and their likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. Our empirical findings show that, in the presence of a party that is strongly opposed to European integration, disaffected citizens are more likely to turn out to vote and to vote for a Eurosceptic party provided that this party also shares their ideological leaning in the left-right dimension. These results indicate that Eurosceptic parties are important actors for the politicization of the European integration conflict and for the Europeanization of EP elections, but, at the same time, they suggest that opposition to European integration is subordinate to the traditional left-right conflict.     

Can electors combat corruption? Institutional arrangements and citizen behaviour

Studies interested in the cross‐national levels of corruption have concluded that specific institutional characteristics drive the aggregate variation. In countries with high institutional clarity and plurality electoral systems, corruption tends to be lower since increased voter monitoring and clarity of responsibility incentivise politicians to deliver virtuous policies. However, the underlying accountability mechanism has never been tested at the individual level. It is still unclear whether (1) voters do place voting weights on corruption, and (2) whether these weights vary in response to aggregate institutional characteristics. In this article, survey data from 23 democracies is used to put the accountability micro‐mechanism to this test. While there is some evidence that voters do vote on the basis of corruption, the moderating effect of institutional characteristics is not as strong as previously thought.     

You just made it: Individual incumbency advantage under Proportional Representation

Using close election outcomes, we identify a personal effect of incumbency on the probability of seeking election, and seeking and winning office in subsequent elections for elected officials in an Open List Proportional System. In many cases Danish local elections creates an as-if random distribution of candidates that are elected or not, which is an ideal setting for a Regression Discontinuity design. The incumbency advantage has been studied to a great extent, though primarily in pluralistic electoral systems, while more recent studies have extended the scope to Proportional Representation systems. This study adds to this budding literature by showing an advantage in a new context and focusing on candidate level electoral returns under conditions where candidates are arguably least likely to benefit from incumbency.     

Income inequality and election outcomes in OECD countries: New evidence following the Great Recession of 2008–2009

Using data on national parliamentary election outcomes in 32 OECD countries from 1975 to 2013, we investigate the importance of economic voting. We focus on the relevance of income inequality which has resurfaced to the forefront of public debate since the last global economic downturn. Additionally, we examine whether the degree of economic voting varies with the political orientation of the incumbent government. Finally, we check whether the Great Recession of 2008–2009 alters the degree to which voters hold the incumbent government, specifically left parties, responsible for poor economic performance and rising inequality. We find that economic growth is the most robust variable for economic voting, before and after the Great Recession. The vote share for left-leaning parties declines when income inequality rises during normal economic times. However, voters are more likely to vote for left-wing incumbents if domestic income inequality and unemployment rate rose during the Great Recession.     

The September 2015 Regional Elections in Russia: A Rehearsal for Next Year's National Legislative Races

The September 2015 elections in the regions of Russia resulted in victories for the major pro-government party, United Russia, in 11 regional legislative elections and brought success to incumbent chief executives in 21 gubernatorial elections. The performance of United Russia was better than in the previous series of regional elections, which is particularly important given that in many respects, the 2015 regional elections served as a rehearsal for the 2016 national legislative races. The results of the elections generally attested to the efficiency of political and institutional manipulation tools developed by the Russian authorities in recent years.     

The leadership dilemma: Examining the impact of strong leaders on parties

Party leaders are often regarded as crucial to a party's success. Successful leaders tend to be big personalities who dominate their party's organisation, policy development and electoral campaigns. But does that control come with a price? We test to see if such leaders damage their parties in the medium term. This happens because strong leaders might be ceded too much control of the party organisation, policy and electoral strategy. We specifically hypothesise that political parties will go through a period of leadership instability and electoral decline after strong leaders step down. Using a dataset with elections under party leaders in nine countries over a 25-year period, and a qualitative case study, we find some evidence for the theory, which should prompt further research of the question.     

晚清时期儒学在新加坡的传播与变革

在新加坡,儒学或曰孔学、孔教,一直被认为是中国传统文化思想的正宗,在一切思想流派中具有无可争辩的统治地位。随着19世纪初期新加坡开埠,华侨来此定居者日益增加,儒学也逐渐在当地华人社会传播开来。自19世纪80年代,晚清设置驻新加坡领事以来,新加坡儒学发展出现兴盛局面。清政府领事官员以及当地华人绅商通过办文社、建孔庙学堂和推广普及双语等方式,实现儒学与西学的对接,将新加坡儒学的发展推向一个新的阶段。     

Understanding UKIP: Identity,Social Change and the Left Behind

In this article we explore the structural shifts which help explain the emergence of UKIP as a major radical‐right political force in Britain. There are two distinct, but related, aspects to this story. The first is the changes to Britain's economic and social structure that have pushed to the margins a class of voters who we describe as the ‘left behind’: older, working‐class, white voters with few educational qualifications. The second is long‐term generational changes in the values that guide British society and shape the outlook of voters. These value shifts have also left older white working‐class voters behind, as a worldview which was once seen as mainstream has become regarded as parochial and intolerant by the younger, university‐educated, more socially liberal elites who define the political consensus of twenty‐first‐century Britain. We then move to consider the political changes that have further marginalised these voters, as first Labour and then the Conservatives focused their energies on recruiting and retaining support from middle‐class, moderate swing voters. Finally, we show how UKIP has developed into an effective electoral machine which looks to win and retain the loyalties of these voters. Finally, we discuss the longer‐term implications of the radical‐right revolt, which has the potential to change the nature of party competition in Britain in the 2015 election and beyond.     

Economic vote instability: Endogeneity or restricted variance? Spanish panel evidence from 2008 and 2011

While the economic vote exists in Western democracies, the question of its stability remains a subject of controversy. This article focuses on two possible factors behind the instability observed: the endogeneity problem and the restricted variance problem. The former concerns the influence of partisan thinking on economic perception, while the latter concerns the influence of economic crisis, when virtually all voters may perceive a bad economy. These problems are examined using panel data from the Spanish national elections of 2008 and 2011. After various causality tests, it is concluded that the economic vote was influential in both contests, but apparently less so in 2011. It is shown in the article that the initial 2011 result misleads because of the statistical artifact presented by the restricted variance problem. Thus, an alternative strategy for exogenising economic perceptions is developed using aggregate economic measures in a pooled cross‐sectional design whereby it is demonstrated that the economy mattered greatly under the economic crisis of 2011. This estimation strategy could be applicable to other Western democracies experiencing such economic crisis.