The Effect of IMF Programs on Women’s Economic and Political Rights

Though much research has been devoted to the socioeconomic and political consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for recipient countries, little is known about the impacts of these programs on the level of respect for women’s rights. We postulate that IMF-induced policy reforms of privatization and public spending cuts, and the growing political repression and instability following the implementation of IMF programs, undermine the government’s ability and willingness to protect women’s economic and political rights. To substantiate the theoretical claims, we combine data on women’s political and economic rights with data on IMF programs for the years 1981–2004. Our findings suggest that IMF involvement is likely to deteriorate the level of respect for women’s economic rights while having no discernible effect on women’s political rights. The results further indicate that the effect of these programs is not conditioned by political regime type and economic wealth of recipient countries. One major policy implication of our findings is that the IMF should start to recognize that the conditions attached to lending programs might be implemented at the expense of women’s economic rights and that more explicit protections of women’s rights need to be included in program negotiations.     

Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators

We examine the impact of IMF programs on economic performance in 95 developing countries over the period 1993–2002. Three macroeconomic measures of economic performance are considered: the real per capita economic growth rate, the ratio of the fiscal surplus to GDP, and the ratio of the current account surplus to GDP. Three estimation techniques are used: censored-sample, full-sample instrumental-variable, and matching. Substantively, we find little statistical support that IMF programs contemporaneously improve real economic growth in participating countries, but stronger evidence of an improvement in economic growth in years following a program. We find that both the fiscal ratio and the current-account ratio improve contemporaneously with IMF participation relative to the counterfactual, with effects in succeeding years differing little from the impact effects. We conclude that the program-effect estimates of matching and other estimators will differ largely because of the sample included in estimation. Matching by its nature excludes country episodes associated with extreme values of the propensity score, while the instrumental-variable estimator includes those. If there is heterogeneity of performance response in extreme vs. moderate cases, the estimates differ systematically between the two techniques. JEL codes F33 · F34 · C34     

20国集团与韩国的外交

20国集团由20多个主要发达国家和发展中国家组成,旨在国际层面进行合作以克服全球经济危机和改革国际金融体系。围绕着加强金融监督、改革国际金融机构、宏观经济政策共助等核心争论点,由于主要参与国之间的观点差异非常大,预计在第二次20国集团首脑峰会上很难在短期内达成有效的国际性协议。与巴西、英国一起担任20国首脑峰会“主要三国”（Management Troika）的韩国,应加强外交方面的努力,调解发达国家与发展中国家之间的立场,提出在短期内行之有效的政策方案。     

GATT第15条:汇率义务衡量需提防的陷阱——基于人民币汇率义务问题的探讨

国内外论著在涉及人民币汇率义务的衡量时,普遍指向了GATT第15条,认为应当以此来确定IMF与WTO在人民币汇率义务问题上的管辖归属和衡量依据.然而,GATT第15条仅规定了IMF与WTO在经常账户下的货币兑换和国际支付方面的关系,并没有规定二者在汇率安排问题上的关系,汇率安排属于IMF辖域.西方的指责属于汇率安排问题,人民币汇率义务应由IMF依IMF协定第4条进行监督,而不应由WTO争端解决机制解决.     

国际货币基金组织何去何从

本文指出国际货币基金组织构建的布雷顿森林体制实行固定汇率制,有利于国际货币金融秩序的稳定。但随着布雷顿森林体制的崩溃,取而代之的牙买加体制,实行浮动汇率制,加剧了国际金融市场的动荡,频发金融危机,面对金融危机,国际货币基金组织表现低能,只立足于救火,未能建立完善的“防火”体制。     

国际货币基金组织投票权分配制度及其改革:发展中国家的视角

投票权的分配直接关系到成员国在IMF中发言权的大小.IMF的投票权分配制度,没有跟上不断变化的国际经济现实,亦未能给发展中国家参与决策提供有效保障.从发展中国家的视角对IMF投票权分配制度进行历史性梳理,评析相关改革意见和举措,为建构稳定与和谐的国际货币金融秩序奠定群策群力的社会基础,具有现实的参考意义.     

论IMF与WTO在国际收支平衡上的磋商机制

一个既为IMF成员方又为WTO成员方在履行IMF的义务时会违反WTO的义务,而履行WTO的义务时又有可能违反IMF的义务,这就构成了一成员方对IMF与WTO的义务交叉冲突;IMF与WTO的磋商机制是必需的,现有的IMF与WTO磋商机削仅具有框架性作用,WTO争端解决机制在具体个案中对IMF与WTO是否冲突没有解释的权利,只能采取回避的办法;完善IMF与WTO磋商机制势在必行。     

论人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据

西方在人民币汇率问题上的核心意图在于舍IMF而取WTO的争端解决机制,因此,需要廓清IMF与WTO的关系以确定人民币汇率义务的管辖归属和衡量依据.合理界定二者的关系需要区分外汇措施和汇率安排.由于外汇措施与贸易措施具有交叉重叠的效果,IMF以技术方法界定外汇措施,WTO在外汇措施是否与IMF条款一致的问题上对IMF的管辖权给予充分的吸收.但是,汇率安排属于IMF专属管辖,WTO的有关规定与此无涉.西方对人民币汇率的指控属于汇率安排问题,应由IMF依其协定第4条进行监督,而不应由WTO争端解决机制解决.     

The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework

IMF supported programs have conventionally been assessed by examining their effects on intermediate variables and final outcomes. More recently greater attention has been paid to their implementation, on the assumption that in order to work programs need to be implemented. Empirical studies have begun to include political economy variables in an attempt to explain implementation. They have used the concept of ‘ownership’ to provide a theoretical foundation. This paper provides an alternative and simple conceptual framework based on the marginal benefits and costs of implementation. It goes on to discuss policies that might be expected to improve implementation based on this framework.