Government survival in semi‐presidential regimes

As semi‐presidentialism has become increasingly common in European democracies, so have the debates about the consequences of several of its political and institutional features. In particular, in those regimes, cohabitation between presidents and cabinets of different parties and cabinet dismissal powers on the part of presidents are thought to be a source of inter‐branch conflict and government instability. However, so far, most empirical work on government survival has failed to confirm any of these expectations. This article addresses this disjuncture between theory and empirical results by making a twofold contribution. First, it takes into account the internal diversity within semi‐presidentialism, modeling the implications for government survival of different configurations between presidential powers’ of cabinet dismissal, parliament dissolution and cohabitation in European semi‐presidential systems. Second, it reconsiders traditional government survival using the competing risks framework by adding a distinction between two different types of non‐electoral replacement: those where replacements imply a change in the party of the prime minister and those where they do not. Once such an approach is adopted, that presidential powers of parliamentary dissolution and cabinet dismissal indeed emerge as highly relevant for explaining government survival in these regimes.     

South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?

The impeachment of President Park Gyeun‐hye on 10 March 2017 saw South Korean politics enter a period of crisis. Her removal from office, the result of an unprecedented mass movement of citizen protests, provided a springboard for the subsequent success of the liberal candidate, Moon Jae‐in, in the presidential election of 9 May 2017. This article suggests that political change in South Korea is only possible if actors move beyond the politics of personality, and tackle the structural reasons for the policy failures of recent times. Further, if democracy, a humane economic system and responsive political institutions are going to be developed and nourished, the country's ‘imperial presidency’ needs to be reformed. In particular, the current ‘winner‐takes‐all’ politics, with the presidency as the main locus of power, needs to be reformed in ways that promote a more balanced political system, increasing the influence of other actors and institutions.     

Disentangling legislative duration in coalitional presidential systems

ABSTRACT

The speed and actions that bills face in legislatures vary immensely, but we do not have a comprehensive framework to analyse legislative durations. Moreover, the absence of data detailing legislative activities and durations in distinct stages of legislative processes hinders analysis. This article presents a framework for analysing legislative delay in coalitional presidential systems and examines unique data on durations, attributes, and parliamentary activities in legislative processes at the level of individual proposals. The empirical analysis investigates executive proposals considered by the Brazilian Congress and seeks to disentangle when duration means legislative activism, when it is due to political conflict, and when it only represents inertia. Our analysis indicates substantial activities in both content-influencing legislative activism and politically motivated obstructionism. Hence, political conflict is as important a source as policy disagreement in accounting for legislative delay. By examining a hitherto untapped area with rich data, this study opens up new venues for rigorous analyses of legislative durations and gridlock.     

Letter from Ankara

This article focuses on the relationship between discourses of economic development and prospects for democracy in Turkey. It does so by tracing the political discourse of high‐ranking government officials and journalists close to them to show how they use arguments for economic development as a tool to politically legitimise interventions into liberal democracy. I first illustrate the dangers caused by the discourse surrounding economic development to democracy by looking at the Gezi protests. I show how demands for pluralism and respect for different lifestyles—which are crucial aspects of liberal democracy—were instead framed by the government as chaos created by agents of the so‐called ‘interest rate lobby’ and provocations caused by those who want to stop Turkey's economic development. I analyse Gezi in comparative perspective with presidentialism debates and the corruption scandal of December 2013. In these cases too, demands for democracy, transparency, checks and balances are pitted against economic development. Citizens are made to choose between a vaguely defined notion of economic development and democratisation.     

The presidential dynamics of leadership decline in contemporary British politics: the illustrative case of Tony Blair

The presidential analogy has provided many explanatory insights into the contemporary development of the British premiership. Nevertheless, the usage of this analytical device is almost invariably confined to the establishment and consolidation of leadership. This article demonstrates that the presidential dimension has comparable utility in accounting for the erosion and decline of leadership. In examining the Blair premiership in relation to three signature themes of the American presidency – public outreach, personalized leadership, and democratic disjunction – the analysis reveals a set of dynamics that not only provides a vehicle for political opposition but largely predetermines the nature and formulation of that critique.     

Chilean Constitutionalism Before Allende: Legality Without Courts

In the 1960s and early 1970s, two political movements in Chile, one led by Eduardo Frei and the other by Salvador Allende, achieved remarkable victories in presidential elections. They both vowed to bring about radical change within the framework of the law. Unfortunately, however, both administrations failed to achieve their objectives. This article, focusing on the 30-year period that preceded these two electoral victories, argues that Frei and Allende's seemingly inordinate faith in the virtues and flexibility of the legal system was firmly rooted in the political system and stemmed from a peculiar form of constitutionalism, which it describes as legality without courts.     

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions,subconstitutional presidential powers,and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far-flung patron–client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presidencies and public law are still on the margins of this research paradigm. This paper proposes a method for measuring subconstitutional presidential power and its change by federal law, decrees, and Constitutional Court rulings as well as a theoretical framework for explaining when and under which conditions subconstitutional presidential power expands. It is argued that as a result of a gradual, small-scale, and slow-moving process of layering, presidential powers have been accumulated over time. This furthers the institutionalization of presidential advantage toward other federal and regional institutions, which in turn contributes to the consolidation of authoritarianism.     

Unravelling semi-presidentialism: democracy and government performance in four distinct regime types

Do semi-presidential regimes perform worse than other regime types? Semi-presidentialism has become a preferred choice among constitution makers worldwide. The semi-presidential category contains anything but a coherent set of regimes, however. We need to separate between its two subtypes, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Following Linz’s argument that presidentialism and semi-presidentialism are less conducive to democracy than parliamentarism a number of studies have empirically analysed the functioning and performance of semi-presidentialism. However, these studies have investigated the performance of semi-presidential subtypes in isolation from other constitutional regimes. By using indicators on regime performance and democracy, the aim of this study is to examine the performance of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes in relation to parliamentarism and presidentialism. Premier-presidential regimes show performance records on a par with parliamentarism and on some measures even better. President-parliamentary regimes, on the contrary, perform worse than all other regime types on most of our included measures. The results of this novel study provide a strong call to constitution makers to stay away from president-parliamentarism as well as against the idea of thinking about semi-presidentialism as a single and coherent type of regime.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.