Beliefs About Wife Beating Among Arab Men from Israel: The Influence of Their Patriarchal Ideology

Despite the recent increase in public and professional interest in the problem of wife beating in Arab society, in Israel, and in the rest of the Arab world, there is a serious lack of empirical research on different dimensions of the problem in those societies. This paper presents the results of a survey conducted among a systematic random sample of 362 Arab husbands from Israel, in an attempt to examine the contribution of patriarchal ideology toward explaining their beliefs about wife beating. Although about 58% of the participants indicated that there is no excuse for a man to beat his wife, 15–62% still justified wife beating on certain occasions (e.g., adultery, failure to obey husbands, disrespect for parents and relatives). In addition, although the participants tended to perceive abusive and violent husbands as responsible for their behavior, 52% still expressed understanding of that behavior and, on some occasions, 23–43% even blamed the wife for violence against her. Regression and multiple regression analyses revealed that over and above the participants' age and level of education, their masculine sex-role stereotypes, negative and traditional attitudes toward women, nonegalitarian marital role expectations, and familial patriarchal beliefs were the most significant predictors of beliefs about wife beating. Implications of the results and limitations of the study are also discussed.     

The Impact of Advertising and Media on the Arab Culture: The Case of the Arab Spring,Public Spheres,and Social Media

The Arab world has experienced some unprecedented social movements, labeled by the media as the Arab Spring. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of public policy, advertising, media, and public spheres on the Arab Spring. The media and economic policies enacted in the Arab world in the 1990s played a significant role in changing consumer culture in the Arab region, resulting in significant changes in public policy. Two studies were conducted to test how the change in consumer culture along with new public polices in the region contributed to the uprisings.     

Between reform and Islam: The Arab spring in Jordan 2011–2014

This article discusses the Arab Spring in Jordan and the reasons the Hashemite regime was able to survive it. Liberals, retired military officers, young people, members of tribes, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood all participated in the demonstrations against the regime, which began in January 2011. In the beginning, it seemed that diversified demonstrations would bring about the regime’s collapse, as happened in other Arab countries. But in the end, it turned out that each group acted in its own interests. Tribal leaders worried about economic concerns, liberals sought to promote political reform, and the Muslim Brotherhood demanded the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The lack of a common goal combined with Jordan’s policy of allowing demonstrations free from the fear of violent repression, sapped protesters’ motivation and minimized the number of participants. The fear of the type of anarchy and terror seen in Syria and Egypt also frightened the protesters and led them to the conclusion that it is better to live in an undemocratic but stable regime than pursue a fight for democracy that might end badly. Ultimately, it was King Abdullah’s astute political strategy in combination with international contingencies that enabled Jordan’s Hashemite regime to survive the Arab Spring.     

Sovereignty,bare life and the Arab uprisings

Five years after people took to the streets in protest at political organisation across the Middle East, the consequences of these actions remain. As the protests gained traction, states began to fragment and regimes sought to retain power, whatever the cost. While a great deal of focus has been upon what happened, very little attention has been paid to the role of agency within the context of the fragmenting sovereignty and political change. This article contributes to these debates by applying the work of Giorgio Agamben to the post-Arab Uprisings Middle East, to understand the relationship between rulers and ruled along with the fragmentation of the sovereign state. The article argues for the need to bring agency back into conceptual debates about sovereignty within the Middle East. It concludes by presenting a framework that offers an approach building upon Agamben’s bare life.     

Iran and Turkey: not quite enemies but less than friends

The rise and subsequent erosion of friendly relations between Iran and Turkey was a result of their regional ambitions. While Turkey had long seen its secular system as presenting an alternative to Iran’s Islamic ideology, the alignment of their regional interests facilitated a rapport between the two states in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the Arab Spring proved divisive for this relationship as each state sought to advocate its model of government and secure a leadership role in the Arab world. The war in Syria widened the divide, as Iran’s long-standing support for the Bashar al-Assad regime could not be reconciled with Turkey’s desire to see President Assad out of office. Using a close reading of Persian and Turkish sources, the authors will analyse the Iran–Turkey divide, focusing specifically on how the Iranians have portrayed it as a clash of civilisations, citing Turkey’s so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambitions as the primary cause.     

The In-securitisation of Youth in the South and East Mediterranean

The securitisation of youth as a social category has been well-documented. For the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries, moral panics over demographic youth bulges, Islamist radicalisation and protracted conflicts have placed youth centre-stage as a threat to the security of states and societies. Rejecting such assertions as themselves being what Foucault might have termed ‘technologies of power’ in a neoliberal order, and instead taking a critical approach to security, the spotlight is turned towards youth themselves as the referent object of study. This reveals the multidimensional hyper-precarity and insecuritisation of young peoples’ lives which derive from that same neoliberal economic order and the political structures that sustain it in the SEM countries. The finding resonates with other studies of new, insecure, formats for adulthood in Africa and suggests that we should look at the insecurity of young people today to understand global neoliberal futures in countries beyond the post-industrial ‘core’.     

Turmoil in Egypt – 1968–2011: the status of the armed forces in citizen uprisings in Egypt

On 15 January 2011, there occurred an unprecedented event in the annals of Arab states: for the first time, the masses revolted and ousted a local ruler. The Tunisian masses took to the streets and stayed there until Zayn al-‘ābidīn bin ‘Alī stepped down, or, rather, fled the country. Ten days after Bin ‘Alī’s fall, the masses filled the thoroughfares of Egypt's major cities and demanded the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for 30 years. On 12 February 2011, after 18 days of stormy protests, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation and announced that Mubarak's powers had been transferred to him. This paper follows the Egyptian saga in the context of the new phenomenon taking place across the Arab world – citizen revolts. It does not address the protests by Islamic opposition groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood; instead, it offers case studies in social, economic, and ideological (one might even say, secular) contexts, not religious ones. It surveys the recent epoch-making events in the Nile region and compares them with violent demonstrations and riots in its past. The paper's importance lies in its examination of the role of the armed forces in each case and primarily in its investigation of the assertion that the broad-based uprisings seem to have written finis to the military's pivotal role in Arab states.     

Neo-Islamism in the post-Arab Spring

The Arab Spring revealed the rise of Islamists and a wave of Islamic movements across the region. The Islamist agenda is debatable on issues regarding their commitment to democracy, pluralism and individual freedom. Central to this is understanding their evolving definition of Islamism and how the players view themselves. The article provides a brief background on which to describe and define the modern Islamist. The features of Islamist political parties are described. The article offers a definition of neo-Islamism that reflects its most modern trends, including these key characteristics: non-traditional religiosity, gradualism, Islam modernization, nationalism and pragmatic relations with the West.     

Post-Arab Spring: changes and challenges

This paper advances the proposition that post-Arab Spring politics are a product of globalisation’s economic and social liberalisation. The global market and privatisation have fundamentally deconstructed centralised autocratic rule over state and society, while facilitating corruption and selective development, culminating in public outrage. The political order of the Middle East and North Africa since the Arab Spring synthesises globalisation’s dialectic duality, in which economic integration has contributed to the demise of national authoritarianism, inciting communalism and political fragmentation. This paper analyses emerging political trends and challenges based on a comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia.     

Peace education in Israel: an educational goal in the test of reality

Peace education is considered a necessary element in establishing the social conditions required for promoting peace-making between rival parties. As such, it constitutes one of Israel’s state education goals, and would therefore be expected to have a significant place in Israel’s educational policy in general and in response to peace moves that have occurred during the Arab–Israeli conflict since the 1970s in particular. This article reviews the educational policy actually applied by Israel’s state education over the years as reflected in formal educational programs and school textbooks, and suggests that although some significant changes have taken place over time, there has been and still is a significant gap between the stated goal and the practice of peace education in Israel. Reasons for this disparity and its implications are discussed and possible directions are proposed for coping with this educational challenge.