Comparing Agenda Content and Roll-call Behaviour in Regular and Lame-duck Sessions of the House of Representatives, 1879–2010

This paper investigates how agenda content and floor behaviour in the US House of Representatives vary across regular and lame-duck sessions. The presence of departing members created a legislative environment marked by increased ideological and participatory shirking, resulting in higher levels of uncertainty. That uncertainty affected how members devised proposal strategies in the face of more fluid voting patterns in lame-duck sessions. The analysis of a unique data set comprised of roll-call votes on House floor motions with an identifiable sponsor from 1879 to 2010 (the 46th to 111th Congresses) uncovers significant changes in the relative frequencies of particular categories of votes, in the success rates on votes within those categories, as well as in the spatial characteristics of floor motions. These findings underscore how the move to the lame-duck session ushered in a distinct and different legislative environment.     

Microwards at postcode level

Much has been made of declining turnout in elections. This is due to a number of factors, and several remedies have been proposed. Voting behaviour seems to depend largely on socioeconomic factors. Partly due to the inordinate expense of household‐level statistics, however, little is known of the demographic breakdown of voting and non‐voting. An effective way of overcoming this would be to crudely estimate the demographics involved by allocating households to consistent voting groupings. Large geographic groups are unwieldy and probably not sufficiently accurate; however, postcode‐level definitions can allow similar but non‐adjacent households in the same general area to be treated as a unit for statistical purposes. This allows consistent trends in voting over the last four general elections in Scotland to be demonstrated. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Popular Interpretations of ‘Corruption’ and their Partisan Consequences

Using a large six-city exit poll from 2000, we examine popular judgments of what constitutes “political corruption” in the United States. We find two distinct evaluative dimensions: corruption understood as lawbreaking, and corruption as favoritism. These judgments are heavily conditioned by the voter’s socioeconomic background and are politically consequential. Subjective understandings of “corruption” shape perceptions of how much corruption actually exists in government. Furthermore, and more importantly, these normative assessments play a significant part in voting decisions. Individuals who judged illegal activities such as bribe-taking to be “corrupt” were more inclined to back one of the major party candidates in 2000; those who believed that favoritism in politics was “corrupt” (e.g., an official recommending an unemployed friend for a government job) were more likely to vote for Al Gore or Ralph Nader.     

A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect

This article suggests a theory of ballot position effect based on the amount of information present in the electorate while accounting for several alternative hypotheses. The more information that voters have, all other factors held constant, the less a role ballot position will play. Additionally, the role of electoral institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect is considered. The theories are tested with precinct-level data from city council elections held in Peoria, Illinois, from 1983 through 1999. Position effect is found to account for a bonus of 0.7% to 5.2% of the precinct-level vote share per position on the ballot. The level of aggregate information and the institutional setting explain a significant share of ballot position effect, even while examined in the presence of alternative explanations such as incumbency, endorsement, campaign expenditure, gender, and race.     

The rise of the opposition party in Taiwan: explaining Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 Presidential election

The 2000 Taiwan presidential election drastically changed Taiwan’s political landscape. For the first time in Taiwan, an opposition party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidential race, receiving 39.3% of the popular vote. To understand the factors that determined the election’s outcome, we analyze survey data from the 2000 presidential election. First, we study whether a divided ruling party was the cause of the opposition party candidate’s victory. That is, would the ruling party have lost if one of the trailing candidates had opted not to run? Second, there were charges following the election that the Kuomintang misled people into believing their candidate was still leading in the polls, when he was really running third, and this misinformation led people to vote differently than they would have otherwise, possibly giving the election to the opposition party candidate. We examine the validity of this claim by measuring the degree to which strategic voting could have influenced the outcome. Third, to understand the underlying dimensions of the electoral competition in Taiwan and to understand each candidate’s electoral support, we run a multivariate statistical model to study how strategic voting, candidate personalities, party identification, and issues influenced respondents’ vote choices. Finally, we discuss the effects of election polling data on election outcomes.     

Voting,non‐voting and consumer buying behaviour: non‐voter segmentation (NVS) and the underlining causes of electoral inactivity

This paper examines some of the issues and debates surrounding the voting and non‐voting of the UK electorate. It attempts to compare and contrast voter behaviour from both a political science perspective and a consumer buying behaviour perspective. In particular, the paper details the output of primary research into non‐voter behaviour and attempts to cluster these motivations and rationales into psychographic segments of non‐voting behaviour. Issues such as alignment and dealignment, social and inherited values are debated in detail, with particular attention being paid to party identification, issue voting and social determinant theory. The paper both challenges and supports previously presented arguments regarding political issues and voting. In addition, electoral turnout and voter participation are analysed and the consequences for democracy discussed. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Migrants and their families in the home country: a bi-directional influence on voting behaviour

ABSTRACT

The voting behaviour of migrants has been studied extensively but limited attention has been paid to how the discussion with families in the home country can be important. This article analyzes under what circumstances migrants influence or are influenced by their families in voting decisions. The analysis uses individual-level data from a survey conducted in 2018 on a sample of 1,839 Romanian migrants. The results indicate that most migrants are not engaged in acts of persuasion about voting. Those who influence their families have a direct interest in the election results, are informed about what happens in the country and are politically active. The migrants who are influenced by their families have limited experience in the countries of residence and strong ties to their home country.     

Campaigning and split-ticket voting in new electoral systems: the first MMP elections in New Zealand, Scotland and Wales

New electoral systems create learning problems for parties and electors: the parties have to learn how to focus their campaigns and the electors how best to use their votes. This was the case in three countries in the late 1990s where MMP was used for the first time rather than first-past-the-post: New Zealand in 1996 and Scotland and Wales in 1999. MMP involves each elector voting twice — for a candidate in a single-member constituency contest and for a party in a regional/national list contest. Survey and (in New Zealand) official data show that substantial proportions of the three electorates voted a split ticket — the candidate they supported was from a different party to that they voted for in the list contest. (Approximately one-in-five did this in Scotland and Wales and two-in-five in New Zealand.) We argue that split-ticket voting will be influenced by the amount of information received by electors regarding the candidates for the constituency seats. Using the amount of campaign expenditure by each candidate as a measure of the volume of information provided, we find strong supporting evidence for this responsive voter model in each of the three countries.     

What accounts for Duverger's law? The behavioral mechanisms underpinning two-party convergence in India

Duverger's Law states the single-member district plurality rules should produce two-party competition. In district-level election races where this expectation holds, what political behaviors—ranging from elites' strategic formation of political parties to voters' strategic abandonment of losing candidates—account for these outcomes? Using data from state elections in India, this article demonstrates that no single mechanism accounts for most electoral outcomes consistent with Duverger's Law. However, mechanisms related to the behavior elites, far more than voters, produce convergence on two-party competition. This article uncovers relatively little evidence of outcomes driven by strategic voting, instead finding that much of the convergence on two parties is attributable to various forms of strategic entry in which parties selectively field candidates in certain races. In particular, elite collusion—when multiple parties coordinate on where to field candidates—is especially important. Data from other countries confirm that these findings are not unique to India.     

An experimental investigation of voter myopia in economic evaluations

A prevalent assumption in the economic voting literature is that voters’ retrospective evaluations are based on very recent outcomes only, that is, they are myopic. I test this assumption by drawing on a population-based survey experiment from Turkey. Turkey presents a good opportunity to explore voters’ time horizons for economic voting: the long tenure of the same single-party government entailed periods of both good and poor performance, and its overall record to date has been better than its immediate predecessors. I find that voters can provide divergent assessments of incumbent’s performance in managing the economy over different time periods that are in line with the country’s macroeconomic trajectory. Moreover, voters’ evaluations of the incumbent’s performance during its entire tenure have a stronger effect on economic vote than their shorter-term evaluations, defying voter myopia. I provide evidence that long-term outcomes might weigh heavier in voters’ considerations than commonly assumed.