构建中国与土耳其新型战略合作关系

中国和土耳其两国在1971年建立外交关系,但在20世纪七八十年代冷战的背景下,中土关系处于一种低水平状态。冷战结束后,两国关系的发展出现了前所未有的势头。2010年10月,中国和土耳其宣布正式建立和发展战略合作关系。这种战略合作关系并非空洞的外交辞令,而是具有丰富的实质性内容。作为两个发展中的地区大国,中国和土耳其双方均着眼于未来,希望在国际舞台上发挥与各自政治、经济和军事力量相称的作用。在埃及、利比亚、叙利亚等阿拉伯国家发生剧烈动荡后,土耳其在中东地区的重要性更进一步凸显。随着中东和中亚在中国对外战略中地位的上升,土耳其在中国外交中的地位会更加重要。     

PEOPLE

正"Reading books gives you access to the knowledge and culture of the people of different countries.The main problem facing China and Turkey in the field of literature is the lack of translated books."Chinese writer and Nobel laureate Mo Yan,calling for more translated literature works at a news briefing in Istanbul on February 22     

Populism and democratic crisis in semi-presidential countries

This article demonstrates how different political opportunity structures in semi-presidential countries either enable or inhibit the overreach of populist presidents. In Turkey, for example, political leverage has been used to hamstring the opposition and transform a democratic regime into an authoritarian one. In Bulgaria, democracy also faded under a populist prime minister. Ukraine’s democracy had a checkered history, with frequent changes of power culminating in presidential breakdown. The Czech Republic introduced popular elections for the president to strengthen legitimacy, but that exposed the regime to conflict between the president and the prime minister.     

Marriage at the intersection between tradition and globalization

In this paper, we will investigate the popularity of marriage migration between Turkish communities in Western Europe and emigration regions in Turkey. Our focus here is specifically on the Belgian case, namely the ‘Emirdag connection’. In Belgium, the majority of immigrants with a Turkish background come from the region of Emirdag, in the province of Afyon. On the basis of quantitative research methodologies, we first consider the magnitude of the phenomenon and the socio-economic situation of those involved. Using the qualitative research techniques of participant observation and in-depth interviews, we analyze the mechanisms in an attempt to explain marriage migration between these regions. Why do so many young people, born and raised in Western Europe, opt for an unknown partner from a region that is largely unknown to them but which proves to be their parents', or even grandparents', region of origin? Why does migration remain such a valuable life project for many young people in these regions of origin, despite the real danger of many negative side effects? The popularity of marriage migration is often explained by its role in making migration possible. However, migration theories alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Here we will argue that the existence of a ‘culture of migration’ that binds the region of origin with the region of destination and in which ‘the family’ as an institution is capable of building a bridge between traditional praxis, as well as the challenges linked to international migration, are crucial for understanding the enduring popularity of marriage migration.     

In pursuit of homogeneity: the Lausanne Conference,minorities and the Turkish nation

Following World War I, the Allied Powers signed Minority Treaties with a number of Central and Eastern European states. These treaties delineated the status of religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities in their respective countries. Turkey would be one of the last states that sat down to the negotiation table with the Allied Powers. In the Turkish case, the Lausanne Treaty would be the defining document which set out a series of rights and freedoms for the non-Muslim minorities in the newly created nation. The present article explores how and why the non-Muslim minorities were situated in the fringes of the new nation. In doing so, the article highlights the content of the discussions in the Lausanne Conference and in the Turkish Grand National Assembly with an emphasis on the position of the Turkish political elite.     

The Impact of Palestine on Arab politics

The economic rationale for energy collaboration between Turkey, Cyprus and Israel is compelling. Cyprus and Israel need commercially viable export routes for their gas while Turkey is eager to diversify and increase its gas supplies. Hydrocarbon resources could potentially be a catalyst for both bringing about a Cyprus settlement and a Turkey-Israel rapprochement. A trilateral cooperation scheme involving a Turkey-Israel pipeline and an LNG plant in Cyprus could offer strong commercial incentives to all parties. But it would require bold political vision on the part of the region’s leaders, coupled with backing from influential external actors with an interest in reconciliation and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.     

Informal institutions,forms of state and democracy: the Turkish deep state

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms.1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’; O'Donnell, ‘Another Institutionalization’; O'Donnell, ‘Polyarchies’; Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions’; Merkel and Croissant, ‘Formale und informale Institutionen’; Weyland, ‘Limitations’; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In ‘defective democracies’,2 Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective’. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually ‘the actual rules that are being followed’.3 O'Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: ‘without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where ‘perverse institutionalization’5 Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation’, 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal ‘domination’,6 Weber, Economy and Society. View all notes Herrschaft in a Weberian sense. This modality of dual domination is what I call ‘deep state’.     

Democratization and the politicization of religious civil society in Turkey

In this article, we explain how the political opportunity structure characterized by official secularism and state regulation of religion has shaped the politicization of religiously oriented civil society in Turkey. The ban on religious political parties and strict state control over religious institutions create constraints for the expression of religious interests. However, due to changes in laws regulating the civil society sector and rule by a religiously sympathetic political party, religious groups use associations and foundations to express their interests. We observe that, in this strictly controlled opportunity structure, religiously oriented Muslims have framed their religious interests in the political realm parallel to those of the dominant political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Through a study of non-governmental organizations we document the rhetoric religious groups use to frame their position on several key issues: religious freedom for the majority religious group, methods of resolving issues related to minority populations, and the Ottoman heritage of charitable service.     

Turkish civil society divided by the headscarf ban

The headscarf ban at universities and public offices in Turkey caused many debates over women's rights and freedoms. Civil society organizations, which are known as agents of democratization, have been an important part of these debates. Drawing on the literature on the relationship between civil society, democracy, and Islam, this article investigates how Islamic, Kemalist secular, and non-Kemalist secular organizations support their stance towards the headscarf ban and react to critical developments regarding the ban. The discourse of the organizations is analysed using their press releases and in-depth interviews with the presidents of the organizations. By declaring the headscarf as anti-secular, anti-modern, and oppressive, Kemalist secular organizations reproduce official state ideology. The various ways in which Islamic organizations frame their stance on the headscarf issue on the other hand suggest that Islamic organizations could be just as democratic as many other secular movements. Furthermore, the fact that non-Kemalist secular organizations are critical of the headscarf ban makes them much closer to Islamic organizations than Kemalist secular organizations.     

LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN TURKEY

After ratification of the European Charter of Local Self‐Government in 1993, Turkey has witnessed major local government reform efforts in 2000s. The policy objectives of these reforms were granting more political, administrative and fiscal discretion to local governments along the principles of democratic decentralization and strengthening accountability linkages between citizens and local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyse the impact of these reforms. We argue that reforms have achieved limited success in improving decision‐making autonomy and accountability of local governments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.