刑事政策体系中的民间社会与官方(国家)——一种基于治理理论的场域界分考察

治理理论是当今世界上颇具代表性的新型国家——社会关系架构和公共事务管理模式,也是认识刑事政策体系中民间社会与官方(国家)在犯罪抗制场域界分时的重要分析工具。运用这一工具可以看出,民间社会与官方(国家)在刑事政策体系中存在着专治与共治领域的治理分工。其中,专治领域是国家保有的专属犯罪抗制场域,共治领域则是官方(国家)与民间社会合作抗制犯罪的开放空间。同时,在共治领域中,官方(国家)与民间社会应形成协同支持、国家主导的伙伴关系。     

Governance without a state: Can it work?

In this article we explore how much state is necessary to make governance work. We begin by clarifying concepts of governance and the “shadow of hierarchy” and we follow this clarification with a brief overview of empirical findings on governance research in developed countries. We then discuss the dilemmas for governance in areas of limited statehood, where political institutions are too weak to hierarchically adopt and enforce collectively binding rules. While prospects for effective policymaking appear to be rather bleak in these areas, we argue that governance research has consistently overlooked the existence of functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy. We assert that governance with(out) government can work even in the absence of a strong shadow of hierarchy, we identify functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, and we discuss to what extent they can help overcome issues of legitimacy and effectiveness in areas of limited statehood.     

Strengthening Green Global Governance in a Disparate World SocietyWould a World Environment Organisation Benefit the South?

The debate on the advantages and disadvantages of upgrading the United Nations Environment Programme to a 'world environment organisation' (WEO) has gained momentum in both academe and politics. This article contends that a WEO would further the interests especially of developing countries, because it would provide them, first, a high-level forum to unite their individual bargaining power against the major industrialised countries. Second, a WEO would assist Southern efforts to garner international support for environmental programmes in regions and sectors that are increasingly bypassed by economic globalisation. Third, a WEO would create a locus to politically institutionalise the influence of non-governmental lobbyists in a way that increases the balance of opinions and perspectives. The article then addresses special challenges and caveats for developing countries in the upcoming negotiation process, in particular whether an upgraded UNEP would address only 'global' issues, thus absolving the international community from assisting developing countries in mitigating the more pressing local environmental issues in the South; whether the new body would have powerful sanctioning mechanisms, which might disproportionally affect developing countries; and what decision-making procedures the new body would have.     

如何建立健全国有独资公司的法人治理结构

国有独资公司在社会主义市场经济中具有重要作用,但现实运行中其治理结构存在着诸多问题。必须建立和完善以 国资委、董事会、监事会、总经理为中心的公司法人治理结构。设想是:通过增加不同利益主体,实现股权多元化;让利益相关者代 表参与董事会和监事会以实现共同治理;建立董事和监事资格认证制度;设计合理的董事会和监事会成员结构。     

关于建立和完善省管国有企业法人治理结构问题的若干思考

完善的企业法人治理结构是建立现代企业制度的核心和关键。审视省管国有企业建立和完善企业法人治理结构中存在的改制不到位、形改质未改等问题,解决的思路是:产权制度须实行多元化改革,解决一股独大,实现决策民主化;企业运营中国有资产要实行问责制;在选人用人上实行保荐制、票决制、竞争制;董事会、监事会、经理层各司其职,相互制衡,加强对企业全方位的监督,实现国有资产的保值增值。     

加强党的执政能力建设积极探索党的执政规律

加强党的执政能力建设,是一项重要而紧迫的任务。新形势下党的执政能力建设,是一项包括五种基本能力在内的系统工程。搞好执政能力建设,必须与党的思想、组织、作风、制度建设紧密结合,必须深入探索党执政的基本规律。     

社会资本视角下中国善治问题研究

经济全球化和政治民主化浪潮的加速发展催生了社会对善治的诉求,但是,社会资本与善治之间存在着结构性制约与依赖的关系。我国政权的性质和谋求发展的政策取向决定了我国对善治的必然选择。目前,我国现代社会资本还相当缺失,制约了善治模式的普遍形成。发展公民社会的现代公民意识,增强公民的主体意识、权利意识和参与意识;发展公民社会的公共精神,提高公民社会的认同、信任、合作和互助水平;培育民间组织的发展,形成现代社会资本的网络结构,对于我国善治的普遍形成具有重要的意义。     

改革和完善党的领导方式和执政方式探析

改革和完善党的领导方式和执政方式,是时代、国情、党情的发展变化对党的建设提出的客观要求。必须按照“实现社会主义民主政治的制度化、规范化和程序化”要求,积极推进党的领导制度、组织制度、领导体制、机构设置、工作制度、工作机制和工作方式等方面的改革。     

社区治理框架中的居民参与问题：一项反思性的考察

本文以治理模式与公民社会的依存性作为分析的理论依据,提出考察中国城市社区居民参与的另一路径。一方面,居民参与意愿和参与程度制约着社区选择何种治理模式;另一方面,选择何种社区治理模式对于促进或制约居民参与程度具有重要影响。通过对二者互动过程的考察,从中国城市社区建设的基本哲学假设、居民—社区关系的理念预设、动员居民参与的理想目标等方面对中国城市社区居民参与动员的策略做了若干反思。     

Hedge Funds, the Deutsche Börse Affair and Predatory Anglo-American Capitalism

Boardroom trouble at Deutsche Börse, the company that operates Germany's main stock market, has recently provoked an important debate about competing capitalist models. Werner Seifert, Deutsche Börse's ousted Chief Executive, was eager to portray himself as the innocent victim of aggressive Anglo-American investors who had bought into his company but failed to understand its traditional operating ethos. In this, he was ably supported by key figures within the ruling Social Democratic Party, who, in order to shore up the party's core support, had increasingly come to blame overseas hedge funds for the development of German corporate governance models which prioritised profits over jobs. I review the SPD's structural reading of the Deutsche Börse affair, whilst comparing it to an alternative interest-based reading. The latter allows me to focus more closely on the issue which, more than any other, led to Seifert's downfall: his refusal to bow to the expressed interests of his own shareholders by pressing ahead, against their wishes, with a hostile bid for the London Stock Exchange. Seifert's eventual removal foreclosed the possibility of an integrated London-Frankfurt stock market and, somewhat ironically given the SPD's response to the affair, as a consequence it also prevented the entry of London's highly capitalised institutional investors into the German market for corporate control. The actions of Deutsche Börse's overseas shareholders might still be seen as evidence of a predatory Anglo-American capitalism. However, their successful removal of Werner Seifert may well have been responsible for temporarily keeping other financial predators at bay.