导入SA8000 促进和谐劳动关系

SA8000是全球第一个可用于第三方认证的企业社会责任国际标准,它的实质是对劳工权益的保护,不能简单地认为它是发达国家的一种贸易壁垒新形式。导入SA8000可以有效地协调劳资双方的关系,推动和谐劳动关系的形成和发展。     

行政问责：运行程序与制度模型

行政问责是对政府责任进行全面追究的一种监督机制。在日渐明晰的内涵、要素与功能的基础上,行政问责的规范效应的发挥与制度价值的实现最终有赖于一整套精确完备且有较强操作性的运行程序和制度模型,并实现行政性问责向程序性问责的实质性转变。根据我国现有的制度基础与行政生态,行政问责的制度模型应当包含行政失范行为的发现、政府责任的解释与评估、政府责任的追究以及行政问责的救济等若干运行环节。     

Coming to grips with corporate governance in local government

Local government, the tier of government closest to the people, provides services and infrastructure which impact daily on the well‐being of local communities. Despite the Australian state‐based regulatory framework, governance dysfunction regularly results in dismissal of councils. This paper seeks to gain an insight into what is understood by corporate governance at the local government level, an area not addressed in previous research. The methodology was a case study of one local municipality in Tasmania using explanatory sequential mixed methods. Findings revealed a narrow compliance‐based understanding, with effective accountability strategies not included in that understanding. Diverse information sources, such as previous employment experience and industry‐based training, led to embedded beliefs about the meaning of corporate governance which were not necessarily shared by all. This study has implications for state governments seeking to find long‐term solutions for dysfunctional councils, and to bring about positive change.     

Who is responsible? The effect of clarity of responsibility on voter turnout

Does voters’ ability to discern who is responsible for policy outcomes affect voter turnout? Although particular institutional arrangements which influence this ability – known as clarity of responsibility – appear to affect how voters form retrospective judgements, existing literature is less informed about its role on voter turnout. This article argues that voters tend to turn out less if they cannot discern who is responsible for policy outcomes. This lack of clarity hinders the process of retrospective evaluations, makes the electoral stakes less profound, and dampens the voters’ political efficacy. Using 396 elections in 34 established democracies between 1960 and 2015, it is found that lower clarity of responsibility is associated with lower voter turnout. This study highlights the importance of clarity of responsibility, as it enhances democratic accountability, not only by encouraging retrospective voting, but also by increasing political participation.     

Government stewardship and primary health care in Guatemala since 1996

This article analyzes the role of government stewardship in the expansion of primary health care in post‐conflict Guatemala. By the time the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, the country's primary health care system was scarcely functioning with virtually no services available in rural indigenous areas. To address this gaping void/deficiency, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (MSPAS) embarked on a progressive expansion of primary services aimed at covering the majority of rural poor. Through a series of legal, policy, and program reforms up to 2014, the MSPAS dramatically expanded primary coverage and greatly improved basic health indicators for the entire population. To succeed in this effort, the MSPAS and its partners needed to simultaneously grow their stewardship capacity to oversee and develop the primary health system. On the basis of recent health systems strengthening literature, we propose a stewardship framework of 6 critical functions and use it to analyze the gains in government capacity that enabled the achievement of many of the country's primary health goals. Of the 6 stewardship functions, “building relationships, coalitions, and partnerships” especially with civil society organizations stands out as one of the keys to MSPAS success.     

Limits of Devolution: Localism,Economics and Post‐democracy

This article challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the alleged benefits of the Conservative government's devolution programme. It suggests that too much attention has been paid to purported benefits and too little regard to the potential risks, and draws attention to international evidence that suggests that the distribution of the benefits of devolution is crucially dependent on its design. It critically examines the case for the currently offered model of devolution and finds the underpinning economic model and limited forms of democratic accountability are likely to produce regressive social outcomes and the reinforcement of existing local elites. It calls for a wider public debate and fuller democratic scrutiny of the model of devolution on offer.     

Throwing the rascals out? Problems of accountability in two‐party systems

This article critically examines the concept of ‘accountability’ as it is understood in two‐party systems and majoritarian democracy – namely the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters’ capacity to ‘throw the rascals out’ is one of the main normative appeals of two‐partism and the single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this article uses a spatial model to show that in at least two types of situation voters are left in a bind when confronted with a mandate‐breaking governing party: (1) when both major parties undertake unexpected non‐centrist shifts in opposing directions after an election, leaving centrist voters with an unappealing choice; and (2) when a governing party that had won an election on a non‐centrist platform undertakes a post‐election shift to the centre, leaving its more radical supporters dissatisfied. In each case, voters have four imperfect options: punish the governing party by throwing the rascals out, but in doing so vote for a party that is ideologically more distant; abstain, and withdraw from the democratic process; vote for a minor party that has no hope of influencing government formation, but which might detach enough votes to allow the ideologically more distant major opposition party to win; and forgive the governing party its mandate‐breaking. All of these options represent accountability failures. The problems are illustrated with two case studies from two‐party systems: the United Kingdom in the mid‐1980s and New Zealand in the period 1984–1993. In both instances, many voters found it difficult to ‘throw the rascals out’ without harming their own interests in the process. The article concludes that accountability may sometimes be better achieved if voters can force a party to share power in coalition with another party in order to ‘keep it honest’ instead of removing it from government completely, as can happen in multi‐party systems based on proportional representation. Thus, although two‐partism based on plurality voting is normally regarded as superior to multi‐partism and proportional representation on the criterion of accountability, in some instances, the reverse can be true. The article therefore undermines a core normative argument advanced by supporters of majoritarian democracy and SMP.     

NGO Accountability from an NGO Perspective: Perceptions,Strategies, and Practices

Extant research in the nonprofit literature focuses on non‐governmental organization (NGO) accountability, framing it relationally. We examine the interplay of several constitutive elements of NGO–donor relationships based on narratives of NGO executives and other staff: NGO perceptions of accountability and of their donors, their assumptions about donor perceptions of the NGO role and expectations of NGO accountability, and their responses to shifts in donor funding. We argue that perceptions and practices of accountability do not only determine to whom an NGO should be primarily accountable but also shape NGO behavior and alter dependence on donors. As such, accountability is not necessarily a consequence of a relationship, but more likely a constitutive element of the relationship. While a favorable response to donor interests might signify upward accountability, it might also suggest that NGOs are more assertive about managing their institutional environments, thereby mitigating their dependence on donors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organization and Reporting of Public Financial Accounts: Insights and Policy Implications from the Singapore Budget

This paper analyses the Singapore government budget's organization and reporting structure, and draws lessons and policy implications for improving public financial management practices. The paper finds that Singapore's fiscal marksmanship record has been poor with consistent underestimates of revenue and overestimates of expenditure. Second, subtle divergences from international reporting standards limit the information available and constrain the budget's analytical usefulness in international comparisons. Third, current reporting conventions of the budget fail to provide an adequate representation of the government's fiscal position. Fourth, revised estimates of budgetary balances in line with international reporting standards show a considerable increase in the fiscal space available. The policy implications of these findings are discussed, as well as some reporting changes which can help improve the fiscal marksmanship record, increase public sector transparency and accountability, and facilitate better quality discourse among all stakeholders on public financial management.     

Recall referendums in Peruvian municipalities: a political weapon for bad losers or an instrument of accountability?

Between 1997 and 2013, more than 5000 recall referendums were activated against democratically elected authorities from 747 Peruvian municipalities (45.5% of all municipalities). This makes Peru the world's most intensive user of this mechanism of direct democracy which is designed to remove elected authorities from office before the end of their term. What are the reasons for this extensive use of recall referendums in Peru and, more importantly, what consequences do they have in terms of democratic legitimacy and government efficiency? This paper sets out to answer these questions by comparing the Peruvian case against the background of other countries in the Andean region. It proposes an explanation for the intensive activation of recall procedures through the combination of two factors: first, the features of the institutional design of the mechanism, which affect the probability of a successful activation of recall referendums, and second, the degree of institutionalization of political parties, which influences the incentives of political actors to gain power between regular elections.