This article investigates links between domestic and foreign policy, topics which are usually discussed rather than analyzed in any detail. The case of the USSR and Lithuania is taken as an historical example of the impact of the external factor on domestic policy, and an attempt is made to elucidate how the Soviets tried to influence and correct Lithuania's policy in the inter-war period by providing financial assistance to parties and their press. In this way they sought to set Lithuania against Poland and fuel the conflict between them, so that they would not become reconciled, would not create the so-called Baltic Union with Latvia, Estonia and Finland and would not orient themselves to the West. Using financial and other levers of secret policy, the Soviets contributed significantly to pushing the pro-Western Christian Democratic Party away from power in Lithuania so that the Nationalists, who sought to establish closer relations with the USSR, came to be established. The overseas financing of parties which remained unknown to the public distorted the political process of Lithuania and hindered the maturing of social awareness. 相似文献
China’ economic boom has produced a surging appetite for fossil fuels, particularly oil. To foster and sustain its economic development, China has taken a series of steps to quench its thirst for energy. The most striking measure is its high-profile oil diplomacy, centering on the goal of gaining more secure national control of overseas oil and gas supplies. Why has China chosen oil diplomacy over directly purchasing oil on the international market? And why does one prefer direct control of oil and gas? This paper attempts to address China’s motivations from the perspectives of both the central government and the national oil companies (NOCs). It is argued that China’s oil diplomacy has been driven not only by the government’s learning skill and strategic concerns, but also by the NOCs’ strong commercial motives to expand business abroad and their management’s personal incentive. Although both actors have common stakes in securing oil and gas from abroad, this by no means can guarantee that the NOCs will obediently follow state orders.
ABSTRACTBringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging – some would say near-impossible – task. The “Minsk II” agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country’s eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which “Minsk II” came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia’s persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict. 相似文献