组织间不信任与替代性武装力量：拉美国家废除军队的政治逻辑

军队是国家权力的关键指标，也是绝大多数主权国家不可或缺的有机构成，在国内政治与国际关系领域都发挥着重要作用。然而，世界上仍存在少数主动废除军队的国家。引人关注的是，这类案例大多集中在拉美地区。对于这些拉美国家为何废除军队，既有研究主要从小国视角和军政关系视角出发，认为国家规模与国家安全之关联性和去军事化改革是基本逻辑依据。然而对拉美具体案例而言，这些理论范式的解释性仍存在一定欠缺。考察哥斯达黎加和海地案例可知，组织间不信任与替代性武装力量强弱是拉美特定国家废除军队的基本政治逻辑；获得可信的武装力量支持是新政权得以巩固的必要条件。当新政府与既有军队之间出现组织间不信任时，新政府便倾向于谋求用其他武装力量来替代既有军队。同时，替代性武装力量的强弱影响着政府的替代决策。若不存在可信的替代性武装力量，或只存在弱替代性武装力量，那么废除军队并建立或扶植一些原先较弱的武装组织便成为拉美国家政府强化武装力量控制的常见选择。     

Policy Monitoring and Ministerial Survival: Evidence from Multiparty Presidentialism

Studies on policy monitoring and ministerial survival within coalition governments are usually conducted separately. In this study, we bring these topics together and argue that the strategy of coalition partners to oversee the implementation of one another's policies has surprising consequences on the duration of office-holding ministers. Our main theoretical insight suggests that the degree to which ministers behave as faithful agents of the government depends on their expectations about their partners' monitoring behavior, such that when they expect to be under high scrutiny, they moderate their drifting behavior. Using evidence from legislative information requests on the activities of individual ministers over all multiparty cabinets formed in Brazil between 1995 and 2014, we demonstrate that: (1) greater policy monitoring by coalition partners is observed under more ideologically heterogeneous cabinets, and (2) more frequent policy-monitoring efforts by coalition partners lead to a lower ministerial replacement within the government term.