Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014

Many comparative scholars classify personalist regimes as a distinct category of nondemocratic rule. To measure the process of regime personalization, and to distinguish such a process from overall authoritarian reversal, is difficult in comparative context. Using the Russian political regime in 1999–2014 as a case study, we examine the dynamics of regime personalization over time. Relying on original data on patron–client networks and expert surveys assessing the policy influence of the key members of the ruling coalition, we argue that having more clients, or clients who are more powerful, increases the power of patrons – and that where the patron is the ruler, the resulting measure is an indication of the level of personalization of the regime. We trace regime personalization from the changes in political influence of the president's associates in his patron–client network versus that of other elite patron–client networks. We find that as early as 2004, the Russian regime can be regarded as personalist, and is strongly so from 2006 onward.     

The evolution of rule of law in Cambodia

Cambodian leaders have confounded the efforts of the international community to promote rule of law. Over the past decade the Cambodian government has introduced a series of legal reforms and overseen an increase in the use of legal proceedings including defamation lawsuits against opposition politicians and members of civil society. These reforms and practices, as well as the role of the judiciary in relation to each, may be better understood through elite perceptions of the rule of law in Cambodia. Comprehending the rule of law as it is understood by the ruling elites offers better insight into the trajectory of legal development and the obstacles to Western ideals for legal reform. This article situates Cambodia within the context of illiberal democracy and examines how a thin rule of law has evolved, focusing on defamation law as a legal and political strategy of control. While the international community has pressed Cambodia to carry out liberal legal reforms for some time, the article will outline the obstacles facing reformers and the competing desires of Cambodian leaders embedded in the patronage based political order.     

Patrons against clients: Electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states

Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition – potential and certain electoral losses – which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross‐country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis‐incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double‐edged sword for institutional reform.     

Bond notes,borrowing, and heading for bust: Zimbabwe’s persistent crisis

“Bond notes” were introduced by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in late 2016 as a local surrogate currency equivalent in value to the US dollar to address the acute currency shortage afflicting the economy. Unsurprisingly, they were overwhelmingly rejected by Zimbabweans, who feared that they heralded a return to the hyper-inflation which had destroyed incomes and savings in 2008–09. Accordingly, faced by a widening budget deficit, the ZANU–PF government turned to alternative methods of creating money with a view to winning the next election: expanding the supply of electronic currency and selling Treasury bills. The resultant financial crisis provided the backdrop to the military’s recent displacement of President Robert Mugabe. However, commitments to economic reform by any new government dominated by ZANU–PF appear unlikely to address Zimbabwe’s persistent crisis.     

Public Administration Reform in Jordan: Concepts and Practices

ABSTRACT

This study reviews the transition of Jordan from a British colony to a modern independent state. It covers contextual attributes influencing the development of the administrative system such as centralization, demographic explosion, low economic growth, excessive reliance on patronage in recruitment for public positions, and corruption. These and other factors hinder administrative reform efforts. As case analysis illustrates, administrative decision making is non-institutional, regularly undermines the merit system, indifferent to accountability, and manifests a low commitment to professional ethics. The study emphasizes that administrative reform in Jordan needs to reconcile these obstacles and to advance skilled and ethical organizational leaders.     

Like father,like son? Power and influence across two Gnassingbé presidencies in Togo

In personalized authoritarian systems, the death of a leader poses a serious challenge to regime survival. Togo, however, belongs to a small number of countries in which regime collapse has been avoided by the transfer of power to the deceased ruler’s son. But can the son simply pick up where the father left off? Combining a theoretically guided single case study with statistical network analysis, this article argues that hereditary succession involves both changes and continuities. While Gnassingbé Eyadema’s rule rested on repression, patronage, and a bizarre leadership cult, his son Faure Gnassingbé has partly adapted and reformulated these strategies. The quantitative part of the article is based on a novel data set that contains information on the biographical characteristics and interaction patterns of the deputies in the Togolese parliament. Using exponential random graph models (ERGMs), the article shows that people who have held important positions in the past or belong to the president’s ethnic group still play a significant role in the regime elite. The article not only presents detailed insights on a so far under-researched country, but also contributes to the wider literature by showing how mixed-method designs can further our understanding of authoritarian regimes.     

When revolutionaries grow old: the Museveni babies and the slow death of the liberation

The liberation struggle plays a crucial role in providing legitimacy for post-liberation regimes. This was the case for the Museveni regime, for whom the liberation argument provided strong moral authority, and a legitimising foundation for its patronage and coercion strategies. But what happens when the liberation argument ‘grows old’, i.e. when the liberation generation elite starts to die or defect, and the young population is no longer impressed by the liberation argument? This article argues that in response to this changing situation, the Museveni regime almost exclusively relies on patronage and coercion, yet is increasingly devoid of the legitimising liberation foundation.     

Foreign investment,black economic empowerment and militarised patronage politics in Zimbabwe

This paper seeks to analyse Zimbabwe's economic empowerment policy. It argues that while there is a felt need for Zimbabwe to redress colonially induced injustices and racial imbalances in the ownership of the means of production, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to the indigenisation of the economy is fundamentally flawed as it deters investors and may further damage the country's already extremely fragile economy. The implementation of the land reform programme contributed to the decline of Zimbabwe's economy: lessons learnt from the programme and related economic policies of the past 15 years highlight the problems of empowerment policies that are intertwined with patronage politics. The government's negation of basic economic principles and failure to open spaces for critical engagement with all relevant stakeholders epitomises an ill-advised indigenisation and economic empowerment strategy. The policy will not promote and retain foreign investment;nor are there sustainable prospects of internally oriented accumulation strategies on the horizon.     

Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship

ABSTRACT

Why do some states terminate their sponsorship of rebel movements while others are persistent in their provision of support? In the past, most research on external support to insurgents has focused on why states choose to sponsor rebel groups and particularly how this affects conflict duration. However, we know little about the termination of such support. This is surprising given that support has been shown to make armed conflicts more intractable and tremendous efforts are made in condemning and sanctioning such behavior. This study constitutes the first large-N analysis of support termination, employing survival analysis on global data of state support to rebel movements between 1975–2009. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that only some of the factors that explain support provision can offer insights into its termination. In particular, support is more likely to be terminated when no ethnic kinship bonds exist between the rebel movement and the government of the supporting state. Many decisions to withdraw support also seem to coincide with the transition from the Cold War. Threats and sanctions from other states appear largely ineffective. The study contributes to our understanding of the international dimensions of civil war and the role and motives of third parties.     

Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems

The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the democratic credentials of highly clientelistic political systems. The question is particularly relevant for the classification of dominant party systems that heavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a relatively open structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread practice in modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the impact of clientelism on political competitiveness in order to sort out the position of these regimes along the lines of democracy and authoritarianism? This task requires identifying the conditions under which clientelism becomes an essentially authoritarian practice and qualifies these regimes as such. The article puts forward two propositions about the circumstances under which clientelism infringes basic democratic standards under a thin and a thick definition of democracy. Clientelism under one-party monopoly engenders authoritarianism when it thwarts and punishes the contesting voice of citizens by effectively blocking exit from its incentives and sanctions.