A hypothetical neurological association between dehumanization and human rights abuses

Dehumanization is anecdotally and historically associated with reduced empathy for the pain of dehumanized individuals and groups and with psychological and legal denial of their human rights and extreme violence against them. We hypothesize that ‘empathy’ for the pain and suffering of dehumanized social groups is automatically reduced because, as the research we review suggests, an individual''s neural mechanisms of pain empathy best respond to (or produce empathy for) the pain of people whom the individual automatically or implicitly associates with her or his own species. This theory has implications for the philosophical conception of ‘human’ and of ‘legal personhood’ in human rights jurisprudence. It further has implications for First Amendment free speech jurisprudence, including the doctrine of ‘corporate personhood’ and consideration of the potential harm caused by dehumanizing hate speech. We suggest that the new, social neuroscience of empathy provides evidence that both the vagaries of the legal definition or legal fiction of ‘personhood’ and hate speech that explicitly and implicitly dehumanizes may (in their respective capacities to artificially humanize or dehumanize) manipulate the neural mechanisms of pain empathy in ways that could pose more of a true threat to human rights and rights-based democracy than previously appreciated.     

The use of neuroscientific evidence in Canadian criminal proceedings

This article addresses the question of how neuroscientific evidence is currently used in the Canadian criminal justice system, with a view to identifying the main contexts in which this evidence is raised, as well as to discern the impact of this evidence on judgements of responsibility, dangerousness, and treatability. The most general Canadian legal database was searched for cases in the five-year period between 2008 and 2012 in which neuroscientific evidence related to the responsibility and recidivism risk of criminal offenders was considered. Canadian courts consider neuroscientific evidence of many types, particularly evidence of prenatal alcohol exposure, traumatic brain injury, and neuropsychological testing. The majority of the cases are sentencing decisions, which is useful given that it offers an opportunity to observe how judges wrestle with the tension that evidence of diminished capacity due to brain damage tends to reduce moral blameworthiness, while it also tends to increase perceptions of risk and dangerousness. This so-called double-edged sword of the biological explanation of criminal behavior was reflected in this study, and raises questions about whether and when the pursuit of such evidence is advisable from the defense perspective.     

Neuroscientific and behavioral genetic information in criminal cases in the Netherlands

In this contribution an empirical approach is used to gain more insight into the relationship between neuroscience and criminal law. The focus is on case law in the Netherlands. Neuroscientific information and techniques have found their way into the courts of the Netherlands. Furthermore, following an Italian case in which a mentally ill offender received a penalty reduction in part because of a ‘genetic vulnerability for impulsive aggression’, the expectation was expressed that such ‘genetic defenses’ would appear in the Netherlands too. To assess how neuroscientific and behavioral genetic information are used in criminal justice practice in the Netherlands, we systematically collect Dutch criminal cases in which neuroscientific or behavioral genetic information is introduced. Data and case law examples are presented and discussed. Although cases are diverse, several themes appear, such as prefrontal brain damage in relation to criminal responsibility and recidivism risk, and divergent views of the implications of neurobiological knowledge about addiction for judging criminal responsibility. Whereas in the international ‘neurolaw literature’ the emphasis is often on imaging techniques, the Dutch findings also illustrate the role of neuropsychological methods in criminal cases. Finally, there appears to be a clear need of practice oriented instruments and guidelines.     

FAMILY LAW AND THE NEUROSCIENCE OF ATTACHMENT,PART I

In this far‐reaching interview, Allan Schore, renowned scientist, clinical psychologist, and clinical neuropsychologist, considers the place of neuroscience in facilitating developmental knowledge and better decision making in family law matters. He details current science on the neurology of attachment formation, the function of early caregiving relationships, gender, neuroscience perspectives on conflict and family violence, and implications for parenting arrangements. At the meta level, Schore describes the responsibilities of the family law system in promoting the development of the child. On the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, UCLA, Schore is on the editorial staff of 35 journals in various academic and clinical fields. His integration of neuroscience with attachment theory is documented in three seminal volumes, Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self, Affect Dysregulation and Disorders of the Self , and Affect Regulation and the Repair of the Self, as well as numerous articles and chapters. He has justifiably earned the nickname of “America's Bowlby.”     

证人记忆的影响因素及认知神经科学检测方法探新

影响证人记忆的因素众多,而证人的记忆准确性决定了其证言的可靠性,从心理学的角度对这些影响因素进行分析并找出应对方法,将证人的记忆提取效率提高到最大化,减少错误记忆的发生。讨论认知神经科学应用在探查证人记忆的可行性及现有理论支撑,该方式在证人记忆检测中将有极大的作用。     

The use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom by those accused of criminal offenses in England and Wales

This examination of the extent of the use of neuroscientific evidence in England and Wales identifies 204 reported cases in which such evidence has been used by those accused of criminal offenses during the eight-year period from 2005–12. Based on the number of reported cases found, the use of such evidence appears well established with those accused of criminal offenses utilizing such evidence in approximately 1 per cent of cases in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Neuroscientific evidence is used to quash convictions, to lead to convictions for lesser offenses and to lead to reduced sentences. In addition, cases are identified where neuroscientific evidence is used to avoid extradition, to challenge bail conditions and to resist prosecution appeals against unduly lenient sentences. The range of uses identified is wide: including challenging prosecution evidence as to the cause of death or injury, challenging the credibility of witnesses and arguing that those convicted were unfit to plead, lacked mens rea or were entitled to mental condition defenses. The acceptance of such evidence reflects the willingness of the courts in England and Wales to hear novel scientific argument, where it is valid and directly relevant to the issue(s) to be decided. Indeed, in some of the cases the courts expressed an expectation that structural brain scan evidence should have been presented to support the argument being made.