工会在企业职工工资收入分配中的维权作用

工资是企业职工收入的主要来源,工资收入分配关系到广大职工的切身利益。针对企业内部分配制度不公和分配无序的现象,工会组织应重点维护企业职工的工资收入权益,加强工会在工资集体协商中的话语权。     

最低工资政策约束下的劳动力转移分析和政策启示——基于托达罗模型的一个解释

文章基于托达罗模型,分析在最低工资标准上涨预期和最低工资地区级差约束下劳动力从农村到城市的转移和再转移行为,并从产业、城市化和人力资本投资等角度提出政策主张,以实现我国劳动力资源有序转移和有效配置。     

Wage inequality across regions in India: Exploring the role of education and skills

This study explores regional differences in wage inequality in India and examine various contributory factors for increasing disparities in wages across different regions in India. Using data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2011–12 and employing RIF regression methodology, the study investigates the influence of the level of education, experience, English and computer skills, gender, age, religion, and other background characteristics on wage inequality. The findings reveal that higher education levels, experience, English, and computer skills significantly contribute to wage disparities across regions. The study highlights the importance of addressing these factors to promote greater equity and inclusivity in the labor market.     

推进工资集体协商，促进构建和谐稳定劳动关系

当前，在市场经济条件下，工资问题是企业中各方利益的核心问题。因此，推行工资集体协商涉及到国家的发展、改革、稳定、执政等各个方面，也是构建社会主义和谐社会的基础和重要内容。     

对英国集体谈判制度形成过程的历史考察

英国是资本主义的先行者，也是最早成立工会、最早进行集体谈判的国家。随着工人运动的发展，英国的集体谈判也经历了萌芽到成熟、非法到合法的过程，并形成了独特的传统：自由放任。这一传统既是英国资本主义经济政治特征的体现，也是工人与资本家斗争的结果，对英国劳资关系的发展有着深远影响。     

辩诉交易相关制度之借鉴

世界各国普遍存在与美国辩诉交易相类似的制度,究其原因在于辩诉交易的实践价值.各主要国家普遍存在着辩诉交易的相关制度,对于被告人自愿认罪的案件在程序上予以简化,并在实体上从轻处理.我国不宜全面移植辩诉交易.应当借鉴其合理内核,打破现有简易程序和普通程序简化审的划分,重构我国的认罪案件处理程序.     

论市场经济国家对劳资冲突的法律规制

西方市场经济国家劳资关系经历了一个较长发展时期,逐步形成一套比较完整的规制劳资冲突的法律制度。主要表现为通过劳动基准、团结权、集体谈判和产业行动立法,规制双方行为,将冲突纳入法制化轨道中。同时,建立完善的劳资争议处理法律制度,作为解决劳资冲突的底线。     

辩诉交易与诉讼效率——基于成本—收益的经济学分析

法律经济分析方法的引进,以一个全新的视角突出了诉讼效率在现代司法中的重要性。在辩诉交易制度的引进过程中,同样存在着成本与收益的问题,同时其成本与收益具有自己的特点。通过对辩诉交易的成本—收益分析,达到定量分析的效果,从而对这一制度在我国的现实应用产生有益的启示。     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.