Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878–1940

This paper focuses on the development of national identity and the formation of political organizations in the Turkish minority in the early years of the formation of the Bulgarian state from 1878 to the 1940s. It studies transnational aspects of nationalism, which is usually considered territorially bounded, by studying the impact of connections between the Turkish minority and the Ottoman Empire and later with Turkey. In addition to studying inter-state relations and their reflection in the legal and political sphere, this paper studies the flow of ideas across borders, transnational networks among political activists, and the resulting cleavage formation. Findings show that transnational connections and actors played dual roles. The circulation of political activists, contributed to the formation of national organizations which played a crucial role in (re)formulating national identity. Transnational connections increased political activity in the name of the Turkish minority. Through these organizations the community was able to make collective demands from the Bulgarian state. However, transnational connections carried debates and divisions in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. By dividing the community, they decreased the capacity for collective action.     

Strong State,Smothered Society: Explaining Terrorist Violence in Thailand's Deep South

Why have militants in southern Thailand utilized anonymous and at times indiscriminate terrorist violence against civilians? This article gauges three explanations: resource wealth, weak states, and strong states. I argue that terrorist violence against civilians in southern Thailand is partially sustained and largely structured by the considerable institutional strength of the Thai state. This helps sustain the conflict by providing an additional grievance and it structures the form of violence by forcing militants underground and severing their links to civilians. A potential response would be to trim state agencies and scale back the presence of the state in Patani.     

Inclusive institutions and stability of transition toward democracy in post-civil war states

This article attempts to bring together research on democratization and democratic consolidation with research on civil war termination. The post-civil war environment is contentious and the transition toward democracy achieved after a civil war is susceptible to failure. The side that wins the democratic elections in a post-war state may use its democratically won power to dismantle the institutions of democracy and repress the opposition. The fear of constant marginalization in the political processes as well as the fear of being repressed might create incentives for the defeated party to return to civil war. By utilizing the expected utility framework, this article suggests that former rivals would support democratic transition if they were confident that inclusive institutions ensured that they could achieve their political interests through the democratic processes. After analysing the data on post-civil war transitions toward democracy (TTD) from 1946–2005, I found that the proportional representation system and the parliamentary system are the most important institutions that help sustain the post-civil war TTD.     

Civil Society Influence on International Organizations: Theorizing the State Channel

Abstract

The literature on transnational civil society tends to treat civil society organizations (CSOs) as independent actors, accomplishing policy change largely through moral force or popular pressure. However, a significant portion of CSO successes in policy advocacy actually utilizes alliances with state actors. To understand the implications of this ‘state channel’ of CSO influence, we develop a new model of CSO use of state influence. We identify four factors that determine whether the state channel is accessible for CSOs to use and is likely to produce more effective CSO influence than direct CSO engagement with the international organization (IO): the porousness of the targeted states and IOs, the availability of contacts, the possibility for alignment of interests, and the relative power of aligned state and IO contacts. We illustrate this theory using four case studies of civil society engagement: two case studies involving the World Bank and two involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Our analysis suggests that the factors determining CSOs' successful use of the state channel currently tend to favour a small number of well-resourced, reformist CSOs from porous and powerful states.     

Bringing the Outside In: Somaliland,Statebuilding and Dual Hybridity

International norms of what it means to be a state dictate domestic policy within developing and unrecognized states but must co-exist with internal demands. With a mutual dependence between internal and external considerations and, indeed, legitimacy, at the fore of Somaliland’s statebuilding project and its stability, it is a useful study in achieving ‘success’ in statebuilding and in what success can mean in bringing together internal and external demands. This article examines the impact of the hybrid inclusion of traditional authority in the central democratic government as the marriage between internal and external demands. This article argues that the Somaliland state is successful because it is a flexible process rather than a project; a process that reflects the demands and expectations of society, an aspect that is often absent in statebuilding projects.     

Backsliding and Reversal: The J Curve Revisited

In this article we argue that democratic transitions can reverse, oscillate, or simply stall. These transitions are exemplified in the different types of states we categorize. We construct a model of stability vs openness using three dimensions of stateness, namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. With the additional application of a six-fold typology of states, we offer a robust analytical framework with which to identify and explain changes in state status. Our construct of stability and openness leads to a novel development of a global conflict damage index, which is built upon conflict risk, but considers a state’s capacity to deal with conflict. The paper concludes with implications for policy and the application of the model to conflict prediction when states under go transition.     

First calculations of the total output of Latvia and Lithuania in the 1920s: a comparison

The contemporary system of national accounts (SNA) framework is used to compare the methodologies and to adjust the findings to allow for cross-country comparisons of the very first calculations of the total economic output of Lithuania in 1924 by Albinas Rimka (1886–1944) and of Latvia in 1925 by Alfrēds Ceihners (1899–1987). Ceihners’ notion of national income corresponds to the SNA concept of gross national income (GNI), while Rimka measured net national income (NNI). Rimka’s estimate has a downward bias, because he applied a fixed capital depreciation rate that was too high and did not include the value of noncommercial public sector services.     

Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia

Kasekamp examines extreme-right political parties (ERPs) in Estonia since the restoration of independence in 1991. While nationalist sentiments have been widespread and political discourse has been dominated by the centre right, ERPs have not been successful. It is possible to identify two distinct generations of ERPs in Estonia with two different programmatic emphases: the first of 1992–8 could be labelled ‘anti-Soviet’; the second generation beginning in 1999 focuses on opposition to the European Union (EU) and as such has more in common with the ERPs in Western Europe than the first generation. Following Roger Eatwell’s model for the political breakthrough of ERPs, Kasekamp concludes that conducive conditions do not exist at present for such a breakthrough in Estonia, although opposition to the EU offers notable potential for future mobilization.     

Social policies in Switzerland and Japan: Managing Change in Liberal‐Conservative Welfare States

Both the Swiss and the Japanese welfare states are difficult to classify in any one of the most widespread typologies, as each of the two countries combines features that are typical of the liberal model, such as a large private sector role in the delivery of welfare, with aspects that are more reminiscent of the conservative model. These include a social insurance system geared toward status preservation and low employment rates for mothers. In this article, Japan and Switzerland are characterised as liberal conservative welfare states. After pointing out the key features of this hybrid welfare state model, the article puts forward some hypothesis with regard to the reform trajectory that this model is likely to follow. In particular, it is argued that retrenchment in these two countries is likely to be more substantial than in conservative welfare states, because the private schemes that are going to be curtailed are less accountable to public scrutiny and do not automatically expose retrenchment‐oriented governments to the risk of electoral punishment. The hypothesis is only partially confirmed by the empirical analysis of reform, as Swiss direct democracy institutions are proving a formidable obstacle to a generalised dismantling of welfare programmes. In Japan, uncovered needs resulting from retrenchment and social change are being picked up by families.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.