A Revenge of the Generals. The Rebalancing of the Civil-military Relations in France

ABSTRACT

While academic debate on the political control of military forces tends to oppose the poles of ‘integration’ or ‘separation’, the French military tradition is most often described as a case of subordination to political authorities. I examine the indicators of the rebalance of power in favour of the military by adopting an inductive approach based on the observation of the institutionalization of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The focus on o?cers’ professional trajectories and collective resources, gives an alternative explanation of the adaptation of the military organizations to the security environment, that no longer only relies on usual realist and functionalist theories.     

Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using Mediated Condolence Payments

When an Iraqi noncombatant civilian is killed in the crossfire between the U.S. military and insurgents, the victim's family can apply for a "condolence payment" of up to $2,500 as a token of condolence and sympathy. As the process currently stands, the family member is handed a sum of money by U.S. personnel and ushered out the door. In this model, money equals apology. In this article, the author argues that the efficacy and efficiency of the current condolence payment program could be greatly increased by adding Arab-Muslim mediation techniques tailored to Iraqi culture. Mediation would fill a gap in the current program to help foster a constructive, stabilizing dialogue between the U.S. military and aggrieved Iraqi civilians. The author believes that with each positive, mediated interaction — each reconciliative engagement between an aggrieved Iraqi civilian, a mediator, and a U.S. military representative — the U.S. military can prevent today's aggrieved Iraqi parent, sibling, or child from becoming tomorrow's insurgent.
This article was written with two goals. The implementation of a mediated condolence payment program, even on a limited or pilot basis, would likely increase the chances of American success in Iraq and improve the daily lives of Iraqi civilians. If it is not possible to implement such a program in Iraq before American involvement there ends, then it may still have value as an important component of the post-conflict nation-building playbook of the U.S. and other foreign forces.     

Beheading the Hydra: Counterinsurgent Violence and Insurgent Attacks in Iraq

We evaluate the effectiveness of anti-insurgent violence as a means to suppress insurgency with micro-level data from the Iraq War. Our findings suggest that while violence against insurgents increases the incidence of future insurgent attacks, the intensity of this violence can significantly influence the outcome. Rather than shifting monotonically, the effect is actually curvilinear, first rising, and then contracting. We argue that at low to moderate levels, violence against insurgents creates opportunities for these groups to signal strength and resolve, which enables them to build momentum, heighten civilian cooperation, and diminish political support for counterinsurgency efforts in these forces’ home countries. The result is an escalation in insurgent attacks. However, at higher levels, this effect should plateau and taper off as insurgent attrition rises, and as civilian fears over personal safety displace grievances that might otherwise provoke counter-mobilization. Our empirical tests on data from the Iraq War, 2004–2009, demonstrate robust support for this argument.     

Fragile states and the territory conundrum to countering violent nonstate actors

The concept of controlling territorial space informs Western conventions of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The Islamic State surprised the West when it recently captured dozens of cities across Iraq and Syria. Eradicating failed states and ungoverned territories vis-à-vis more robust state-building also forms the backbone of U.S. efforts to reduce violence, provide order, and build stronger societies. I argue that clearing territory, while important, should be selectively employed. Greater stateness does not always correlate with reductions in violence, and conversely not all “ungoverned spaces” are terrorist safe havens. A number of these areas are natural, if non-integrated, parts of the international system. Second, I posit that state-building can have its own negative externalities, such as pushing nonstate actors across state borders and thereby externalizing internal conflicts. The policy implications of my theory are twofold: First, territory is often a poor metric to capture military progress in the fight violent nonstate actors; second, fixing failed or fragile states does not always reduce the threat of violence but often just relocates it, as nonstate actors get squeezed out of areas of increasing stateness and move toward areas of weak stateness.     

Counterinsurgency for wind energy: the Bíi Hioxo wind park in Juchitán,Mexico

Sustainable development and climate change mitigation policies, Dunlap and Fairhead argue, have instigated and renewed old conflicts over land and natural resources, deploying military techniques of counterinsurgency to achieve land control. Wind energy development, a popular tool of climate change mitigation policies, has consequently generated conflict in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (Istmo) region in Oaxaca, Mexico. Research is based on participant observation and 20 recorded interviews investigating the Fuerza y Energía Bíi Hioxo Wind Farm on the outskirts of Juchitán de Zaragoza. This paper details the repressive techniques employed by state, private and informal authorities against popular opposition to the construction of the Bíi Hioxo wind park on communal land. Providing background on Juchitán, social property and counterinsurgency in Southern Mexico, this paper analyzes the development of the Bíi Hioxo wind park. It further explores the emergence of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ counterinsurgency techniques used to pacify resistance against the wind park, enabling its completion next to the Lagoon Superior in October 2014. Discussing the ‘greening of counterinsurgency’, this contribution concludes that the Bíi Hioxo wind park has spawned social divisions and violent conflict, and intervened in the sensitive cultural fabric of Istmeño life.     

Bringing the Insurgents Back In: Early Wars in British India

What role do weaker actors play in determining the outcomes of irregular wars? The literature on counterinsurgency outcomes has tended to explain weak-side victory either as a result of informational asymmetries caused by constraints on counterinsurgent forces, or as a result of suboptimal strategic choices by the state. We suggest that this underplays the role of insurgents themselves; we attempt to “bring the insurgents back in,” giving variation in insurgent polity a role in explaining their own victories and defeats. In order to do so, we focus inductively on a relatively novel pool of cases: Great Britain's wars in India from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Doing so allows us to hold the counterinsurgent side constant while evaluating variance among the insurgents themselves. We find that variance on the insurgent side is indeed significant in determining outcomes, and suggest possible reasons why this occurs.