Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective

This article discusses the conditions of failure and success of pro-democracy semi-oppositions to authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of the last phase of the Portuguese authoritarian regime (1968–1974). It specifies and reformulates Juan Linz's concept of semi-opposition. In Portugal, contrary to Linz's argument, the moderate pro-democracy semi-oppositions participated in the regime's electoral moments and tended to take the greatest possible advantage of these periods so as to discredit the regime and to demonstrate that it could not be transformed from within. In order to make sense of this paradox, scholars should look at the institutional legacies and frameworks of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, we argue that the Portuguese semi-opposition failed because the institutional heritage of the Estado Novo, at the moment of the leadership succession, provided no opportunities for a reformist democratizing coalition to assert itself and promoted instead the radicalization of the semi-opposition. Paradoxically, it was the more liberal institutional framework of the regime that made a political change guided by the democratic semi-opposition impracticable.     

Military extrication and temporary democracy: the case of Pakistan

Pakistan's 1988 transition to democracy defies most of the conventional wisdom on democratization as well as the bulk of the literature on democratic transitions. This peculiar case can be understood as a case of ‘temporary democracy’, in which democracy emerges as a short-term outcome that is not likely to be sustained. Pakistan's military leaders chose to democratize because of the high short-term costs of repression coupled with the low long-term costs of allowing democracy. The authoritarian elite agreed to allow democratization knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidation were dim. In this sense, the same factors that made the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy unlikely made the transition possible.     

Opportunities and constraints: comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the coloured revolutions

Nearly two years after removal of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia and Egypt are still in transition: gains made by early 2013 remain tenuous, and whether democracy takes root remains to be seen. This article identifies variables affecting these states' prospects for democratic development by drawing lessons from the post-communist coloured revolutions of the early 2000s, when democratic forces had difficulty consolidating initial gains. Based on these cases, we suggest that choices available to political actors, in particular the ability of democratic opposition forces to maintain unity and support a common transition platform, and their success in removing old regime elites, will be crucial in the post-Arab Spring environment. However, we also examine structural variables, including the nature of the ousted authoritarian regime and external leverage, which point to differences between the coloured revolutions and MENA uprisings and suggest limits to cross-regional comparison.     

Party matters: the institutional origins of competitive hegemony in Tanzania

Electoral authoritarianism has emerged as a primary mode of authoritarian rule in the post-Cold War era. It is also a notably heterogeneous phenomenon, in terms of both its impact upon incumbents and the quality of contestation. This article investigates a specific type of electoral authoritarian outcome, a competitive hegemony. In competitive hegemonies regimes are able to dominate elections by large vote margins, but with comparatively much lower levels of electoral fraud and coercion. Using a case study of Tanzania and its ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), this article argues that distinct investments made under single-party rule into party institutionalization and the incorporation of subsistence-based peasants provided CCM with additional sources of elite cohesion, strong mobilization capacity, and therefore greater stability. The article shows how during multiparty elections elite defection has in fact been minimal, and voting patterns largely coincide with infrastructural investments made as part of Tanzania's socialist development programme, ujamaa. Moreover, while Tanzania's opposition parties have made important strides in recent years in terms of institutionalization, they are still precluded from competing effectively in large portions of the country where demand for new parties is low.     

The election trap: the cycle of post-electoral repression and opposition fragmentation in Lukashenko's Belarus

Recent work on competitive authoritarianism has not explored the full consequences of electoral participation for opposition movements. While prominent work argues that the government must employ a mix of side-payments and repression to fragment opposition to its rule, Belarus’ history since the ascension of President Alexander Lukashenko in 1994 shows that the opposition has been repressed after most parliamentary and presidential elections without any substantial co-optation. I argue that electoral contestation and subsequent post-electoral repression have led to the Belarusian opposition's fragmented state. This state is grounded in competition for foreign aid, which creates a need among Belarusian opposition leaders to demonstrate their ability to mobilize support through campaigns. Invariably, successful opposition leaders emerge as the principal challengers to the regime, leading to their arrest or exile. Repression then fosters division within anti-government movements and restarts the cycle for new aid-seeking parties and leaders. A quantitative test establishes that repression concentrates in post-electoral periods and a qualitative assessment shows that opposition fragmentation stems from the arrest or exile of opposition leaders. The empirical findings provide contrasting evidence to work on co-optation in autocracies while suggesting an adverse effect of foreign democracy assistance around the world.     

Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Why do some Arab citizens regard democracy favourably but see it as unsuitable for their country? Modernization theory contends that economic development creates modern citizens who demand democracy. Cultural theories see Islam and democracy as incompatible. Government performance theories argue that citizens who perceive the current authoritarian government as acting in a transparent manner will demand greater democracy. I argue that attitudes toward democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences, including those related to sectarianism. I test this consequence-based theory using Arab Barometer data from six nations. Sixty percent hold favourable views of democracy generally and for their country, while 7% reject democracy. Twenty-seven percent support democracy generally but see it as unsuitable for their country. Beliefs that democracy will have negative consequences and perceptions of poor government performance are the most important predictors of democracy's unsuitability. Modernization theory receives support, but Islamic identity and beliefs do not consistently predict attitudes in the expected direction. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of Arab public opinion and suggest that concerns about the consequences of free elections affect support for democracy as much as assessments of the political and economic performance of the current authoritarian regime.     

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.     

Prevalence of sexual abuse in organised competitive sport in Australia

Abstract

This article reports the first phase of a three-phase research programme investigating the prevalence and long-term sequelae associated with sexual abuse in a non-psychiatric sample of male and female Australian athletes. A cross-sectional, retrospective design, using a mailed survey, provided a quantitative assessment of sexual abuse prevalence in a national sample of elite athletes and a regional sample of club athletes. Results from the total sample (n = 370) revealed that 31% of female and 21% of male athletes reported experiencing sexual abuse at some time in their lives. Of these, 41% of females, and 29% of males had been sexually abused within the sports environment. It was also found that almost half, 46.4%, of the elite group reporting sexual abuse had been sexually abused by sports personnel. For the club group, this figure was 25.6%. Implications of these results and current initiatives for the prevention of sexual abuse of athletes in Australia are discussed.     

国际大都市文化竞争力比较

本报告通过对城市要素等12项指标的国际比较,分析了上海在国际大都市文化竞争力所处的历史方位,指出了取得的成就、存在的不足,还据此提出了若干对策性建议。     

特色农业的增效增收之路——兴安县实施“新三个农业”战略的回顾与展望

“新三个农业”是兴安县委、政府为了优化农业区域布局，积极发展特色农业提出的“精品农业”、“礼品农业”、“工业农业”的简称。在农业产业化的实践中，兴安主要加速发展葡萄、白果、柑桔、毛竹、食用菌、甜玉米种植等支柱产业，积极扶持一村一品经济的发展，促进了龙头企业、协会组织、种养大户作为“精品农业、礼品农业、工业农业”主体地位的确立，走出一条标准化生产，规模化发展，品牌化经营和农户共同发展的特色农业的增效增收之路。