货币一体化政策的时空分异研究——基于欧元区国家异质性的实证分析

欧元区的经济动荡需要重新考量货币一体化的政策效果。文章基于创新要素的内生增长模型对欧元区成员国的经济行为进行模拟,并利用其经济发展数据,对政策效应进行评估。结果发现：统一的货币政策将促进区内国家的分工,在经济环境较好时,实力较弱国家会因为资本流入而获得经济发展;当经济环境恶化时,资本回流将导致国家间经济分化。因此,选择合适的一体化政策、保护并扶持战略性产业、提高本国经济实力是实现区域合作的重要前提。     

The target strikes back: explaining countersanctions and Russia’s strategy of differentiated retaliation

This article analyzes Russia’s retaliatory food embargo, explaining why the Russian government banned some imports from the West but refrained from banning a range of equally plausible others. I argue that Moscow was following a strategy of differentiated retaliation when selecting which imports to embargo. The countersanctions were not designed to mete out equal punishment on all members of the sanctioning coalition. Rather, Russia purposefully crafted the policy to inflict greater economic damage on some states than others. Utilizing an original data-set on all agricultural and food products that Russia imports, I demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, imports of sizeable commercial value to countries the Kremlin has long viewed as the mainstays of anti-Russian policies were far more likely to have been banned. In contrast, the evidence shows that Moscow stayed its hand in dealing with Europe’s major powers. This analysis both illuminates the policy objectives being pursued by a leading actor in world politics, as well as lays the groundwork for theoretically understanding the geostrategic, political, and economic drivers of countersanctions.     

Discordant Allies: Trans-Tasman Relations in the Aftermath of the ANZUS Treaty, 1951–1955

Contrary to popular belief, the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty did little to encourage an immediate closer political relationship between Australia and New Zealand. The Tasman powers disagreed on major strategic issues and cooperation was minimal (and in some cases entirely absent). Focusing on the development of trans-Tasman relations between 1951 and 1955, this article examines Australian and New Zealand views pertaining to the scope and implementation of the ANZUS Treaty, proposals for the Five Power Staff Agency in Southeast Asia, the “United Action” proposal during the 1954 Indochina Crisis and the “Operation Oracle” project during the 1954–1955 Quemoy–Matsu Crisis. This article advances the conclusion that Australia and New Zealand mainly disagreed on these issues due to competing views about their respective political relationships with the United States and Britain. In other words, in the immediate post-treaty period, closer trans-Tasman political relations were ultimately hindered by strong divisions over accepting the United States instead of Britain as the cornerstone of their respective foreign policies.