浅析国内府际博弈模式的缺陷与重构

本文通过归纳美国州际契约的成功要点,得出府际博弈“达优解”几个要件,即博弈主体地位独立而平等、获取资源的机会均等,博弈规则具法律效力、信息沟通快速顺畅,重视长期利益和相对利益等,认为造成目前我国府际博弈现状与“达优解”状态之间的差距的原因主要有传统的行政等级影响、获取资源的机会不公平,信息沟通机制滞后等因素,并提出相应的对策建议。     

服务型政府建设与政府间纵向关系调整

服务型政府建设对政府间纵向关系这一中国政府体制重要方面的调整和改革提出了迫切要求。中国的政府间的纵向关系在结构性要素上具有权力较为集中的特点,在体制性要素上也有一系列独特性。这样的政府间纵向关系有其优势,也有其不足。建设服务型政府对政府间纵向关系调整提出的基本要求是:使各级政府能够有效回应和满足公民日益增长的公共服务需求,实现基本公共服务均等化,有效推进行政管理改革和政府职能转变;进一步保持与提升政府间纵向关系的优势并克服其不足。     

府际关系与政府创新扩散：一个文献综述

本文对有关府际关系及其对政府创新扩散的影响的相关文献进行了初步综述,并探讨了这些文献对中国的启示。本文从垂直和水平两个方向分析了府际关系,并进一步将垂直关系分为自上而下和自下而上两个方面,将水平关系划分成竞争和学习两个维度,进而从上述四个方面对已有研究文献进行综述,发现了目前研究的主要特征及问题,并指出了未来研究方向。最后,文章探讨了中国政治体制的特点及其同这些文献的关系,并对中国政府创新扩散的实践与研究前景进行了总结。     

Subnational Regionalisation in Argentina: The Effects of Subjective Interdependence and the Relationships between Actors on Intermunicipal Cooperation

This article studies the networks of intermunicipal cooperation that occur through a process of subnational regionalization. It analyses data from two Regional Communities in the Province of Córdoba, Argentina. The results show that interlocal subjective interdependence and strong relationships between actors, results in greater inter‐municipal cooperation Furthermore, the results of the analysis suggest that interpersonal trust does not necessarily result in institutional coordination. While the local political parties are not a significant variable in this study, geographic distance does seem to play a role in the larger process of intergovernmental coordination.     

区域治理视角下城市群内政府间合作困境

要有效治理城市群内政府间合作难题,不仅要从理论上阐释区域治理的必要性,更需要全面分析当前城市群内政府间横向合作面临的现实困境,提出有针对性的解决路径,提升城市群内政府间合作的成效。     

Subnational Governments in the Negotiation of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020: The Case of Spain

The negotiation of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 has been an outstanding topic on the agenda of the EU during the past few years, on which subnational units also tried to have a say. In this article we analyse the formal institutional framework available for the Spanish Autonomous Communities to participate in the negotiation of the Cohesion Policy 2014–2020 and the Common Agriculture Policy 2014–2020. By analysing this participation, this text explores how this institutional framework has evolved during the past few years and how the Autonomous Communities could represent their interests at the domestic and supranational level within these crucial negotiations.     

城市群治理绩效何以差异化--基于三大城市群比较

城市群治理是有效化解城市群发展病症的必由之路。但是,从三大城市群治理演化实践来看,在基本趋同的府际合作中产生了差异化明显的治理效应。这是因为城市群有效治理不仅要求不断完善纵横结合的府际合作,而且要求实现府际合作与市场机制的二元配比驱动。要使城市群治理有效运作,必须超越府际合作从而使完善城市群府际合作和激发市场机制活力双管齐下。在此基础上,三大城市群应该分类治理,调适城市群治理中的府际合作与市场机制的配比。     

超越税务:乌海联合办税对中国"府际关系"发展的启示

"府际关系"是政府过程研究中一个非常重要的领域.内蒙古乌海市在实践中探索出的国、地税联合办税模式,虽然只是发生在一个地方,仅涉及国税、地税两个部门的制度创新,但其在理论探索上的贡献,已经超越了税务行政本身的变革.乌海联合办税模式在构建"伙伴型府际关系"方面的主动探索,从纵横两个维度上,不仅为在实践中逐步化解条块矛盾,构建新型的横向"府际关系"和调整政府横向间的职能配置等提供了新的思路,同时也为在理论上深化中国的"府际关系"理论研究提供了一个新的方向.     

Refining the Concepts of Territorial Revenue Assignment,Substate Fiscal Self-rule and Territorial Fiscal Balance

Fiscal federalism has offered a template for understanding intergovernmental fiscal relations. Yet when politicians are involved in day-to-day decentralization it may happen that some of the normative elements of fiscal federalism do not fit reality. Substate entities may go beyond the own-source paradigm and have a practical interest in alternative forms of fiscal self-rule. To better understand this pragmatism a threefold stage model of territorial revenue assignment is presented drawing on some insights offered by Germany’s fiscal constitution. Within this framework a reassessment of the role of territorial levels as levels during vertical revenue assignment is undertaken, a new typology of fiscal self-rule is introduced, and finally a theory of multiple territorial fiscal balance points is outlined, including the one based on the real domain of substate own policy-making.     

Intergovernmental councils in the United States

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on intergovernmental councils (IGCs) in the United States in which prominent state-level executive politicians, that is, governors, play a leadership role. In the US case, these IGCs developed out of a desire to facilitate interstate information exchanges and a need for state governments to join forces to protect their autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government. In this latter role, the councils function as lobbyists for state government interests. The research question driving the analysis has to do with impact: what difference do executive-led IGCs make, either vertically or horizontally, in the US federal system? The question of impact is particularly relevant because growing partisan polarization in contemporary federal and state political institutions complicates collective action by states.