Crime Trends in Western Europe from 1990 to 2000

This paper analyses the evolution of police recorded crime rates for nine offences (intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, vehicle theft, burglary, domestic burglary, and drug offences) over the period 1990–2000 in 16 Western European Countries. The analysis shows that there was an increase in drug and violent offences, while property offences reached a peak at the beginning of the 1990s and started decreasing afterwards. The evolution of property offences can be related to the emergence of a large black market for stolen goods in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the time series, while by the end of it that market was saturated and there had also been a reinforcement of police measures in the frontiers and of security measures in Western European households. The increase in drug offences is correlated to the rise of drug use in Europe shown by other indicators, and can be related to an increased availability of drugs in European markets. Finally, the upward trend in violent offences can be explained partially by gang struggles over the control of illegal markets and by the consolidation of problematic neighbourhoods, but seems also due to a large extent of increase in the reporting of violent offences by their victims and the recording of such offences by the police. The analysis shows that opportunity-based theories provide a satisfactory explanation of the trends in recorded crime, and that the crime opportunities are heavily influenced by socio-economical factors.Versions of this paper were presented at the 3rd Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology (Helsinki, August 27–30, 2003) and at the Societies of Criminology 1st Key Issues Conference (Paris, May 13–15, 2004). The paper was written during a stay at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Freiburg imBreisgau, Germany) made possible through the support of Swiss National Science Foundation     

Corporate Incubators: Industrial R&D and What Universities can Learn from them

The explosive growth of incubation has seen a concurrent and significant increase in research on and knowledge of the incubation phenomenon. However, instead of comprehensively differentiating between non-profit and for-profit incubators, research has described a whole array of partly overlapping archetypes, thus missing out on important aspects. This article first offers two arguments validating a framework of what non-profit university incubators can learn from for-profit corporate incubators before presenting the framework itself. While corporate incubators are for-profit organizations with which to enhance a corporation’s technology development, university incubators try to leverage technological insights from the university in a similar manner. In accordance with their respective missions, organizational structures, incubator processes and resource flows, it is possible to transfer lessons learned from two corporate incubator archetypes—the fast-profit incubator and leveraging incubator—to the world of university incubator. Our empirical findings are based on in-depth case studies of 25 companies through 52 semi-structured interviews with managers of corporate incubators of large technology-intensive corporations in Europe and the U.S., two EU incubator benchmarking surveys and five interviews with the heads of technology transfer offices of two top technology universities.     

The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms

We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3–5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, while in another 11–17 pct. of the firms, the controlling owners are likely to incur a loss of control. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a loss of control. The restrictions that the Break-Through rule put on the ability of these firms to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure are also estimated. We conclude that a significant number of firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break-Through rule.     

欧洲一体化经验及时代精神

区域化是当今世界的一个重要发展趋势。作为迄今为止世界范围内区域化运动中最为成功的典范,欧洲一体化在其漫长岁月中,积累了一些具有借鉴意义的经验。这些经验正在为世界其他地区所借鉴。和平与发展是欧洲一体化的基本目标,合作是达到这一目标的根本途径。欧洲一体化经验的精髓,在于体现了和平、发展、合作的时代精神,它因而具有伟大的时代意义。     

试析欧盟对华经贸政策的历史演变

在世界多极化和经济全球化的时代,研究欧盟对华经贸政策的历史演变,分析其影响因素,对促进世 界经济、政治以及中欧关系意义重大。     

欧盟宪法对传统宪法学的挑战

宪法是一个国家的根本大法 ,具有最高的法律效力。欧盟不是一个国家 ,因此 ,欧盟宪法草案的出台 ,对传统意义上的宪法学提出了严峻的挑战。这些挑战在制宪权、宪法涵义、国家结构形式及国家主权等方面表现得尤为突出。     

The role of the European Parliament in Turkey-EU relations: A troublemaker or a useful normative actor?

This article analyzes the role of the European Parliament (EP) in Turkey–EU relations. More specifically, it explores the reasons why in practice EP’s role in promoting fundamental values of the European Union (EU) in Turkey remained largely limited. Drawing on the broader socialization literature, it concludes that a combination of factors related to the socializer (EP) and to the socializee (Turkey) limits the EP’s effectiveness to emerge as a normative actor in its relations with Turkey. In particular, the study points to the mismatch of values promoted by the EP and those embraced by the Turkish political elite as the real obstacle that prevents any socialization mechanism from being triggered.     

The EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership and global environmental governance: Towards effective multilateralism after Copenhagen?

ABSTRACT

This paper uses an analytical framework drawn from organisational studies to unpack and evaluate climate change relations under the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership. The article finds that, while the EU and South Africa share a common purpose and high-level climate goals, many of the formal organisational structures set up under the partnership to tackle climate change and the environment are weak and have fallen into disuse. At the same time several factors outside of the strategic partnership, such as South Africa's hosting of the Durban climate change meeting, have played a significant role in promoting climate cooperation between the two partners. Therefore, while the strategic partnership creates an additional opportunity for climate cooperation, it is by no means the only or even the most important instrument in the EU's foreign policy tool box for negotiation and dialogue.     

The EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership: From bilateral to multilateral forums and the strategic value for South Africa

ABSTRACT

Strategic partnerships are seen as a means of elevating bilateral relations between two countries, or in the case of the European Union (EU), relations between an intergovernmental organisation and its 10 identified strategic partners. There is a growing body of analysis on the value of these strategic partnerships for the two partner states, yet just what role this partnership has within wider multilateral forums is an area for further discussion. This article explores the role that the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership plays in shaping engagement between the bilateral partners in multilateral contexts. In reviewing the partnership over the course of its first decade, the article argues that South Africa has increasingly acknowledged its potential value. However, further interrogation on how to manage the complex intersection between bilateral and multilateral relations is called for if the strategic partnership is to be used to optimal effect as a tool of foreign policy.     

The national politics of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans

Abstract

European enlargement has often been viewed from an institutional perspective. The academic literature in the field has tended to focus primarily on how the Commission or the Council has addressed the issue of EU expansion. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of individual member states. This article considers the way in which domestic political concerns and national politics affects the way in which EU members approach enlargement to the Western Balkans. It does this by examining studies conducted on seven countries: Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Cyprus. It shows that there are in fact a wide variety of factors that shape individual member state attitudes towards enlargement. These factors include economic and commercial goals, ties to the region and to individual accession states, concerns over immigration, general foreign policy priorities and national ideological approaches towards the future shape and orientation of the European Union.