Is governance democratic?

This paper argues that governance can engender undemocratic inequality, exclusion and populism. It does so by analysing the concept of governance, and unearthing three theoretical justifications for it: one libertarian, one radical and one republican. These justifications are in turn refuted by showing how they respectively undermine a process-view of democracy, neglect structural avenues for accountability and encourage elites to wield power.     

公共治理视角下的预防腐败体系建构

从权力的角度看,腐败是权力的异化。公共治理具有多元化、网络化、互动性的特征,为建构预防腐败体系提供了新的理论视角。权力、制度、法律和伦理是权力运行过程中对腐败的产生与治理都有着重要影响的四个维度。其中权力与法律侧重于内外互动,制度与伦理侧重于内部整合。四者融汇交织,形成网络式互动,产生对权力运行过程的修正作用。以此建构一套预防腐败体系,是克服传统反腐模式重惩治轻预防、重政治动员轻制度建设等弊端的有力举措。     

行业协会腐败治理及其刑事责任追究

行业协会有一定的行政管理和服务职能,也有经费来源,故有腐败的条件。行业协会腐败形式多样,对行业协会腐败的治理措施主要是政社分开、加强监管以及对腐败活动追究行政和刑事责任。其中,《刑法》对以个人名义进行的腐败活动有相应的罪名惩处,而很多腐败活动以协会名义进行,《刑法》缺乏对这类腐败的罪名规定。要提高对行业协会腐败治理的效果,应在《刑法》中增设相应的行业协会单位犯罪的罪名。     

When success is an orphan: informal institutional governance and the EU–Turkey deal

This article traces the role of the EU institutions in the process leading up to the EU–Turkey Action Plan and EU–Turkey Statement. The EU–Turkey deal is the proverbial ‘orphan’ in EU crises management, with none of the key actors and institutions eager to claim ownership. Yet when judged from the perspective of process management, the deal resulted from effective inter-institutional collaboration, which stands in stark contrast to the EU’s handling of the relocation schemes or the Dublin reform. Using insights from the informal governance literature, the article maps the inter-institutional network that managed this process, traces the activities within the network, and determines the effects these had on the final outcome. On an analytical level, the mechanism contains five key elements of informal institutional governance: linking, bridging, shielding, laying out the tracks and creative fixes. The conclusion reflects on the wider applicability and scope conditions of this mechanism.     

Autocratic checks and balances? Trust in courts and bureaucratic discretion

An emerging literature in political economy focuses on democratic enclaves or pockets of quasi-democratic decision-making embedded in non-democracies. This article first explores the factors that may lead to the emergence of such institutional checks and balances in autocratic politics. I use the comparative analysis of courts in Morocco and Tunisia, and argue that interest group mobilization and the centrality of legalism in political development have been essential for the existence of “governance” enclaves. Second, I explore whether such checks effectively contain everyday rent-seeking, as well as the theoretical channels through which this may occur. Findings from firm-level surveys conducted in Morocco and Tunisia in 2013 indicate that higher general trust in courts, even in modest relative terms, rendered businesses significantly less vulnerable to tax corruption in Tunisia, in sharp contrast to the Moroccan case.