新时代建构党的政治建设话语的意义、原则与思路

建构党的政治建设话语是现实的且必要的。新时代建构党的政治建设话语的重大意义在于:是加强和推进党的政治建设的现实之需,是加快构建党的建设话语体系的应有之义,是开拓马克思主义党建理论新境界的当然之要,是彰显中国特色社会主义政治优势的有效之音。新时代建构党的政治建设话语需要切实遵循主体性与在场性相统一的身份原则、现实性与理论性相统一的生成原则、导向性与价值性相统一的功能原则、对话性与批判性相统一的开放原则。新时代建构党的政治建设话语需要明确把握是“我”在说话、用“事实”说话、为“人民”说话、与“外界”对话的总体思路。     

晚清至五四时期知识分子的性别话语及其社会文化意蕴

本文主要从性别分析视角,通过梳理晚清至五四运动时期精英知识分子关于妇女解放的话语,揭示女性与中国现代性之间的关系,探讨这一时期女性形象如何被不断建构,从而展现性别化了的历史图景.文章认为性别的变化并不只是女性社会地位的变化,从某种意义上说,女性是作为一种文化符码被纳入到了知识分子的话语系统与现代民族国家的建构之中的,民族主义一直是性别表述的主旨,同时,女性形象的变化也与精英知识分子自身的身份认同危机紧密相关,性别变化背后有着丰富复杂的社会文化内涵.     

中国环境权理论的认识论研究

中国目前的各种环境权理论都没有达致认识主体间的理解、交往和商谈。二十世纪末期的环境权理论具有建构主义的倾向,二十一世纪初的环境权理论不仅具有现实主义的倾向,而且更为符合中国精英的“自然主义认识论”倾向。当下中国语境中主张“现实主义者的建构主义认识论”的理论家们试图在一个弱势的自然主义基础上个体性和群体性地建构中国环境权的公共话语。     

“法律”一词使用、翻译的话语实践——集中于19世纪初期在中国的西方传教士

基于法律的独特语境,“法律”概念的使用和翻译不可避免地是复杂的。在近现代随着各个民族国家交往的深入展开,这样复杂地使用和翻译的背后隐藏着许多“重要故事”。我们可以认为,法律的存在其本身就意味着纠纷的存在,纠纷不仅可能是个人的,而且可能是广义社会的或说民族国家的,后者在特定时期可能是更为重要的。在纠纷中,随着人们的利益、观念、立场或者态度的不同,这种不同同样又是不可避免的,“法律”概念的一般含义因而也会裹挟在利益、观念、立场或者态度中表达自己的“差异”。因此,应当揭示使用、翻译背后的话语实践。     

论教育学中关于“生活世界”的话语

“生活世界”作为中国当前教育学理论探讨中一个重要的价值取向已经在教育理论及实吓中导致了一系列的变革,将建立在主-客二分基础上的传统的师生之间的认知关系转变为以理解与对话为基础的主体性的我一你交往关系。这一转换直接带来了中小学日常教育活动的新面貌,如我一你式温馨评语的兴起与这一转换直接带来了中小学日常教育活动的新面貌,如我-你式温馨评语的兴起与推广,这是对马克思主义实践理论的深化和创造性转换,但是,在将“生活世界”这一西方概念用于中国本土语境中,也存在许多问题,主要是缺乏乡村的视角,忽视制度化教育对学生身体的规训,将“生活世界”概念与普通人的日常生活相混淆。     

论强奸罪应当废除——基于后现代女性主义立场的一种观点

后现代女性主义将强奸视为一种"语言"。借由"话语塑造主体"这一机制,男性在有关强奸的立法与司法仪式中被塑造为身体上的压倒性体力占有者,女性则具有了"可被强奸"的属性。女性在男权社会中被客体化的事实在强奸罪这一罪名中得到进一步强化。后现代女性主义主张的话语转换策略提醒我们应当跳出既有法律框架来思考防治强奸的对策,即可以考虑在社会条件成熟的时候,取消"强奸罪"这一法律语言,达到改变女性弱势地位,约束男权的扩张,抑制强奸行为发生的目的。至此,女性以主体地位进入法律史,性别平等得到实现。     

Protecting people's livelihoods,restarting nuclear reactors: ‘risk recalibration’ in Prime Minister Noda's 8 June 2012 national address

Given popular concerns about nuclear accidents in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese state shut down the last of its fifty-four reactors for inspections on 5 May 2012, the first time the country had been without nuclear energy since May 1970. However, on 8 June 2012, in a nationwide address, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko justified a resumption of nuclear power generation at the Oi nuclear plant in Oimachi, Fukui Prefecture. This article examines Noda's speech as an example of ‘risk recalibration’. The first section outlines the underlying theoretical assumptions, while the second section provides the context behind the speech. This involved the input of political, economic and social actors as they vied for policy influence. The third section then analyses the risk rationality used in the speech itself. The argument is that while the speech is an important example of risk rationality operating through discourse as a medium of power, the overall ‘recalibration’ runs contrary to what recent studies have shown in other areas. In short, it is held that the speech follows a more traditional paternalistic logic of centralized risk management rather than a neoliberal logic of ‘individual responsibility’.     

Refracted axis: Kitayama Jun'yū and writing a German Japan

The question of how individuals navigate a given regime is inevitably a delicate one, but one no less important because of its sensitivity. This article examines the case of one Kitayama Jun'yū – author of dozens of works during the 1930s and 1940s that purported to introduce Japan to a German audience – and his changing rhetorical strategies in presenting a Japan that would be acceptable to his readership. It employs an adapted notion of Bhabha's concept of ‘mimicry’ as a means to understand both developments internal to Kitayama's works as well as their changing reception. This framework recognizes that power dynamics played an influential role in cross-cultural exchange between the two countries; at the same time, it enables a depersonalized engagement with cultural politics that does not rest on identifying individual authorial political allegiances. Drawing on both Kitayama's writings and archival materials that reflect official and semi-private responses to his work, this article offers a closer look at how a particular Japanese intellectual negotiated Japan's place within the discursive space of the National Socialist regime.     

Remembering and forgetting: the state policy of memorializing Stalin's repression in post-Soviet Kazakhstan

The general perception of Western analysts and observers is that the nation-states created as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union all treat the memory of the dark, repressive aspects of the Stalinist regime in public spaces as a symbolic element in the creation of a new post-Soviet identity [Denison, Michael. 2009. “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan.” Europe-Asia Studies 61 (7): 1167–1187]. We argue that the government of Kazakhstan employs non-nationalistic discourse in its treatment of Stalinist victims’ commemoration in a variety of forms, through the creation of modern memorial complexes at the sites of horrific Soviet activity (mass burial places, labor camps, and detention centers), purpose-built museum exhibitions, and the commemorative speeches of its president and other officials. Kazakhstan's strategy in commemorating its Soviet past is designed to highlight the inclusiveness of repression on all peoples living in its territory at that time, not just Kazakhs, thereby assisting in bringing together its multinational and multiethnic society. Thus, the official stance treats this discourse as an important symbolic source of shaping the collective memory of the nation, based on “a general civil identity without prioritizing one ethnic group over another – a national unity, founded on the recognition of a common system of values and principles for all citizens” [Shakirova, Svetlana. 2012. “Letters to Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan's Intellectuals Debate National Identity.” February 7. Accessed July 28, 2015. http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/letters-nazarbaev-kazakhstans-intellectuals-debate-national-identity].     

Limits to a cyber-threat

This paper reveals the limits to representing cyberspace as a threat. In contrast to more conventional threats, the suggestion is that the not-immediately-apparent consequences of a cyber-attack make it largely reliant on official practices of representation. Exploring the implications of this reliance, the paper outlines how attributing meaning and culpability – always contested practices – are amplified in the potential absence of a readily apparent attack. Given these limits, does the cyber-threat then require a different lexicon of danger to both educate and engender a sense of caution? Examining the discursive construction of the cyber-threat, the paper demonstrates how this threat draws upon an established economy of danger – likening it to warfare and terrorism – but also suggests a limit to these representations. Specifically, by engaging post-structuralist literature the paper illustrates that these limits are best understood through an appreciation of the performative and the constitutive ‘lack’ in signification. It thus concludes that the value of the cyber-threat is not determined by transparently representing a cyber-attack. Rather, it is drawn from processes of hyper-securitization and through the establishment of institutions like the NATO Center of Excellence in Cooperative Cyber Defense that retroactively bring into existence the very object it purports to defend against.