Fake and Dishonest: Pathologies of Differentiation of the Civil and the Political Sphere in Hungary

ABSTRACT

Almost 25 years has passed since transition, and Hungarian democracy is in a deplorable state. Party politics pervades every aspect of political life, undermining the autonomy of civil actors, treating them as a potential ‘fan club’ of parties rather than cooperating and consultative partners. In order to capture what went wrong in Hungarian civil society, we propose a structural analysis that highlights pathologies of the differentiation between the political and civil spheres. We elucidate how the political sphere usurps the autonomy of the civil sphere; thereby not only does it undermine trust in civil actors, but also undercuts their capacity to perform their control function over the political sphere. In the analysis, we concentrate on what we identify as the ‘fake-civil/pseudo-civil’ phenomenon and related discourses, relying on the conceptual and theoretical apparatus developed by Arato and Cohen.     

The economistic fallacy and forms of integration under and after socialism

Abstract

The concept of ‘the economistic fallacy’, theorized most elaborately in a posthumous work, is central to the entire oeuvre of Karl Polanyi – and to its endemic ambiguities. While previous discussion has focused on capitalist and pre-capitalist societies, this paper explores the alleged fallacy in a socialist framework. Drawing on field-work in a village on the Great Plain, it is argued that the Hungarian variety of ‘market socialism’ brought about a successful balance between the Polanyian ‘forms of integration’, in a conjuncture which stimulated household accumulation and promoted the interests of the rural population as a whole. Since the demise of socialism, this balance has been lost. A renewed economistic fallacy can be detected in the era of neo-liberal capitalism, but in Hungary the scope for household accumulation has greatly diminished, and the high price paid by the countryside is reflected in reactionary political movements. Polanyi sometimes fell into the trap of an anti-market, ‘collectivistic fallacy’. However, if the economistic fallacy was dominant in the ‘nineteenth-century consciousness’ which he lambasted, the twentieth century demonstrated the inadequacy of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist alternatives in their purist forms. The Hungarian case exemplifies the more general challenge: how to institutionalize substantivist mixed economies which allow individuals and households appropriate space for ‘economistic’ behaviour in markets to meet some of their needs, without indulging the fantasy that reduces human motivations to utility maximization and socio-cultural complexity to a generalized market rationality.     

Shadowing the elected: mixed-member incentives to locally oriented parliamentary questioning

It is often suggested in the case of mixed-member electoral systems that legislators with close ties to the single member districts (SMDs) are more constituency oriented than those with weaker ties. This article investigates the effect of three career-related variables (mandate type, tier of candidacy and the number of formerly held SMD mandates) on the constituency orientation of national representatives. The analysis relies on a comprehensive database containing MP-level career information and the number of locally relevant written questions submitted between 2010 and 2013 in the Hungarian parliament. Contrary to expectations, the results suggest that SMD candidates who were elected on party lists tend to ask a larger number of questions with local relevance than SMD MPs. Furthermore, MPs with considerable SMD experience are found to be more constituency oriented only among those who gained their mandates in an SMD.     

Shocks and oscillations: The political economy of Hungary

While economic voting studies exist for the new democracies in post-communist Europe, time-series vote functions are scarce. Here, we fill this void by testing how public support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) responds to political shocks and economic oscillations, using monthly data from 2002 to 2009 (N = 83). As the economy fluctuates, on both objective and subjective measures, Hungarians reward or punish the Prime Minister’s party in the traditional manner. Political shocks, including the change to an MSZP minority government, the 2006 riots, and the IMF bailout, induced increased support for the party while troops in Iraq and the election campaign led Hungarians to be less supportive of the party. Clearly, government support in Hungary can be explained in political economic terms, despite the newness of democracy and the severe economic uncertainties of the times.     

Competition and turnout revisited: The importance of measuring expected closeness accurately

This study aims at contributing to the literature on the effect of political competition on electoral participation. I test the Downsian Closeness Hypothesis (DCH) on data from runoffs in general elections in Hungary. The expected closeness of the runoffs is proxied with first round margins of victory. The findings of the paper are consistent with the DCH: increases in margins between two parties in the first round significantly decrease turnout in the second, even when turnout in the first round is controlled for. This is in line with the theoretical considerations of the DCH but contrary to a large part of the existing empirical literature. The estimates of closeness are substantially greater than in previous papers and suggest that previous studies of the DCH using actual closeness as a proxy for expected closeness encountered a serious measurement error problem.     

Populists in government? Hungary's “system of national cooperation”

This article considers Hungary's political system from 2010 to 2014 with Fidesz in power and domestic and international actors’ responses to the challenge of populists-in-government. The article argues that domestic responses were weakened by Fidesz’ use of its supermajority for a partisan redrafting of the country's constitutional order, but also by its mainstream competitors’ failure to offer a contrasting yet positive vision for the electorate. External actors, and the European Union (EU) in particular, may therefore have emerged as the main bulwark against the effects of populists-in-government. However, the EU was relatively ill-equipped to deal with systemic violations of the common values of the Union with respect to its member states, and arguably even the available measures were not used to their full potential. The main explanation for this lies in Fidesz’ origins: rather than starting its life on the fringes of the electoral space, the party had been the major, mainstream centre-right alternative. This position in Hungary's party system had in turn endowed Fidesz with strong transnational links which outlasted the party's own transformation and continued to act to dampen EU action.     

Hungary's punitive turn: The shift from welfare to workfare

The Hungarian post-communist welfare state was created under the neoliberal influence of international organisations while retaining lots of elements of solidarity. The growing social tensions in the mid-2000s due to a second economic crisis in the new millennium led first the left then the right wing governments to shift the post-communist welfare state into a punitive type of workfare system. The article concludes that the political populism of the mid-2000s leading to an undemocratic governance by the 2010s better explains this paradigm shift than – as many authors argue - the neoliberal influence frame.     

Spatializing the future: financial expectations,EU convergence and the Eastern European Forex mortgage crisis

Existing accounts of failure to predict the financial crisis focus on the complexity of the financial system, and are less useful for understanding crises in non-securitized markets. We examine the roots of optimism leading up to the Eastern European mortgage crisis through the case of Hungary, and use recent theories of expectations, which understand them as both pragmatic and fictional practices that commonly incorporate narratives. Based on archival research and interviews with bankers, regulators and legislators, we demonstrate how the EU convergence narrative was central in forming optimistic expectations. Fusing the underspecified convergence process with an orientalist geographical imaginary, this narrative and its associated measures translated growing indebtedness as ‘catching up’ with Europe, de-emphasized exchange rate risk through a belief in European convergence and precluded crisis scenarios originating in the European Union. Our findings contribute to theories of how economic expectations are formed, stabilized and maintained by developing the concept of ‘spatializing the future’, denoting practices that handle uncertainty by charting the future as movement in concrete geographical or abstract space, along externally verifiable pathways.     

How Migration Experience Affects the Acceptance and Active Support of Refugees? Philanthropy and Paid Work of Hungarian Migrants in the German Immigrant Service

Abstract

The paper examines migration experience and migrant solidarity within a differential migration system. The paper unfolds how Hungarians living in Germany have become involved in refugee support (either in form of voluntary or paid work), and how their engagement relates to their own experience of migration. Concerning applied methods the paper is based on a quantitative online survey and qualitative interviews.     

Vehicles of opposition influence or agents of the governing majority? Legislative committees and private members’ bills in the Hungarian Országgyűlés and the Israeli Knesset

ABSTRACT

In this article, we assess the role and the strength of the legislative committee system of two legislatures: the Hungarian Országgy?lés and the Israeli Knesset, by looking at the fate of private member bills over the past four legislative cycles (1998–2014 in Hungary and 2006–2019 in Israel). We find that Israeli committees allow opposition PMBs to succeed at a significantly higher rate than Hungarian committees do, even though the formal properties of the two committee systems are very similar: during the examined period, more than one-fifth of the laws that were passed by the Knesset were initiated as opposition sponsored PMB, whereas the corresponding number in the Országgy?lés was only one per cent. The central reason for this unexpected divergence in the success rate of opposition sponsored PMBs, in spite of a favourable institutional setting shared by the committee systems of the two parliaments, may lie in the different degrees of party concentration in the two legislative party systems.