系统论视域下私营企业劳资合作中政府作用研究

按照系统论的解释,私营企业是包括资方和劳方在内,由多种生产要素构成的系统.政府处于私营企业的上位系统中.私营企业作为一个封闭的系统,具有较强的能动性.我国政府对私营企业劳资合作的产生与终结仅具有相对“决定作用”,对私营企业劳资合作过程也只具有重要的影响作用.因此,需要理性看待政府作用,脚踏实地重新思索私营企业劳资冲突问...     

后哥本哈根时代气候治理的经济学思考

伴随着2009年的结束，哥本哈根气候大会也落下了帷幕。后哥本哈根时代如何治理全球气候依然是一个悬而未决的重大问题。各主权国家关于气候治理问题的激烈争论，与其说是各国间的政治博弈，倒不如说是经济博弈。因此，该文认为，在后哥本哈根时代，全球气候治理只有寄望于制度建设及其约束。     

The need for international cooperation in combating terrorism

Abstract

As this paper briefly notes, an elaborate international legal system has been established to combat terrorism. But this system has two primary deficiencies: There are serious gaps in the current law and the law already on the books is not being implemented vigorously. The paper examines the specific nature of the gaps and recommends the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, of a committee to oversee implementation of the antiterrorist conventions. The paper also examines some recent work of a less well‐known branch of the United Nations, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. Finally, the paper considers the possibility of establishing an international criminal court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking and related acts of terrorism, a proposal that is currently on the agenda of the United Nations International Law Commission.     

Mind the (Mobilization) Gap: Comparing Climate Activism in the United States and European Union

The barriers to concerted political action on climate change mitigation are steep, especially in multilevel systems where power is diffused and authority contested. This article seeks to explain how mobilization—galvanizing resources and people to participate actively—occurs in complex multilevel systems. It compares two different polities—the United States and the European Union—to tease out the key features of multilevel systems and how they affect climate activism and mobilization. To capture this dynamic, it proposes a three‐staged model of mobilization: awareness building, alliance building, and network creation. The latter stage features “mobilization networks”—stakeholder networks able to transcend levels and institutional inertia and steer polities toward particular climate goals. The article demonstrates how each stage of mobilization is highly contingent on stakeholders' ability to exploit—or at least navigate—multilevel institutional barriers.     

Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the results achieved so far are overly specific. Therefore, we develop a more general framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a systematic way. We propose transfers using both internal and external financial resources for making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme, we use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.      

政府营造良好区域旅游合作环境探析

区域旅游合作是旅游业发展到一定阶段的产物。基于市场经济和公共产品理论要求,营造良好合作环境是政府有效作为空间。政府应通过改善交通等基础设施建设,营造良好合作硬环境;通过多种机制建设和辩证看待竞争与合作关系,营造良好合作软环境,形成真正意义上的大旅游格局,从而推动区域旅游合作的大发展。     

奥巴马时代中美关系新桥梁——记美国新任驻华大使洪博培

美国新任驻华大使洪博培作为共和党内的政治明星，以其显著的政绩、丰富的亚洲工作背景和颇为深厚的中国情结，成为中关两国热议的焦点人物。奥巴马选择洪博培任驻华大使具有深刻的政治动机。对洪博培担任驻华大使之后在发展中关关系方面所发挥的作用，中关两国认知有着微妙的差别，但总体上是积极的、乐观的。     

从亚欧会议看区域合作与中欧关系

作为全球化浪潮与区域化进程合力之下产生的一项区域间合作机制，亚欧会议在推动亚欧国家间交流与合作方面具有重要价值。本文从国际制度的理论与实践出发，考察亚欧会议的制度化特征，并分析这些特征对于区域合作和中欧关系的意义。     

探索建立行政执法部门岗位风险防控新机制——以通州工商局“三联三防工程”为例

“三联三防工程”是通州工商局探索建立的岗位风险防控新机制。“三联三防”是指行政执法部门主动联合纪委建立岗位廉政教育工作机制，重点防控廉政风险；主动联合法院建立依法行政工作机制，重点防控执法风险；主动联合检察院建立预防职务犯罪工作机制，重点防控渎职风险。这一机制的建立，有效地整合了资源，借助多方专业力量，形成风险联防合力，从而打破了当前政府部门廉政建设内部循环的封闭格局，提高了行政执法部门廉政风险和履职风险防控的水平。     

International cooperation in exchange‐rate management: Coordination of U.S. and Japanese intervention, 1977–1990

What are the determinants of international cooperation in exchange‐rate management? To answer this question, coordination of foreign exchange intervention by the United States and Japan from 1977 to 1990 is analyzed. An examination of the data raises two empirical puzzles: (1) Why do the periods of active intervention and high cooperation coincide?; (2) Why does Japan intervene unilaterally more often than the United States? Some hypotheses drawn from various theories of cooperation are tested, but none of them receive strong support. Instead, intervention volume and learning by U.S. administrations account for the variance in coordination. These findings resolve the two puzzles: (1) The periods of active intervention are the time of high need for cooperation; (2) Japan is obliged to intervene unilaterally while the United States is learning to cooperate.