The Polish Solidarity Movement in Retrospect: In Search of a Mnemonic Mirror

The legacy of the Solidarity movement of the 1980s, which was a leading force in the region’s 1989 revolutions, culminating most symbolically with the fall of the Berlin Wall, has yet to be institutionalized in Polish social memory. A spate of official commemorations marking the movement’s 25th anniversary in 2005 provided a palette on which Poles projected—or refused to project—their memories. The movement’s legacy continues to play out in current and contentious electoral politics, since the leaders of the top contending parties are former Solidarity activists. Despite and partly because of this active presence of Solidarity movement players, Polish civil society appears to be in a liminal state of active hesitation over the task of concretizing this movement’s past in commemorative forms. This article proposes six cultural and political explanations for this hesitation. It also recommends that social scientists disaggregate the concept of memory work into various manifestations on a continuum from hesitation to deliberation and agitation to institutionalization. As the article illustrates, hesitation can constitute action. At stake in this exercise is a larger discourse—over the direction of the post-1989 socio-political changes vis-à-vis the aims of the 1989 revolutions and the meaning of democracy and transitional justice in a posttotalitarian context.     

Soviet war memorials and the re-construction of national and local identities in post-communist Poland

This article proposes to look afresh at the legacies of communism in urban spaces in post-1989 Poland. Specifically, it investigates the fate of Red Army monuments and explores how these public spaces have been used in the multifaceted and multileveled process of post-communist identity formation. The article suggests that Red Army monuments constitute sites for the articulation of new narratives about the country's past and future which are no longer grounded in the fundamental division between “us” (the nation) and “them” (the supporters of communism) and which are far from being fixed in the binary opposition of the banished and the embraced past. The reorganization of public memory space does not only involve contesting the Soviet past or affirming independence traditions but is rather the outcome of multilayered processes rooted in particularities of time and space. Moreover, the article argues that the dichotomy “liberator versus occupier,” often employed as a viable analytical tool by scholars investigating the post-communist memorial landscape, impedes our understanding of the role played by Soviet war memorials in the process of re-imagining national and local communities in post-1989 Eastern Europe.     

Silesian in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: a language caught in the net of conflicting nationalisms,politics, and identities

A probe into the changing perceptions and classifications of Silesian (i.e. the Slavic dialect and the Slavic-Germanic creole of Upper Silesia, or both construed as the ethnolect of the Silesians) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as most saliently influenced by the mutually nullifying competition of German and Polish ethnolinguistic nationalisms. This competition opened the space for the rise of the Silesian national-cum-regional movement, which sometimes undertook the task of codifying a Silesian language. Such codifications were frustrated during the periods of dictatorship and totalitarianism, which lasted in Upper Silesia from 1926/1933 to 1989. Berlin and Warsaw suppressed the possibility of the rise of a Silesian language, perceived as an ideological threat to the ethnolinguistic legitimization of German and Polish national statehood. Today, Warsaw dislikes the recent popular grassroots project to codify Silesian as a language, but, under the democratic conditions enjoyed in postcommunist Poland, the state administration has no legal means to suppress this project. The codification of Silesian gathered pace at the turning of the twenty-first century, due, among other reasons, to the rapid spread of access to the Internet. However, without the state's blessing and support, the outcome of the codification project, remains, at best, uncertain.     

Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland

Recent developments in East Central Europe have made countries in the region increasingly attractive to organised crime. The development of organised crime in ECE is seen as a significant problem with global implications. The roots of organised crime in ECE date back to the 1970s, but conditions after the revolutions of 1989 led to an influx of foreign-based gangs into the region. This has resulted in the emergence of organised crime that is predominantly international in character. Gangs have established strategic alliances to organise operations spanning three continents. The countries of ECE have been fighting back against organised crime and significant advances have been made. Continued criminal operations through the region, however, are perceived as a threat on a global scale. The accession of the Czech republic, Hungary and Poland into the EU in May 2004 will provide a clear litmus test for how successful these attempts have been to date.     

E-SITES FOR SAFE SCHOOLS

Abstract

Uncontrolled outbursts of violence, of both an individual and group nature, are distinctive elements of social and economic changes occurring in Poland. They affect all social environments and institutions in this country, and unfortunately many people believe in violent solutions of problems (at least as represented in the media). Between aggression and submission, well-fixed in the school environment, there is a space for assertiveness and empathy; its persistent and thoughtful promotion among pupils, school personnel, and parents may be an effective answer to the expectations of further changes in Polish schools.     

DANGER ZONES OF CORRUPTION: HOW MANAGEMENT OF THE MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRACY AFFECTS CORRUPTION RISKS IN POLAND

This article examines the relationship between management of the ministerial bureaucracy and the risk of high‐level corruption in Poland. Four danger zones of corruption in the ministerial bureaucracy are distinguished, comprising the personalisation of appointments, the emergence of multiple dependencies, the screening capacity of the personnel system and the incentive of bureaucrats to develop a reputation of honesty and competence. Empirically, the article investigates the case of Poland from 1997 until 2007 and sets the findings in a comparative East Central European perspective. The article shows that corruption risks in the ministerial bureaucracy increased in most but not all danger zones after 2001 and, in particular, during the period of the centre‐right governments that were in office between 2005 and 2007. The increase in corruption risks is reflected in Poland's deteriorating corruption record during the same period. The conclusion discusses the findings with regard to alternative causes of corruption and the relationship between civil service professionalisation and corruption in other East Central European countries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leaders or Laggards: engendering sub-national governance through women's policy machineries in Spain and Poland

More than three decades of international best practice and a rich body of scholarship demonstrate that women's policy machinery (WPM) is a crucial tool for promoting feminist policymaking. A new and unstudied form of WPM is emerging at the sub-national level. In this paper, we examine the effects of (1) regional leftist party governance and (2) sub-state durability on feminist policymaking. We employ Stetson and Mazur's model of effective, feminist WPM and operationalize policy Influence and Access provided to feminist groups. Drawing on four regional cases within Spain and Poland, we use field research, interviews, and party documents to examine whether regional leftist party governance and federalized state structure are associated with WPM ‘Leaders’ in feminist policymaking. We find that regional leftist governance is associated with WPMs that offer feminist policy and empower feminist groups; however, sub-state durability modifies the impact of party governance. We conclude with suggestions for further research.     

How democracy ends,by David Runciman

In 2006, Poland and Romania embarked on renewed lustration programmes. These late lustration policies expanded the scope and transparency measures associated with lustration as a form of transitional justice. While early lustration measures targeted political elites, late lustration policies include public and private sector positions, such as journalists, academics, business leaders, and others in ‘positions of public trust’. Given the legal controversy and moral complexity surrounding lustration, why lustrate so late in the post-communist transition and why expand the policies? The dominant explanation is that lustration is a tool of party politics and is a threat to democratic consolidation. However, the late lustration programmes do not fit this hypothesis neatly. The new laws have been restructured and packaged with other reform programmes, specifically anticorruption programmes. Late lustration has evolved to include economic and social, as well as political concerns. As such, some post-communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe appear to be trying to use lustration as a way to further the democratic transitions by addressing remaining public concerns about corruption, distrust, and inequality.