我国侦查主体与侦查权的合理设置与配置

我国现行侦查主体设置与侦查权配置的二元化模式不符合国际"侦查主体一元化"的潮流,因此后者必然成为我国在此方面改革的借鉴。"检警一体化"的侦查模式由于其存在特定缺陷也难以与我国历史情况与现实国情契合,因此按"警察一体化"的侦查模式重新调整我国现有的检警关系成为我国对此改革的方向。独立、垂直的职务犯罪侦查局的设置可以将剥离出来的检察机关对职务犯罪的侦查权和纪委对党员干部涉嫌职务犯罪的调查权或称之为"准侦查权"合并吸纳,有利于对职务犯罪的实际预防、控制和惩处。     

建立健全干部教育内外双重评估机制

干部教育评估体系包括外部评估和内部评估。本文概述了当前干部教育培训评估中存在的问题，提出构建教育培训评估体系的基本原则，分别从外部评估和内部评估两个角度阐述了干部教育评估的主体、内容、方法。     

警务实战实景体验教学法

警务实战实景体验教学法,是将警务实战案例教学设置到警务实战场景中,培养民警的实战意识、安全意识、程序意识、应变技巧和综合技能意识,检验民警的多种能力,包括控制局面的能力、抑制冲突的能力、决策判断能力、敏捷应变能力和实战心理能力,从而达到警务实战教学所预期的目标。     

论老年人任意监护制度

我国《老年人权益保障法》第26条确立了老年人任意监护制度,适应了人口老龄化问题突出、人权保障观念深化的时代背景,融入保障身心障碍者福利理念,弥补了老年人监护制度方面的立法空白.但是我国新确立的老年人任意监护制度仍存在受监护对象狭窄、缺乏具体实施办法、监护监督机制不健全等问题.针对我国老年人任意监护制度中存在的问题,该制度中关键的老年人委托监护合同与任意监护监督制度的配套规则亟需完善.     

高科技犯罪的侦防对策

随着知识经济时代的逐步到来，科学技术的进步已成为社会发展的原动力。利用高新科学技术的犯罪案件也如影随形、初伴而生。高科技犯罪作为一种新兴的犯罪形态，由于其自身所具有的特点，呈日益增多的发展趋势。且社会危害性也日趋严重。本文主要依据高科技犯罪的特点，提出构建针对高科技犯罪的预防体系和现代侦查模式。完善相关法律、法规的建设，提高侦查人员的整体素质等几个方面的侦防对策。     

论邓小平科技人才思想

邓小平科技人才思想是邓小平理论中的重要组成部分 ,其内容包括尊重知识、尊重人才 ,打破常规选拔人才 ,知人善任使用人才等     

论社区养老服务发展特征

社区养老服务已成为解决我国养老问题的必然选择。探讨市场经济条件下其特征,无论对社区养老服务的理论研究,还是对社区养老服务的实践指导,都有着十分重要的意义。     

中部欠发达地区非公经济发展策略分析

非公经济作为我国国民经济中最具有活力和生命力的组成部分,已成为支撑和推动中部欠发达地区经济增长的重要力量。只有不断加强非公企业的能力建设,进一步转变政府职能,营造良好的社会环境,毫不动摇地鼓励、支持和引导非公有制经济发展,才能增强经济活力,充分调动人民群众和社会各方面的积极性,加快推动社会主义现代化进程,实现“中部崛起”的战略目标。     

A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET

"Network neutrality" is the shorthand for a proposed regimeof economic regulation for the Internet. Because of the trendto deliver traditional telecommunications services, as wellas new forms of content and applications, by Internet protocol(IP), a regime of network neutrality regulation would displaceor subordinate a substantial portion of existing telecommunicationsregulation. If the United States adopts network neutrality regulation,other industrialized nations probably will soon follow. As aresult of their investment to create next-generation broadbandnetworks, network operators have the ability to innovate insidethe network by offering both senders and receivers of informationgreater bandwidth and prioritization of delivery. Network neutralityregulation would, among other things, prevent providers of broadbandInternet access service (such as digital subscriber line (DSL)or cable modem service) from offering a guaranteed, expediteddelivery speed in return for the payment of a fee. The practicaleffect of banning such differential pricing (called "accesstiering" by its critics) would be to prevent the pricing ofaccess to content or applications providers according to priorityof delivery. To the extent that an advertiser of a good or servicewould be willing to contract with a network operator for advertisingspace on the network operator's affiliated content, anotherpractical effect of network neutrality regulation would be toerect a barrier to vertical integration of network operatorsinto advertising-based business models that could supplementor replace revenues earned from their existing usage-based businessmodels. Moreover, by making end-users pay for the full costof broadband access, network neutrality regulation would denybroadband access to the large number of consumers who wouldnot be able to afford, or who would not have a willingness topay for, what would otherwise be less expensive access. Forexample, Google is planning to offer broadband access to end-usersfor free in San Francisco by charging other content providersfor advertising. This product offering is evidently predicatedon the belief that many end-users demand discounted or freebroadband access that is paid for by parties other than themselves.Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that suchrestrictions on the pricing policies of network operators arenecessary to preserve innovation on the edges of the network,as opposed to innovation within the network. However, recognizingthat network congestion and real-time applications demand somedifferential pricing according to bandwidth or priority, proponentsof network neutrality regulation would allow broadband Internetaccess providers to charge higher prices to end-users (but notcontent or applications providers) who consume more bandwidthor who seek priority delivery of certain traffic. Thus, thedebate over network neutrality is essentially a debate overhow best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadbandnetwork in a two-sided market in which senders and receivershave additive demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—andhence additive willingness to pay. Well-established tools ofRamsey pricing from regulatory economics can shed light on whethernetwork congestion and recovery of sunk investment in infrastructureare best addressed by charging providers of content and applications,broadband users, or both for expedited delivery. Apart fromthis pricing problem, an analytically simpler component of proposednetwork neutrality regulation would prohibit a network operatorfrom denying its users access to certain websites and Internetapplications, such as voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). Althoughsome instances of blocking of VoIP have been reported, suchconduct is not a serious risk to competition. To address thisconcern, I analyze whether market forces (that is, competitionamong access providers) and existing regulatory structures aresufficient to protect broadband users. I conclude that economicwelfare would be maximized by allowing access providers to differentiateservices vis-à-vis providers of content and applicationsin value-enhancing ways and by relying on existing legal regimesto protect consumers against the exercise of market power, shouldit exist.     

Two-Year Reliability of the Propensity for Abusiveness Scale

The Propensity for Abusiveness Scale (PAS; Dutton [1995a] J. Fam. Violence 10[2]: 203–221) has been shown to correlate with both physical and psychological abuse in a variety of samples including gay men, assaultive males, and male and female college students (Clift, 2001; Dutton et al., 2001). For the current study, 27 male and 37 female university students completed the PAS during the 1998–1999 and the 2000–2001 school years. A 2-year test–retest reliability coefficient of r = .851 was found for women and a reliability coefficient of r = .629 was found for men. The combined sample had a reliability coefficient of r = .774. Moderate test–retest reliability coefficients were also found for each of the subscales.