坚持和巩固马克思主义指导思想的一元化——兼论西方“普世价值”观的本质

近年来,国内外某些人鼓吹和宣扬的以民主、自由、人权等为主要内容的“普世价值”观,实际上是资产阶级在当今世界实行西化、和平演变和“颜色革命”的工具。社会主义社会是高度重视和发展民主、自由、人权的社会;坚持和完善社会主义民主、自由、人权,是中国特色社会主义发展的重要任务。在社会意识形态领域中,必须毫不动摇地坚持马克思主义指导思想的一元化。     

从十六大到十七大：中国共产党党内民主的逻辑演绎进程

党的十六大以来,从提出“党内民主是党的生命”到“要以扩大党内民主带动人民民主,以增进党内和谐促进社会和谐”的论断,中国共产党在新的历史条件下,根据世情、国情、党情的变化和新形势新任务对党的建设提出的新要求．把推进党内民主建设作为保持和发展党的先进性和加强党的执政能力的一项根本性建设,以改革创新的精神积极发展党内民主,在理论和实践上取得了重要进展。     

国际法基本属性之思辨

以法学基本理论为依据,采用比较研究的方法,辨析了国际法的基本属性.国际法具有法的一般性质--规范性和强制性.国际法比国内法具有更显著的平等性和民主性.无论作为法的一个部门,还是作为一个法律体系,国际法都是独立的.     

Between Christian and multicultural democracy: religious legacies and minority politics

The article presents a comparative analysis of the religious underpinnings of 19 liberal democracies in the West and their relevance for contemporary minority politics. The democratic relevance of religion is conceptualised as stemming from actors (churches, religious parties) and from historical and structural factors such as confessional patterns, relationships between state and church and degrees of secularisation in 19 democracies with a Christian background. The article’s historical mapping demonstrates that democratic development has occurred in distinct patterns rooted in the Catholic?Protestant divide. It then demonstrates that there are distinct effects of this divide on minority politics. It is hypothesised that in line with the confessional patterning of democratisation, Catholic countries and actors seem to be more resistant to the pressures arising from religious pluralisation than Protestant ones and that, even after 9/11, there is no cross-national or cross-confessional convergence in these responses.     

Risk,politics, and development: Lessons from the UK's democracy aid

Political risks are inescapable in development. Donors keep them in check with a range of tools, but existing options provide little guidance about how political forms of risk can—or should—shape programme design. This paper presents a novel framework that offers practical guidance on how to think about and manage some of these risks. This is based on a review of programmes delivered by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which provides a specific type of aid: democracy assistance. Political forms of risk have a strong influence on that aid, so it provides a valuable example. Our framework centres on two trade‐offs inherent in the provision of aid for democracy support. The first relates to the type of approach employed in a programme; should it focus on a thematic issue or a specific event, or should it focus primarily on an institution and its processes? The second concerns the scope of a programme in terms of who it includes. Understanding the costs and benefits of these trade‐offs will help development practitioners to make decisions about political risks in a more rigorous and transparent way and, potentially, to shift from a culture of risk aversion, to one of informed risk‐taking.     

The mysterious overvaluation of KRW in the 1990s†

Existing theories on real exchange rates predict a significant undervaluation of the Korean won (KRW) in the early and mid-1990s. The paper demonstrates why this expectation did not materialize and instead an unprecedentedly large degree of overvaluation took place. Focusing on three variables, namely, financial repression, devaluation pass-through, and policy exhibitionism, the paper examines how the unraveling of the developmental state eventually gave rise to the 1990s’ overvaluation. It argues that the policy exhibitionism of the new civilian government amplified the influence of Chaebol on monetary policies, which in turn created a strong appreciative force to KRW. It also contends that the increasing exchange rate pass-through onto the prices of imported intermediate goods explains why Chaebol did not desire to tame the excessive appreciative trend despite its detrimental effect on their exports. The paper offers policy implications for other state-led, emerging economies.     

Legitimacy and post-conflict state-building: the undervalued role of performance legitimacy

Legitimacy is essential to state-building after conflict. Yet, the prescribed path to gaining legitimacy is often a narrow one that borrows heavily from the experiences of Western states. Elections are prescribed as an essential first step on the logic that this means gaining process legitimacy can rebuild a social contract between citizens and the state, a social contract that is rooted in democratic norms and values. This article proposes an alternative path, one that emphasises the critical role of performance legitimacy and its non-exclusive nature. Performance legitimacy is granted when citizens perceive that some or all of their basic needs are being met. The article offers a new analytical framework for understanding a state’s potential source of performance legitimacy, how non-state actors may vie with the state to seize this form of legitimacy, and what consequences this has for processes of state institution-building after conflict. In this respect, this article seeks to reorient theory and practice to a broader view of legitimacy and its critical role in post-conflict state-building.     

Neoliberalism,Nationalism and the Decline of Political Traditions

The three great Western political traditions (conservatism, liberalism, social democracy) incorporate three of the four possible combinations of the core political axes: traditional, unchanging authority versus the challenge of change, and egalitarianism versus inegalitarianism. The fourth possibility—egalitarian conservatism—has appeared in various guises, but has usually become submerged within the right, including its most authoritarian forms. Current xenophobic movements claiming to represent those suffering from excessive change—for example, those involved in the UK 's EU referendum and Donald Trump's victory in the USA —are seeing an apparent resurgence of this neglected tradition. What are its implications for politics in general?     

Democracy in Britain: Retrospect and Prospect

The EU referendum has raised questions about the nature of democracy, which is not just majority rule. It is wrong to claim that direct democracy has now replaced representative democracy, as Parliament is required to answer all the questions that the referendum did not. The conduct of the referendum reflected the worst aspects of Britain's political culture of sterile adversarialism. Both left and right have shared assumptions about governing that have made it difficult to develop a culture of democratic citizenship. The political system still reflects its pre‐democratic origins (as in the survival of a House of Lords and the obsession with titles) and the role of money in politics represents a form of corruption. Institutional reforms depend for their success on the nurturing of a democratic culture, which is a task for many hands.     

A New Progressive Patriotism

The need to hold capital to account and to bend markets to the common good is as powerful as ever, yet it is becoming steadily harder to create an electoral or political majority for such an idea in societies that are fractured and divided. The fundamental bond between voters and parties depends on political identity relationships; old ones are fading, new ones need to be created. The most dynamic politics in advanced capitalist societies are those of nation, people and place. The strategic challenge for the left is to create a new progressive patriotism that can embed radical ideas in a common sense of national purpose.