Political values in independent agencies

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The “avoidance model” asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the “specification model” recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The “public reason model” requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.     

Indexing watchdog accountability powers a framework for assessing the accountability capacity of independent oversight institutions

Independent oversight institutions are critical components of the accountability landscape in modern democracies. This paper presents a framework for assessing the accountability powers of these watchdogs. This watchdog accountability index is an empirical tool to assess the key accountability powers of accountability forums that operate in a democratic constitutional context. The aim is to provide a richer evidence base to assess evolving external accountability arrangements and their effectiveness. Our approach breaks down the concept of watchdog accountability power into three distinct, conceptually coherent dimensions. We apply the accountability index to assess the strength of one of the main watchdog institutions in the EU, the European Court of Auditors in 2017. Data were collected by means of a study of secondary sources and by an expert survey.     

弱化与强化：地方政府公信力缺失的理论剖析

当前,重构地方政府的公信力,一方面中央要通过完善转移支付制度充分保证地方的有限能力;另一方面,地方政府要合理定位自己的角色,树立正确的政绩考察体系和激励结构,不断提高政府官员的政治素养和官德意识,明晰并强化地方政府的职责。只有这样,才能挽救政府的信誉,保持社会的稳定和长远发展。     

Blame shifting and blame obfuscation: The blame avoidance effects of delegation in the European Union

The delegation of governance tasks to third parties is generally assumed to help governments to avoid blame once policies become contested. International organizations, including the European Union (EU), are considered particularly opportune in this regard. The literature lacks assessments of the blame avoidance effects of delegation, let alone of the effects of different delegation designs. To address this gap in the literature, we study public blame attributions in the media coverage of two contested EU policies during the financial crisis and the migration crisis. We show that the blame avoidance effect of delegation depends on the delegation design: When agents are independent (dependent) of government control, we observe lower (higher) shares of public blame attributions targeting the government (blame shifting effect), and when agents are external (internal) to the government apparatus, overall public blame attributions for a contested policy will be less (more) frequent (blame obfuscation effect). Our findings yield important normative implications for how to maintain governments’ accountability once they have delegated governance tasks to third parties.     

Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.     

When do political parties benefit from incumbents’ personal votes? Comparative analysis across different electoral systems

Do political parties benefit electorally from the personal votes cultivated by their incumbent candidates? How do these benefits vary across electoral systems? This paper offers the first systematic, comparative analysis of parties' electoral gains from fielding incumbent candidates. The paper provides a theoretical argument on how the parties' gains from running incumbents vary across electoral systems and examines it empirically using district-level election data in eleven established democracies. The results suggest that the gains are largest in the multimember district systems that allow voters to determine the intra-party rank of candidates, but these gains decline as district magnitude grows. There are also gains in the single-member district systems, but no gains, or small gains if any, in the multimember district systems that don't allow voters to determine the candidates' rank or allow it only partially. The findings have implications for the cross-system variation in the balance between the collective and individual accountability in democratic elections.     

Money,people or mission? Accountability in local and non-local NGOs

Little is known about how ownership affects accountability in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This article explores differences between locally- and non-locally-owned NGOs in South Africa. Our data suggest that locally-owned NGOs more often claim to implement downward and internal accountability mechanisms, while non-local NGOs more often claim to implement upward accountability mechanisms. Bigger NGOs also perform better at downward and upward accountability mechanisms than smaller ones. The data suggest there is much these organisations can learn from each other to strengthen their accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, assuming there is a positive relationship between local ownership and development effectiveness, these findings may have important implications in furthering effective development interventions.     

Epidemiological accountability: philanthropists,global health and the audit of saving lives

Abstract

There have been concerns about the recent private turn and re-emergence of philanthropies in world health, with many worrying about philanthropies’ perceived lack of transparency and accountability. In contrast, I argue that while the private turn might have led to a decline in democratic or public accountability, it did not bring an end to all forms of accountability. Specifically, I suggest that philanthropists’ involvement in global health has led to the spread of another, new form of accountability: epidemiological accountability. The latter is a combination of two regimes of expertise and practices hitherto kept separate: audit and epidemiology. To substantiate this argument, I draw on my research on the Bloomberg Initiative – a global effort to reduce tobacco use spearheaded by the Bloomberg and Gates foundations.     

The opposition deficit in EU accountability: Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states

Debates about the European Union's democratic legitimacy put national parliaments into the spotlight. Do they enhance democratic accountability by offering visible debates and electoral choice about multilevel governance? To support such accountability, saliency of EU affairs in the plenary ought to be responsive to developments in EU governance, has to be linked to decision‐making moments and should feature a balance between government and opposition. The recent literature discusses various partisan incentives that support or undermine these criteria, but analyses integrating these arguments are rare. This article provides a novel comparative perspective by studying the patterns of public EU emphasis in more than 2.5 million plenary speeches from the German Bundestag, the British House of Commons, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados over a prolonged period from 1991 to 2015. It documents that parliamentary actors are by and large responsive to EU authority and its exercise where especially intergovernmental moments of decision making spark plenary EU salience. But the salience of EU issues is mainly driven by government parties, decreases in election time and is negatively related to public Euroscepticism. The article concludes that national parliaments have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability and suffer from an opposition deficit in particular.     

Bridging the accountability and transparency gap in inter-municipal collaboration

Municipal governments are increasingly showing interest in inter-municipal cooperation. Often overlooked in the discussion of such collaborative relationships are concerns related to accountability and transparency. In this article, we introduce a framework to measure accountability and transparency in inter-local relationships and test it with a brief case study of inter-municipal cooperative agreements collected from the Greater Toronto Area. Overall, the agreements collected score very low on our accountability scale, mainly because of low levels of public access and poor internal accountability. We conclude the study by examining the challenges of having multiple lines of accountability in local service collaboration.