食品监管渎职罪的若干疑难问题解析

食品监管渎职罪是《刑法修正案（八）》新增的一个渎职罪。从立法规定看,本罪的实行行为表现为滥用职权行为或者玩忽职守行为。作为本罪的构成要件,发生重大食品安全事故或者造成其他严重后果是本罪的渎职结果,其与行为人的渎职行为具有刑法上的因果关系是行为人承担本罪刑事责任的客观根据。尽管立法没有对本罪的主观罪过形式作出明确规定,但其并不是复合罪过形式,仍然是单一罪过形式,因此,在具体处理案件时,应结合其实行行为来确定行为人的罪过形式。     

食品安全立法技术的限度及其修正

目前,食品安全立法技术是基于完全理性论基础上制定的,这种立法理念是相信人拥有完全理性认识能力,对一切事物采取正面看法,其立法技术特征是以"增进善"为立法目的,因而在力图表明技术指标确定性的同时,导致了片面性。科学哲学家波普尔、库恩的有限理性论则认为,衡量一种理论科学地位的标准不是"可证实",而是"可证伪性"或"可反驳性",在此立法理念指引下的立法技术特征表现为:立法目的并不一定会"增善",但却可以"减少恶"。因此,以有限理性论为分析视角,可修正立法技术,使立法技术指标不仅具有确定性,更具有全面性。     

加强食品行业协会自律的必要性及实现路径

近几年来,我国频发的食品安全事故反映出政府监管的严重不足,即单靠政府的监管不能确保食品安全,因此,应积极发挥食品行业协会的自律作用,以形成食品行业内部的问题自行解决的氛围。为此,应进一步增强食品行业协会的独立性,促进食品行业协会自律职能的有效履行,加强政府对食品行业协会自律的监管。     

论食品安全监督过失责任

监督过失是指处于放置危险状态的上位监督者以及管理者地位的人违反监督、管理义务,对其应当避免的危害结果发生的过失心理状态。危惧感说是食品生产经营管理者负监督过失责任的理论依据。根据危惧感说,食品生产经营者处于保证人的地位,监督管理者不适用信赖原则。在确定食品生产经营者的注意义务时,一定要将其在立场上与消费者相对立的同生产、销售等市场运作过程相联系的特殊性作为最基本的出发点。     

食品监管渎职罪的认定及适用

重大食品安全事故频频发生,许多案件触目惊心,人民群众的生命和健康安全受到极大威胁,社会危害极其严重。导致这种现象的原因很多,但不可否认的是,食品安全领域的渎职行为是不容忽视的一个重要因素。     

有毒有害食品犯罪实践问题探究

在食品安全令人忧心忡忡的社会现实下,"量刑反制"的思路悄然而生,具体表现为在区分生产、销售有毒有害食品罪与生产、销售伪劣产品罪区分的过程中对"明知"的主观内容进行曲解。在与生产、销售不符合卫生标准的食品罪的区分过程中,由于添加物质的标准不够明晰,也导致了罪刑关系的确定性被损害,甚至有毒有害食品犯罪的关联行为被适当地确定为以危险方法危害公共安全罪。目前我国司法实践中对生产、销售有毒、有害食品罪的基本犯罪的处罚较轻是符合实际的,但对于结果和情节加重犯应当慎用死刑。     

Food Brexit and Chlorinated Chicken: A Microcosm of Wider Food Problems

This paper situates food safety concerns raised in the Brexit debate since the referendum and suggests that, although the issue of chlorinated chicken entered public discourse, it represents wider concerns about food safety standards. Food safety has had high resonance in the UK since the 1980s, but Brexit shows how it connects to wider concerns also raised about Brexit, such as impacts on healthcare, the effects of austerity on food poverty, the limitations of low waged employment, concerns about migration and labour markets, and regional economic disparities. Brexit’s impact on the UK food system is immense because food has been highly integrated into EU governance. While food standards can be portrayed as a single narrow issue, the paper suggests it provides a useful lens with which to examine, interrogate and comprehend these wider Brexit politics. The complex realities of food politics and wider food system dynamics undermine any simplistic political narrative of ‘taking back control’.     

Internationalism Under Platform Capitalism: Brexit and the Organisation of UK Fast Food Workers

In October 2018, a coalition of UK trade unions and civil society organisations called a strike across the UK’s fast food sector in support of a living wage, union recognition and the end to zero‐hour contracts in the sector. This paper takes the day of action—labelled the McStrike—as a starting point for an account of the place of the EU and Brexit in the campaign for fast food rights, as well as the contrasting political standpoints adopted by the different trade unions involved in the action. Brexit is used as a prism through which to analyse aspects of Britain’s contemporary food politics, especially those pertaining to freedom of movement, workplace organisation, and the role of EU legislation in protecting workers’ rights. In exploring the international dimensions of union organisation among the UK’s fast food workers, other, more conceptual considerations regarding the changing nature of public and private food consumption and the incorporation of food‐to‐go into the gig economy are also broached.     

Understanding “corruption” in regulatory agencies: The case of food inspection in Saudi Arabia

Corruption is a relatively neglected topic in studies of regulatory agencies. The label is applied to a wide range of deviations from behavioral standards ultimately derived from Weber's account of the ideals of Prussian bureaucracy. This paper draws on a study of the work of Saudi Food Inspectors to argue that it is unhelpful to reduce a complex phenomenon to simple allegations of malpractice that can be managed by disciplinary sanctions. Our data show that irregular behavior by street‐level agents may be deeply embedded in the expectations that members of a society have of one another. It is less a matter of personal gain than of maintaining one's recognition as a fellow citizen. Such behavior is not easily changed through sanctions directed at individual inspectors. Our study does not exclude the possibility that irregular behavior can be motivated by personal gain, and properly managed by criminal or similar penalties. However, it does propose that research should be more sensitive to the contexts within which irregular behavior occurs rather than treating “corruption” as a uniform and homogenous phenomenon.