World Bank Lending And Other Financial Flows: Is There a Connection?

At a time when there is a serious debate about reforming the international financial architecture, it is important to understand how existing multilateral agencies affect financial flows to emerging and less-developed countries. This paper extends past research - which has focused on the International Monetary Fund - by examining the various mechanisms through which the World Bank may be associated with other financial flows, and by presenting new empirical evidence based on regression analysis. Little support is found for a positive connection. The implications of this finding for effective reform of the Bank and its various activities are then discussed.     

国际货币体制的困境与出路

以国际货币基金组织为核心的现行国际货币体制渊源于大国之间的政治妥协，在约束性和执行力方面存在先天不足。世界经济格局的演变导致该体制的代表性受到质疑，全球金融危机进一步揭示出其所面临的困境，主要表现为机构职能误入歧途、政策监督顾此失彼、治理结构力量失衡以及争端解决有心无力。有鉴于此，应当在近期已有改革举措的基础上，在重塑机构职能、加强双边监督、完善治理结构和促进争端解决四个方面寻找出路。     

The rationale for and potential role of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement

This article examines the potential role the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) could play in stabilising countries experiencing a high degree of economic volatility. The CRA is a US$100 billion pooled reserve fund that has its origins in the fifth BRICS Summit hosted in Durban. The CRA was set up to help emerging nations deal with liquidity shortages and to strengthen financial systems during crisis. The article examines the debate on the effect of capital market liberalisation and collates some relevant macroeconomic data on the BRICS economies in order to explore the case for a contingent reserve facility. It is found that emerging economies that rapidly liberalised their capital accounts experienced increased economic volatility, creating an uncertain macroeconomic environment and hampering the ability of policymakers to conduct appropriate stabilisation policy. The article takes the position that the CRA could play an important role in providing liquidity to distressed emerging economies. However it concludes that the CRA facility does not signal a significant break from the Bretton Woods institutions on the part of the BRICS countries.     

全球经济治理:强化多边制度

相比以前,世界经济正在变得越来越不稳定、不平等以及缺少治理。为了解决这些问题,WTO、IMF和世界银行应该分别在贸易、货币和发展援助领域发挥更大的作用,而发挥这些多边组织的作用,首先在于这些组织自身治理结构的改善,这样才能适应全球经济的新变化,应对全球经济的新挑战。WTO、IMF和世界银行的治理改革应该从议题设定、决策和执行过程、领导人遴选以及总部所在地等几个方面开始。只有发展更具多边主义特征的全球经济制度,才能促进国家间合作,共同解决全球经济的不稳定、不平等和缺少治理的问题。     

The politics of market reforms: Korea's path from Chaebol Republic to market democracy and back

This paper studies the politics of market-oriented reforms in Korea since the 1997/98 financial crisis. It focuses on the capacity of the state to implement these reforms, and challenges the view that successfully implemented market reforms follow a technocratic ‘best practice’ approach. On the contrary, this paper argues that reforms in Korea were relatively successful because they were political projects that went beyond ownership concepts of the IMF and World Bank. The temporary weakness of big business (chaebol) and the formation of reform coalitions by the government created a balance of power between societal interest groups that opened a political space for the government. The state regained some of the autonomy it had lost during the ‘Chaebol Republic’ from 1987 to 1997 and was able to implement reforms in a temporary corporatist framework. However, the chaebol adapted to the new situation and used the market-friendly reforms in their favour. The re-emergence of the chaebol undermined state autonomy and with the inauguration of the new President and former chaebol CEO Lee Myung Bak in 2008, Korea is arguably entering the second Chaebol Republic.     

Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality,Partisanship, and Labor Unions

Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs.     

The rise of the Global South,the IMF and the future of Law and Development

Following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis the world has witnessed a re-accommodation of the global financial system. In the particular case of middle-income countries they have disentangled themselves from the conditionality of the IMF and grown into more assertive actors in international forums, proposing new alternative mechanisms to become more financially independent and for the provision of development assistance. This article critically reviews the new reality by assessing the strategies deployed by developing countries to reduce the IMF’s influence, and explores the potential consequences of the rise of middle-income nations for Law and Development.     

Comparative Analysis and Economic Policies with Special Reference to Financial Crises

Policies for preventing or mitigating unfavorable economic conditions, such as inflation, balance-of-payments deficits, and recessions are usually determined by successful policies used in the past, but these policies may not be relevant for certain problems in the future due to changes in conditions. In the past, developing countries with balance of payments problems seeking help from the IMF were usually required to reduce their budget deficits, restrict the money supply, and make other macroeconomic restrictions. However, financial crises experienced by the East Asian countries in 1995–1996 arose mainly from declines in their securities markets accompanied by capital exports and sharp currency depreciation. The IMF provided generous assistance conditioned on the recipients' applying restrictive macroeconomic measures, even though there was no inflation or excessive monetary expansion. The cause of the financial crises was primarily capital outflows generated by defaults on loans made by banks largely for real estate projects, and in some cases resulting bank failures. The capital outflow and the sharp depreciation of the currencies, coupled with macroeconomic restrictions, led to recession and unemployment in these countries. The article goes on to discuss the policies the IMF should have promoted. Its credits should have been used to sustain imports rather than to support currencies and maintain debt service repayments.     

Reviving the Bank and Fund

The missions of both the Bank and the Fund have changed greatly since the early years. And the client base has changed greatly. It is time to change procedures to match the rhetoric about governance, corruption, and ownership to incentives that help to bring about these results. The paper offers some suggestions for shifting from the command and control arrangements to systems that encourage local officials to reform. JEL codes F1 · F34 · O19     

人民币汇率问题的国际法分析

人民币汇率问题近年来在国际上备受关注。本文以国际法为视角封汇率问题进行分析,阐述了人民币汇率形成机制改革的原则和内容,国际货币基金组织与世界贸易组织在解决相关国际争议上的管辖范围与相互关系,指出中国的汇率政策完全符合国际货币基金组织的相关规定,依法履行了相关国际条约义务。国家货币主权完全属于一国内政,国家有权独立自主地行使本国的货币主权。人民币汇率改革应坚持三个原则,即主动性、可控性和渐进性。