西方基于选举的政治经济周期理论及其实证分析

失业率和通货膨胀率普遍被认为是宏观经济业绩的基本指标,这些变量构成了贯穿西方政治经济周期理论文献的共同主线。在一届政府当选前夕,政府会实行扩张性的经济政策,即以适度的通货膨胀为代价以便降低失业率;在当选之后,政府采取的措施是实行紧缩性的经济政策来降低实际通货膨胀率,以降低人们的通货膨胀预期,在此过程中失业率也会上升,从而引发宏观经济的周期性波动。     

Thwarted voters at the 2000 US presidential election

This article examines the behavior at the 2000 US presidential election of the self-described Democrats who, prior to the election but after the candidates were nominated, preferred Bill Bradley to Al Gore, as well as of the Republicans who had a higher opinion of John McCain than they did of George W. Bush. These “thwarted voters” are examined with regard to turnout, candidate choice, and motivations, and they are compared on these dimensions with thwarted voters at earlier US presidential elections. Attention is given to estimating the extent to which their behavior in 2000 was critical for the popular vote totals, and counterfactual analysis is employed to estimate the probable effects on the election’s outcome of marginal alterations in the voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ attributes.     

论中国经济增长与东亚经济合作的良性互动

97/98金融危机后的东亚显现两大举世瞩目的趋向:一是中国经济持续快速增长,二是东亚经济合作全面展开、迅速推进。更加引人注目的是,在这两大趋向之间,还形成越来越密切的良性互动关系:一方面,中国经济增长为东亚经济合作提供了强大的动力和支撑。其主要表现是中国越来越成为东亚经济增长的发动机、东亚出口扩大的容纳器、东亚相互投资的吸收地、东亚金融运行的安全阀和东亚经济合作的推动者;另一方面,东亚经济合作也为中国经济增长构造了良好的环境和条件。其主要表现是东亚经济合作的全面展开和迅速推进,有利于中国发展对外贸易、稳定外来投资、扩大对外投资、规避国际风险、突破资源瓶颈和平衡地区差距。     

Parliamentary elections in Cambodia 1998

On 26 July 1998, Cambodia had a general election for the second time since the 1991 Paris Peace Accords ending the Civil War. The first elections took place in 1993 within the framework of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The 1998 elections were organised by Cambodian institutions with the international community supplying financial and material help, and electoral advice.     

Capital Mobility and Current Account Imbalance: Nonlinear Threshold Vector Autoregression Approach

In this study, we utilize the growth rate of gross domestic product as the threshold variable to construct two nonlinear threshold vector autoregression models to re-examine the findings in Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]:23) that “current account imbalance causes capital mobility in developed countries; capital mobility causes current account imbalance in emerging countries.” The nonlinear causality test shows that the findings of Yan (2007 Yan, Ho-Don. 2007. Does Capital Mobility Finance or Cause a Current Account Imbalance?. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(1): 1–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) can exist only in certain regimes and the primary factor that affects the causality between current account and financial account (and its components of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment) is the asymmetry caused by the business cycle.     

Technocratic attitudes and voting behaviour ten years after the Eurozone crisis: Evidence from the 2019 EP elections

The onset of the Great Recession raised the profile of technocracy, or government by experts, as a contrasting model to democracy. Yet, there is little research on how attitudes towards technocracy may impact European citizens' political behaviour. Moreover, the consistency of technocracy supporters' political attitudes, especially towards the EU, is questionable. This paper uses new survey panel data collected before and after the European parliament elections in May 2019 in six countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). We investigate how citizens’ technocratic attitudes affect their voting behaviour in the European elections. We find evidence that citizens with technocratic attitudes are less likely to support mainstream parties, and tend to either abstain or, if they vote, to give their vote to anti-system parties, especially from the populist right. In addition, by distinguishing technocracy supporters according to their partisanship, we conclude that technocracy is a thin ideology that can be combined with different patterns of political support: while many technocracy supporters have no party identification or support non-mainstream parties and show dissatisfaction with democracy and the EU, another subgroup of technocracy supporters identifies with a mainstream political party and show above average political support and support for the EU.     

Public support for electoral reform: The role of electoral system experience

What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people's willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.     

Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile

How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.     

What accounts for Duverger's law? The behavioral mechanisms underpinning two-party convergence in India

Duverger's Law states the single-member district plurality rules should produce two-party competition. In district-level election races where this expectation holds, what political behaviors—ranging from elites' strategic formation of political parties to voters' strategic abandonment of losing candidates—account for these outcomes? Using data from state elections in India, this article demonstrates that no single mechanism accounts for most electoral outcomes consistent with Duverger's Law. However, mechanisms related to the behavior elites, far more than voters, produce convergence on two-party competition. This article uncovers relatively little evidence of outcomes driven by strategic voting, instead finding that much of the convergence on two parties is attributable to various forms of strategic entry in which parties selectively field candidates in certain races. In particular, elite collusion—when multiple parties coordinate on where to field candidates—is especially important. Data from other countries confirm that these findings are not unique to India.