Local revenue structure under economic hardship: reliance on alternative revenue sources in California counties

This article investigates how a worsening economy affects local revenue structure, and whether the impact is moderated by the fiscal relationship within higher levels of government. The revenue potential of nontax sources – fees/charges and fines/forfeitures – is considerable for local governments under economic hardship. With the panel data from California counties over a period of 11 years (2000–2010), this article shows that reliance on nontax revenue largely depends on the economic and fiscal factors that vary across counties, and the effect of economy is contingent on local dependence on intergovernmental transfers. Counties are likely to raise nontax revenue when the economy worsens and their transfer-dependence increases, while the marginal effect of the economic indicators changes from negative to positive as transfer dependence increases. This article illuminates the characteristics of the two types of nontax sources in terms of the mechanisms of incentivising human behaviour and concludes with policy implications for researchers and practitioners.     

Financial management conservatism under constraints: tax and expenditure limits and local deficit financing during the Great Recession

This paper investigates the relationship between tax and expenditure limits (TELs) and local government deficit financing decisions following the recent recession. Cities under the resource constraints are hypothesised to practise conservatism in financial management decisions and thus less likely to deficit finance during difficult times. Using data from 2005 to 2012 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports of the 50 largest US cities, this paper finds that cities subject to a binding TEL are more likely to control expenditure growth from pre-crisis years to years following the recession; these cities are also less likely to increase deficit financing following the recession, as indicated by a relative increase in their net assets. Although continuous deficit erodes fiscal sustainability and is an undesirable management practice, deficit financing during recessions may be needed for smoothing expenditure and sustaining service provision. The management conservatism associated with the fiscal rules may contribute to the cyclicality of local spending.     

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.     

财税治腐的路径证成——兼论财税治腐的功能变革

党的十八大以来,腐败治理被提升到前所未有的高度,受到各界的广泛关注。"财税治腐"能够克服长期以来以"治人"为主要反腐手段的弊端,这种模式通过明确财权边界、规范公共财产管理等手段,进一步压缩了权力的寻租空间。财税治腐以财政党规和财税法律为制度土壤,以"理财"和"治腐"为两大主题和形式目标,聚合于"国家治理现代化"的终极目标之下。以领域法学理论、公共财产理论以及政党治理与国家治理理论为基石,财税法跨越不同法域的法学研究路径,以其务实、低调、灵活的特质在面对日益复杂的腐败治理难题时展现出十分独特的价值。财税治腐承载着实现权力规制、优化理财方式和推进国家治理现代化的三重任务,同其他权力监督方式相结合,形成对公权的监督合力,共同构建出"法治财政、廉洁政治、现代国家"的理想图景。     

Why can't Europe save itself? A note on a structural failure

Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been struck by one financial crisis after another. Yes despite many bold new initiatives, instability and uncertainty persist. Why can't Europe save itself? The answer, this chapter argues, lies in a structural failure. EMU lacks a credible mechanism to cope with the threat of imbalances within the group – a framework to manage the European region's internal payments problems. The challenge was foreseen from the beginning. How could a regional monetary union manage the risk of fiscal imbalances among its members? Europe might have turned to the USA for inspiration. For analytical purposes, the USA too can be considered as a regional monetary union comparable to EMU, facing the same fundamental challenge. America's solution was to create a permanent ‘transfer union’, featuring more or less automatic flows of funds through the federal budget at the centre. But European policy-makers chose otherwise, for reasons that go to the very heart of their ongoing integration project. EMU is a league of sovereign states, each determined to retain for itself as many rights and privileges as possible. In such a structure, a permanent transfer union never had a chance; and since no adequate substitute has yet been found, Europe is forced to pay a high price in terms of instability and lost growth.     

Measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance: the case of Italian municipalities

In the literature on fiscal federalism, vertical fiscal imbalance has been widely studied, while the theme of horizontal fiscal imbalance and inequality among local governments, due to differences in their fiscal capacities, has been less explored. This article contributes to fill the gap. A new method to compute fiscal capacities based on regression analysis is proposed, which can overcome some of the drawbacks of traditional methods such as the representative tax system. This new approach is then employed to evaluate the fiscal capacities of Italian municipalities over the period 2002–2010. Finally two global measures of the horizontal fiscal imbalance are used to evaluate the equity implication of a major policy change occurred in 2008 in Italian municipal finance.     

¿Cómo recaudar más sin gastar mejor? Sobre las dificultades de incrementar la carga fiscal en México

This article explores how tax revenue can be increased in Mexico, especially through more collection in higher-income sectors. An overview of the Mexican government's capacity to collect taxes is offered before analyzing the reasons why tax revenue has not increased in over more than two decades. A sketch of strategies that the recent Peña Nieto administration could have followed in order to increase tax revenue in a progressive fashion is also provided. One of the article's main arguments is that without more efficient public spending, it will be difficult to collect more taxes permanently, especially in such an open economy, with institutions that are as weak as those in Mexico. Furthermore, in a democracy, there is little public acceptance for more taxes, no matter how progressive they may be, unless the government can provide certainty about more efficient public spending. For these reasons, unless the quality and progressiveness of public spending and tax collection advances, it is even undesirable that the government increase its tax revenue.     

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education,Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.     

The centralization vs decentralization tug of war and the emerging narrative of fiscal federalism for social policy in India

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between fiscal federalism and social policy in India through an analysis of the effects of a recent effort to increase fiscal decentralization to state governments on the nature of social policy investment at the sub-national level. Through its analysis, this paper highlights the persistence of a strong centralisation bias in India’s fiscal architecture for social policy. We trace this centralisation bias to the political and administrative dynamics of the federal bargain. The peculiar dynamics of this bargain have created a context where the core goal of centralization – to ensure equity – is undermined while the expectation of decentralization – greater accountability through alignment of expenditure with local needs and preferences, fails to take root. India is thus likely to continue to witness significant regional variation in social policy outcomes, despite a centralised financing architecture.     

Federalism and Governability in Brazil: Oil Royalties in Dispute

This article discusses the relationship between governability and federalism in Brazil, analysing the dispute among Brazilian states for oil royalties. This conflict features an unusual pattern in federal legislative voting, leading to regional alignment, rather than the usual party political configuration. This study explains the phenomenon by showing how this organisation makes it possible to align the preferences of national party leaders, regional party leaders, parliamentarians, and each state's voters. The political influence of governors and mayors is also underlined, and the Union's role in the process is described in detail.