Public Administration in Libya: Continuity and Change

ABSTRACT

Libyan public administration has been shaped by Libya’s history, ideology, and economy. It has been negatively affected by the political changes occurring since independence in 1951, particularly Gaddaf’s distinctive initiatives, and by upheavals in the post-Gaddafi transition. Libya’s rentier economy has had its impact on public administration, particularly through its promotion of widespread public corruption. This article analyzes the history of Libya’s politico-administration system before describing the current administrative arrangement, identifying the essential factors that have given rise to those arrangements, and analyzing the contemporary characteristics of public administration that constitute the key future challenges Libya faces.     

Migration diplomacy in the Global South: cooperation,coercion and issue linkage in Gaddafi’s Libya

Despite a recent resurgence in research on the politics of migration, foreign policy analysts have yet to approach cross-border population mobility as a distinct field of inquiry. Particularly within the Global South, scant work has theorised the interplay between migration and interstate bargaining. This article proposes the framework of migration diplomacy to examine how mobility features in states’ issue-linkage strategies, in both cooperative and coercive contexts. Drawing on Arabic, French and English primary sources, it empirically demonstrates the salience of its framework through an analysis of Libya’s migration diplomacy towards its Arab, African and European neighbours under Muammar Gaddafi.     

EVOLVING TOWARD NORMALCY AMID ANOMALY: NORTH KOREA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY SINCE THE DEMISE OF KIM IL-SUNG

North Korea's engagement in the Middle East is a six-decade long narrative. Neither the DPRK nor its Middle Eastern partners have remained still over this time; each region has undergone significant changes. In particular, the leadership of the North Korea is now in the hands of the third generation. No matter how stagnant and monolithic the country may seem at first sight, each generation has had to deal with differing commitments and adapt to changing realities. As such, each generational change of leadership in Pyongyang has arguably had repercussions on the DPRK's relationship Middle Eastern partners, which may at times have been misattributed to a fundamental change of approach. This study attempts, therefore, to probe the twists and turns in the DPRK's interactions with the Middle East since the death of Kim Il-sung, beginning with an appraisal of each leaderships’ priorities in North Korea, and how they could potentially influence Pyongyang's overall orientation toward its different partners in the region.     

Liberal Interventionism

David Lipsey analyses the arguments made by former Labour prime minister Tony Blair in his Chicago speeches for armed liberal intervention in states which are abusing the human rights of their citizens. He traces these arguments back to previous advocates of such intervention such as W. E. Gladstone and Woodrow Wilson. The arguments of Blair and advocates are often compelling in principle. However, in most cases—Iraq and Libya are examples—the practical consequences of military action turn out to be disastrous. Though opposing pacifism, and the ill‐thought‐out hostility to all things military of Labour's current leader Jeremy Corbyn, Lipsey's advice to those thinking of intervening is: don't.     

No supply without demand: explaining the absence of the EU Battlegroups in Libya,Mali and the Central African Republic

Although the sad track record of the EU Battlegroups has attracted considerable scholarly attention, analyses have largely focused on obstacles related to the provision of the Battlegroup troops and to the consensus within the EU Council, hence taking a supply-side perspective. This article calls for complementing this perspective with an analysis of the demand for their deployment. That implies analysing whether and why the EU Battlegroups were (not) considered as an option by those actors taking the initiative to intervene in a particular crisis. Applying a rational-institutionalist approach, this article explains the absence of the Battlegroups from three recent crises: Libya (2011), Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2013–2014). Using data from document analysis and elite interviews, it shows that once a rapid military reaction became urgent, the EU Battlegroups were not even considered as an option by those initiating an international reaction.     

Military action but not as we know it: Libya,Syria and the making of an Obama Doctrine

This article examines the evidence for a putative Obama Doctrine. Its main finding is that a Doctrine is identifiable and is characterised by a modus operandi deriving its strength not from what it threatens to do but from what it offers: a calibrated, multilateral response to egregious humanitarian crises. This nascent Doctrine is identifiable in three main ways: first, it is an attempt to clarify and institutionalise a response to the massive human rights violations that have typically engendered little or no action on the part of the USA. Second, it seeks to recast a series of false choices which have historically compelled an uncomfortable commitment to stability rather than the pursuit of reform. A third defining element concerns the practical application or operationalisation of this philosophy. While adding clarity – specifically in terms of identifying how and when to act – the Obama Doctrine is very broad indeed, raising concerns about both content and articulation.     

The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’

When the crisis in Libya began, it was hoped that the AU would be the one to deal with it under its cherished notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’. However, from the very beginning, the organisation took half-hearted measures in its reaction; its members did not speak with one voice on how to resolve the crisis; and Qaddafi ignored the organisation's call to end the crisis peacefully, eventually resulting in the organisation being over-ridden by the western powers through means of the UN Security Council (UN SC). The Libya crisis demonstrated that beyond rhetoric, the AU does not have the capacity to respond effectively to the crises facing Africa. The crisis rendered the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ moot and demonstrated that at the moment the AU lacks the requisite functional tools to actually operationalise the notion.     

Foreign minister's budget vote address

This article examines the evolution of the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm through the institutional frameworks of the African Union and the United Nations. The investigation aligns itself with recent constructivist thinking around norm evolution and contestation which holds that diverging interpretations around norms facilitate not only norm contestation, but ultimately norm acceptance. In this case different ‘meanings-in-use’ of R2P within and across both organisations reinforce the contested nature of R2P. This becomes most apparent in the prevailing confusion around the affiliated concept of the protection of civilians, which is not effectively delineated from R2P. Nevertheless R2P is found to be widely acknowledged within both organisations.     

The benefits of norm ambiguity: constructing the responsibility to protect across Rwanda,Iraq and Libya

Over the past two decades, International Relations scholars have highlighted the importance of efforts by hegemonic states and norm entrepreneurs to foster norm clarity when promoting the establishment, institutionalisation, and internalisation of norms. Yet, such analyses obscure the benefits of norm ambiguity in facilitating consensus, flexibility, and compliance. The authors offer a framework positing that hegemonic and institutional ambiguity can help create consensus and facilitate incremental reform necessary to sustain that consensus. Empirically, the authors then show how such ambiguity has facilitated the development of the responsibility to protect norm, tracing Rwanda-era debates over humanitarian intervention, Iraq-era backlash over interventionist abuses, and Libya-era norm implementation.     

Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005–2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a “normative power”.