论跨境环境损害民事责任的法律适用——以冲突规范为研究对象

作为统一实体法规范的国际环境民事责任公约在高度危险活动领域如核能利用、石油污染等发挥着巨大作用,但对于一般环境损害未做任何规定,因此,需要由国内冲突法规范加以调整。由于传统的调整方法——侵权行为地法很难解决当今环境损害中的所有问题,在继续追求冲突法正义的同时也应顾及到索赔主体实体利益的保护,于是,有必要考虑新的系属公式如当事人合意选择的法律、对受害人有利的法律等。但仍应赋予侵权行为地法最重要的地位,同时采用选择性冲突规则。     

被误读了的司法审判?——基于新闻、舆论与司法关系的视角

司法的独立性诉求和新闻及公众的参与性诉求经常发生矛盾,导致两个领域之间的误读时有发生。立法的模糊与不周延更加剧了这种趋势。从新闻规则完善和司法体制内部治理两方面入手,较能理想地实现新闻和公众的知情权和监督权,也能为刑事诉讼程序自治创造条件。     

新闻自治的法治思考——从新闻规范的角度

新闻规范表征着新闻传播的自由状态。前法治社会里的新闻规范是政治规范、经济规范、文化规范、法律规范等构成的总和,它是新闻自治和新闻法治的规范事实。在法治社会里,新闻自治是法治的子系统,是一项具体法治。以法治精神构建新闻法律规范统摄下的新闻规范体系,新闻自治才能真正实现。     

物权法定原则批判——兼评《中华人民共和国物权法》第五条

物权法定原则下的物权体系是封闭性的,不能及时吸纳经济生活实践中涌现出来的新型物权。物权法定原则限制了民事主体的财产自由,违背了私法自治原则,而且没有充分、正当的立法理由。我国《物权法》第五条明确规定了物权法定原则,这是一个不明智的立法选择,将来应当予以废弃,代之以实行物权自由创设主义,以公示性作为物权与债权的区分标准,使物权体系由封闭走向开放。     

公司章程两分法论——公司章程自治与他治理念的融合

公司章程作为规范公司对外经营活动及公司内部治理活动的重要文件,在大陆法系国家一般表现为一个统一的法律文件。但在英美法系国家却大多由章程大纲和章程细则两份文件组成,分别用于调整公司的外部事务和内部事务。公司章程两分法对进一步融合公司自治与他治有着十分重要的意义。     

病人家属参与医疗决定之法律研究

在我国目前的收入结构与医疗体制之下,对于大多数人而言,一旦面对大的病患风险,家属往往是其医疗成本以及医疗后果的直接承担者。当医疗决定牵涉到家庭成员的重大利益时,患者自主权应该受到家属决定权的制约。病人并非如病患自主理论所预设的前提一样是一个自由且理性的选择者,而是一个组织社群所有关系的总和,因此个人自决并不应该豁免其社群义务,尤其是对于家庭之义务。即使是成年具有意思能力病人其家属亦应具有相应的权利。     

个人自主:自由主义的核心价值

自由主义的根本精神是个人主义,个人主义的根本含义是对个人自主能力的尊重。自由主义以个人自主为其目的价值,其他基本价值包括多元主义、宽容、自由、正义、平等等皆以这一目的价值为根据。个人自主以消极自由和积极自由为其必要条件。仅仅强调消极自由会纵容盲目、非理性的个人行为,而仅仅强调积极自由则会走向专制主义。反自由主义者们往往在批评以至抨击过度的消极自由现实时,走向反个人主义的积极自由所必然演绎的专制主义。只有把消极自由与包含个人自主的积极自由相结合,才能克服上述两个极端。     

Struggles for Citizenship? Peasant Negotiation of Schooling in the Sierra Norte de Puebla,Mexico, 1921–1933

This article identifies four different responses to educational policy in peasant villages. Acceptance, appropriation, resistance and opposition to schools are considered as forms of negotiating the educational contract. Peasants contributed to education through legal and customary practices. In return, they sought to influence the terms of schooling. However limited, such influence was possible because the Mexican state had scarce resources and depended on villagers' support. Taking into account the difficulties of peasants' subordinate position, their struggle over schooling is defined as a defence of autonomy rather than an exercise of citizenship.     

Diversity,federalism and the nineteenth-century liberals

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues for the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity.     

Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions

This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘the self-defeating argument.’ We argue that the objection’s success depends on how we interpret the idea of moral permission, an issue Dworkin does not clearly resolve. Against his objection, we advance two different arguments. First, once we learn what role the idea of moral permission plays in morality, we can see that any plausible view of some agent’s moral permission must acknowledge its complex character, and that the existence of a moral permission must have some impact on the balance of moral reasons for other agents. On this understanding, it is false that it follows solely from external skepticism that everything is permissible. Second, we argue that even if permissions have a simple character, not a complex one, they are plausible only when framed within a moral constellation of rights and obligations. So understood, it is, again, false that it follows from external skepticism that everything is permissible.