International Law as Remedy: When the State Breaches Child Protection Statutes

While legislative frameworks prescribe the legal obligations of the parents to protect and nurture their children, there is no equivalent legal framework requiring and sanctioning the conduct of agents of the state who act in loco parentis. In consequence some children continue to be “at risk” and may even be in greater danger once the state has intervened. This is a problem that is not confined to one or two countries, but a matter of global concern that touches most developed and developing nations alike. In this article I ask what remedies are available for addressing this perennial problem and suggest that one option is to use the existing human rights framework embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) which specifies the rights of children. I outline the reporting UN mechanisms and provide an example of how evidence and argument can be used as part of that reporting process with a view towards securing some of accountability.     

‘New’ approaches confront ‘old’ challenges in African public sector reform

The disappointing performance of conventional public sector reforms in developing countries has led to the rise of ‘new’ approaches seeking to overcome traditional bureaucratic barriers to change: leadership-focused interventions like the Africa Governance Initiative (AGI); accountability-focused initiatives like the Open Government Partnership (OGP); and adaptation-focused models like those of Africa Power and Politics (APP). While these approaches are appealing to aid donors in their promise to move beyond the limitations of purely formal institution building, they fail to provide new answers to the ‘old’ analytical and practical challenges of public sector reform, in particular administrative patrimonialism, public corruption and political capture. The evidence is yet inchoate, but all points to the need for these approaches to work together with conventional ones. Beyond novel implementation tactics, however, there is a need for new strategies of sustained political support for embattled reformers who face powerful incentives against institutional change.     

Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: Major Constraints and Strategies

Many Asian countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public-sector reform, but their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. Except for a few, many Asian developing countries are still struggling with political and socioeconomic weaknesses. Indeed, the nature of public sector reform in many Asian developing countries differs substantially from that of advanced countries. Furthermore, the concept of accountability is not interpreted equally throughout the world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to review the major constraints to enhancing public accountability in Asian developing countries and to discuss major strategies to promote such accountability from the perspective of developing countries. This article first reviews the concept of accountability and its development, followed by discussion of constraints in enhancing public accountability and public sector reform, key measures to enhance public accountability, and implications and conclusions.     

Performance accountability in the UN Secretariat – The conflictual way toward more flexibility

The article investigates accountability structures in the Secretariat of the United Nations (UN) by emphasizing the institutional design and the interaction between member states and Secretariat. Empirical findings indicate that reform endeavors toward a more performance‐based accountability in the UN Secretariat have fallen short. The article finds that mistrust between Secretariat and member states and among the member states themselves is predominantly responsible for the identified shortcomings and outlines how polarized the legislative organs – namely the member states – are. Evidently, a substantial concern of the countries represented in the G77 is that an empowerment of the Secretariat would ultimately lead to an empowerment of the influential donor countries and the permanent members of the Security Council. Consequently, the authors identify three main challenges that have to be handled in order to move toward a more performance oriented accountability structure: The creation of a trusting environment and strategic partnerships between the governing bodies, the further empowerment of senior managers, and a review of the current performance management system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

试论我国建立行政异体问责制的意义

2003年以来,我国从中央到地方都开始了行政问责的践行,并取得了可喜的进展。但是由于我国实行行政问责制时间不长,理论研究欠缺,导致我国行政问责制仍存在行政异体问责制缺位。行政异体问责的缺位导致问责不公、问责不实、问责中出现真空等弊端,因此亟需建立行政异体问责制度。     

国际组织与非传统性公共安全问题的国际治理

本文对全球化背景下的非传统性公共安全问题的属性、特征及其国际治理需求作出了分析,并在此基础上归纳出作为治理主体的国际组织的六项公共安全治理功能:问题提示功能、信息提供功能、标准设置功能、组织协调功能、绩效评估功能和外部监督功能。最后对国际组织在非传统性公共安全治理中的“民主赤字”问题及其消极影响进行了简要的剖析,本文认为,非传统性公共安全治理要达到真正的帕累托最优,有赖于国际组织的责任性问题的解决。     

Is the EU held accountable for economic performances? Assessing vote and popularity functions before and after membership

The EU has become increasingly responsible for the state of national economies over the last decades. Meanwhile, many observers have claimed that this increased responsibility has not translated into more accountability. In this article, we revisit this literature and analyse vote-popularity functions before and after accession because it provides a situation when the EU is an incumbent and when it is not. Using Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2011, which were carried out in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, we first show that individuals do not hold the EU accountable for macroeconomic performances before accession, but that they do after accession. Using European Election Studies surveys, we also indicate that the incumbent European Peoples’ Party is held accountable for the state of the economy in countries that are ruled by the EU, but not in countries that have just become EU members.     

American standards: definition and differentiation through nonprofit regulation

Nongovernmental organizations are deeply enmeshed in global governance, as promoters and, increasingly, subjects of regulation. Focusing on the proliferation of self-regulatory initiatives, this article asks: Why do NGOs adopt governance initiatives? Do their subsequent regulatory experiences match their expectations? It investigates these questions through the analysis of InterAction, the American international NGO alliance, and its PVO Standards. Based on interviews with NGO leaders, it emphasizes collective meaning over material benefit: American NGOs constitute themselves as American NGOs through standards, with which they underscore their professionalism and market orientation. These gains do not accrue equally, however, with large, central organizations perceived to benefit most from regulation.     

我们需要什么样的生态环境问责制度?——兼议生态环境损害赔偿中地方政府的两难困境

我国的生态环境问责制度是一项以党内法规和生态环境政策为规范基础,并以《环保督察规定》、环保督察制度和问责依据为主体构成的制度。在实践中,它也拥有着基层性、广泛性和严厉性三大特点。这样的属性和特点使得生态环境问责制度一方面对督促地方党委和政府履行生态环境保护职责,解决重大生态环境问题上大有裨益。但另一方面,也给地方政府带来了较大的政治压力,并继而影响到了生态环境损害赔偿制度的实施。在这种压力的影响下,如何引导地方政府积极提起生态环境损害赔偿诉讼就成为了亟待解决的问题。为此,我们首先需要构建生态环保领域干部容错机制,并实现生态环境问责制度法制化的改造,最后完成生态环境问责机制多元化的转变,以此赋予生态环境问责制度新的功能和使命。