反对强迫自证其罪特权及其诉讼理念

沉默权是反对强迫自证其罪权在刑事诉讼中的体现与保障措施。反对自证其罪特权强调控辩双方的平等 ,体现的是程序公正观。反对自证其罪特权使犯罪嫌疑人 ,被告人的人权保护获得了空前提高。我国设立的反对自证其罪特权应有若干例外规定     

Influencing the Penal Agenda? The Justice Select Committee and ‘Transforming Justice’, 2010–15

This article assesses the policy influence of the House of Commons Justice Select Committee, established to oversee the work of the Ministry of Justice following its creation a decade ago. The committee has, from the outset, overseen many contentious policy and legislative developments in the penal field, although none so extensive as those introduced following the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. Despite the newsworthy nature of its business, the committee has, to some extent, operated in the shadows of its high‐profile sister, the Home Affairs Select Committee, and has received surprisingly limited attention from criminologists and political scientists alike. Forming part of a wider investigation into the work of the committee, this article examines the extent to which it was able to influence penal developments during the coalition years. This period is of particular interest given that it heralded the end of the New Labour administration and welcomed the ‘fresh thinking’ of a coalition leadership keen to emphasise its progressive attitude towards law and order. While the committee was able to influence the direction of penal policy on several occasions, this mostly occurred as a result of its proactive or niche inquiries. The committee had less impact when conducting inquiries that assessed the government's flagship policy agenda, however. Such findings brought into question the ability of the committee to influence the most significant justice transformations in this era of new penal governance.     

Confidence and Caretakers: Some Less‐Obvious Implications of the Fixed‐Term Parliaments Act

This article explores the 2011 Fixed‐term Parliaments Act's less‐obvious implications. First, it discusses why Theresa May found calling the 2017 election so straightforward, and notes what this implies for how FTPA works. Second, it looks at executive–legislative relations. FTPA removed the government's ability to designate controversial parliamentary votes as matters of confidence, and introduced a fourteen‐day cushion between a no‐confidence vote and Parliament's dissolution. In the process, it shifted the balance of power from ministers to backbenchers, to an extent potentially greater than most observers recognise. Third, it considers the more outlandish possibilities raised by FTPA's imposition of a fourteen‐day waiting period after a government's defeat on a no‐confidence motion before a new election can be called. It is possible, for example, for rebel MPs from the governing party to use the no‐confidence procedure to force concessions from the cabinet. Finally, it assesses FTPA's long‐term survival prospects, and what repeal would involve.     

Explaining subnational parliamentary scrutiny powers: A fuzzy-set analysis of German Landtage

While the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty has important implications for regional parliaments with legislative competences, most studies have focused on cross-country differences or examined the activities of regional parliaments at the EU level. This contribution shows the existence of substantial intra-country differences in the formal scrutiny rights of regional parliaments. We analyse how German regional parliaments (Landtage) have addressed the challenge of controlling their governments in EU affairs. Using fuzzy-set comparative qualitative analysis, we find that institutional and partisan factors (vote share in the second chamber, economic potential, and conservative governments) explain the differences found among German Landtage particularly well. Landtage with otherwise weak parliamentary prerogatives were successful in using the reform momentum to strengthen their rights in the field of EU policy. Combined with the party political salience of EU policy-making, the integration process has thus empowered formally weaker Landtage.     

Whose Mandate is it Anyway? Brexit,the Constitution and the Contestation of Authority

Over the past year, a seemingly relentless barrage of Brexit‐related challenges has besieged the British constitution, which together have called into question the legitimacy of the political system. Yet, although it is tempting to regard the decision to hold a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union as precipitating an acute constitutional crisis, this article argues that political and democratic dilemmas arising from Brexit are symptomatic of a wider constitutional malaise, the roots of which extend far beyond 23 June 2016. Flowing out of this, the article contends that the current crisis is one of ‘constitutional myopia’, fuelled by decades of incoherent reforms and a failure to address adequately democratic disengagement; and that the EU referendum and its aftermath have merely exposed the extent to which the foundations of the constitution have been eviscerated.     

Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Do prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Influential theories of parliamentary governance and legislative bargaining assume that the use of the confidence vote procedure – parliamentary governments’ most powerful legislative weapon – entails an electoral cost, but evidence on this important claim has been scarce. This article provides the first estimates of how prime ministers’ public approval responds to their use of the confidence vote. Analysing time series data from France 1979–2008, it is found that prime ministers experience a considerable drop in approval after their use of the confidence vote that is not accounted for by standard economic and political covariates. The effect size is similar to a 1 per cent decline in economic growth. The findings help explain French prime ministers’ selective use of the confidence vote procedure. They also suggest that political costs constrain the bargaining power conferred by the confidence vote.     

论公共安全与驾驶路权之博弈——以杭州富家子飙车肇事案为例

近日发生在杭州的富家子飙车肇事案引起了境内外人们的关注。在对此案的关注之余，笔者冷静地思索了公共安全与机动车驾驶路权的冲突问题，认为驾驶路权是占有公共道路资源的一种特权，这种权利的行使必须以不妨害公共利益为前提，否则就必须加以限制．于是建议参照关国的相关立法，呼吁中国尽早修改《道路交通安全法》与《刑法》，增设限制“飙车”的条款，依法封飙车行为进行规范。     

特免权规则：美国的制度与实践——兼论特免权规则的普遍性与差异性及中国语境下特免权规则的确立

英美证据法上设立特免权规则的目的在于保障特定的国家政策和具有普遍性的价值观念。特免权规则不仅存在于英关法系国家，而且也存在于大陆法系国家。但我国法律并没有明确地确立任何特免权规则，因此，我们应当审慎地对待特免权规则的移植问题。对于那些体现全人类共同价值的特免权规则，应当毫不犹豫地加以移植；对于尚无生活基础的特免权规则，暂时可不予考虑；对于相应制度具有类似功效且在实践中尚无显著问题的领域，也可以维持现状。     

从约翰·李尔本案透视英国诉讼制度之演进

英国资产阶级革命爆发前夕的李尔本案，作为英国从中世纪向近代转型时期的典型案例，它比较全面地反映了英国诉讼制度中沉默权制度、对抗制和陪审制度的演进过程，折射出了英国诉讼法制现代化的模式——经验主义、途径——历史继承基础上的创新、价值意义——通过程序正义实现实体正义，限制权力，推动法制和社会现代化。     

论民事诉讼简易程序的法理基础

民事诉讼简易程序作为迅速、廉价地解决民事简单案件的诉讼程序 ,得到越来越广泛的肯定和适用。设立民事诉讼简易程序 ,并非仅仅是为了提高法院的办案速度而采取的权宜之计 ,而是基于公民获得司法救济权、诉讼费用相当、司法资源的合理配置以及适时审判等诉讼法理的必然要求