China’ economic boom has produced a surging appetite for fossil fuels, particularly oil. To foster and sustain its economic development, China has taken a series of steps to quench its thirst for energy. The most striking measure is its high-profile oil diplomacy, centering on the goal of gaining more secure national control of overseas oil and gas supplies. Why has China chosen oil diplomacy over directly purchasing oil on the international market? And why does one prefer direct control of oil and gas? This paper attempts to address China’s motivations from the perspectives of both the central government and the national oil companies (NOCs). It is argued that China’s oil diplomacy has been driven not only by the government’s learning skill and strategic concerns, but also by the NOCs’ strong commercial motives to expand business abroad and their management’s personal incentive. Although both actors have common stakes in securing oil and gas from abroad, this by no means can guarantee that the NOCs will obediently follow state orders.
How has China's food safety administrative system changed since it was founded in 1949? How can we periodize the process of this historical transformation in terms of regulators, regulatees, and regulatory tools? This review article offers an analytical framework that distinguishes three regimes in the history of China's food safety governance: an old regime of command and control (1949–1977), an intermediate regime of mixed instruments (1978–1992), and a new regime of regulatory governance (1993–ongoing). In the article the regimes' features, advantages, disadvantages, and development tracks are discussed, and the groundwork is laid for an analysis of China's emerging regulatory state. Finally, a new notion of “transitional regulatory state” is used to define the current Chinese regulatory state based on its food safety regulation. 相似文献