Do Provincial Governors Control National Legislators? Quasi-Experimental Evidence of Argentine Federalism

Do governors control the behaviour of legislators from their provinces and parties in the national congress? The aim of the article is to test gubernatorial subnational political influence on national legislators. I first discuss the problems of the logic behind empirical exercises that measure the legislative influence of governors. Then the study tests gubernatorial influence using quasi-experimental evidence from Argentina, a federalism that bears all the hallmarks for governors to be central actors in the legislative arena. The results support the hypothesis that governors influence the behaviour of legislators from their provinces and parties in the national congress.     

Federalism Dreaming? Re‐imagining the Governance of Australian Landscapes

We propose a re‐imagining of Australian federalism in response to the White Paper on Reform of the Australian Federation. We acknowledge the unique nature and existing strengths and challenges confronting the Australian federation. In so doing we argue the value of listening to the history of the land in connection with its people and bringing landscape lessons into federation calculations moving forward. The distinctiveness of our federalism dreaming is distinguished from traditional calls for regionalism or regionalization.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

新形势下人大财政监督职能之建构简

《宪法》将人民代表大会制度规定为我国的根本政治制度,并赋予人大立法权、监督权、重大事项决定权和任免权的职能。其中,监督权更是起到了约束政府权力的关键性作用,应充分贯彻于预算的整个过程。在社会主义法律体系已经形成的新形势下,人大在进一步完善立法的同时,亟须“一体两翼”地着力加强预算监督,促进工作重点向强化预算审批职能方面转移,不断提高理财治国能力,推动国家治理模式的现代化转型,从而与公共财政、良法善治的理念相契相合,顺应关注民生、防治腐败的时代发展要求。     

ECONOMY

正Fiscal Reform China will endeavor to build a comprehensive,transparent and efficient fiscal and tax system by strengthening reforms in the coming years,the central leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC)said on June 30.     

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education,Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.