The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term

An American political scientist and constitutional scholar recounts the development, and analyzes the procedures and backstage activities, of Russia's highest judicial body. The study, based in part on personal interviews, traces the constitutional court's political influence up through the pivotal conflict between the Parliament's Speaker Khasbulatov and President Yel'tsin during the last week of March 1993. In addition to major decisions, notably that which followed 52 sessions from May 26 to December 16, 1992 devoted to the trial of the CPSU, the narrative focuses on the role of Chief Justice Zor'kin. Also discussed are the court's legislative mandate, its expanding caseload and legal shortcomings. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H11, K10, K41, P20.     

浅析斯大林模式对当代中国社会主义经济建设的启示

本文从社会主义经济建设的角度出发,探讨斯大林模式对当代中国社会主义经济建设的启示,认为社会主义经济建设要从本国国情出发,要始终把发展生产力放在首位,要全面深化经济体制改革,要促进人的全面发展,要处理好和资本主义国家的关系。     

斯大林“三和”思想探析

苏联国家工业化和农业集体化的过程,也是对城乡资本主义经济成分实行排挤和消灭的过程。斯大林根据苏联社会主义改造完成后的经济结构、阶级结构变动情况,初步探索和分析了社会主义社会内部的矛盾关系,提出了社会主义社会生产关系和生产力之间、社会成员之间、各民族之间,形成一致与和谐的关系。然而,斯大林把和谐看成是无矛盾,甚至"完全一致",这就使得他的认识不仅偏离了唯物辩证法,陷入形而上学,而且也不符合当时苏联的实际情况,其后果是非常严重的。我们要构建社会主义和谐社会,必须从斯大林的错误中吸取深刻的教训。     

列宁和斯大林时期官制的比较

苏联的官制在列宁时期初步运行起来,在斯大林时期得到发展和僵化,列宁和斯大林时期的官制相比较,二者既有继承,也有异化。分析和比较列宁和斯大林时期的官制特点,不仅可以进一步审视斯大林体制,而且从中能够得出苏共失败的原因。同时,它对我国社会主义政治体制的改革、执政党的建设也是一个好的借鉴。     

Putin as a flexible politician. Does he imitate Stalin?

The article is about Putin's ‘Jewish anomaly’. Against all expectations, Putin during his tenure as president of the Russian Federation showed in various ways his concern about the life of Jews in his country.     

勃列日涅夫时期苏联对斯大林的再评价问题

经历了赫鲁晓夫的“解冻”,勃列日涅夫时期对斯大林的重新评价问题显得非常突出。从1964年到1982年,分三个阶段,勃列日涅夫时期对斯大林的态度发生了明显的转变。从最开始的维护苏共20大、22大决议到最后实质上为他恢复个人名誉,但在形式上却没有太大的变化。     

简论苏联干部委任制的形成

苏联的干部委任制始于列宁时期 ,形成于斯大林时期。委任制作为俄国文化的积淀在苏联一定历史时期的存在 ,有其合理性。但是委任制毕竟要被现代社会所抛弃。斯大林非但未能及时进行改革 ,反使之登峰造极 ,最后给后代留下了遗患。     

“The laughing third man in a fight”: Stalin's use of the wedge strategy

Although much IR theory focuses on balancing, this paper examines a version of the wedge strategy, what Stalin allegedly called being “the laughing third man in a fight.” This is the practice of advancing one's goals by setting up other states to fight each other. The first case study is Soviet strategy in Europe from September 1939 until June 1941. The second is Soviet strategy in the Far East in 1941–45. What I am looking at here is a policy of deliberately encouraging the start of a war and/or aiding its prolongation in order to weaken both sides. The two case studies indicate that the Soviet Union used such a strategy at times in place of the usual forms of balancing, discussed in the international relations literature. Additionally, analysis of Moscow's conduct, statements by Soviet leaders, and the policies of a number of foreign communist parties indicate that, in addition to any security goals, Stalin's agenda included furthering the USSR's goal as a revolutionary state, even thought this had at times to be constrained by realpolitik.     

Bolshevism,Stalinism and the Comintern: a historical controversy revisited

ABSTRACT

‘Bolshevization’ and ‘Stalinization’ have been used variously by historians of American and British Communism to designate and date the processes by which the Comintern and national parties were subordinated to Soviet policy. Despite their pervasive influence on the American and British left, this literature reveals little curiosity or consensus about the politics of Bolshevism and Stalinism, their history and relationship, indeed, these labels have sometimes been employed inexactly and interchangeably. In some narratives, Bolshevization dates from 1924 and was completed from 1929. In others, the Comintern and its affiliates were Stalinized from 1924, in still others, from 1929. The historiography of the Soviet Union, in contrast, includes forensic interrogation of Bolshevism and Stalinism, their meaning, periodization and consequences as well as the continuities and disjunctures between them. This work has been overlooked by historians of the American Workers’ Party and the British Communist Party. The present article assesses both literatures. It utilizes insights from Sovietologists to argue that Stalinism constituted a politics and practice connected with but distinct from Bolshevism. Reviewing Comintern and party history, it proposes a specific periodization. State Bolshevism, 1919–1923, saw subjugation of the American and British parties to Russian imperatives. Incipient Stalinism, 1924–1928, witnessed restructuring of the politics of subordination. From 1929, Stalinization accomplished a distinctive subordination. It enthroned a politics and practice foreign to that of Lenin and the Bolsheviks which endured, through different phases, until the 1950s.     

Interpersonal violence by authoritarian rulers: Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin compared

Why do some authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, kill or torture other people personally, whereas others, like Joseph Stalin, delegate such violence to subordinates? Such politically motivated interpersonal violence committed by authoritarian leaders has never before been theorized. Through a comparison of Hussein and Stalin, we explain why some dictators engage in this behavior and others do not. We propose a model based on three components: the individual's prior habituation or non-habituation to violence; regime characteristics that ‘select for’ a personally violent or non-violent ruler; and, once a ruler takes power, the interaction of the first two variables. We also suggest that most communist regimes featured organizational characteristics that discouraged such violence by the leader.