The Limits of Peace: Third Parties in Civil Wars in Southeast Asia, 1993–2004

At of the end of 2005, Asia had the highest number of active civil war dyads. The number of active dyads in other regions was either low or declining. Africa, in particular, experienced a sharp drop in the number of active dyads from 2001 to 2005. Civil wars in Asia also last longer than wars in other regions. With a high number of warring dyads fighting in long wars, the expectation would be that the region would be the focus of third-party conflict management, but this is not the case. In this article, we use an original data set to take a closer look at this gap in expectations by focusing on third-party efforts in Southeast Asia between 1993 and 2004. Bilateral talks were the most common form of third-party engagement, but mediation has been the most likely form to lead to agreements between warring parties. We conclude the article with a discussion of the policy implications of this research.     

统一战线与宽容

伴随着改革开放的深入和社会主义市场经济的发展,社会的多样性和差异性特征更加突出,利益关系和社会矛盾日趋复杂。在错综复杂的社会背景下,营造一个宽容的社会环境,是构建社会主义和谐社会的必然要求。而统一战线的本质特征、工作原则和工作方法无不渗透着“宽容”的魅力,必然在构建社会主义和谐社会中发挥作用。     

近二十年来国内学界的东北抗联研究

中国共产党领导的东北抗日联军及其在东北地区开展的对日斗争活动是中国抗战力量的重要组成部分,也是中华民族抗击日本法西斯侵略的坚定意志的体现。长期以来,对于东北抗联的研究是中国学界有关抗战研究的重要课题之一。特别是近二十年以来,相关研究不断拓宽和深入,形成了多个研究较为集中的领域,在长期的研究过程中涌现出了一大批有价值的成果。这些研究成果充分佐证了中国共产党从组织策划,宣传动员到武装斗争等方面领导了东北抗日联军,从而为"中国共产党在抗日战争中发挥了中流砥柱作用"作了有力注脚;同时,东北抗联及广大爱国民众在抵抗日本侵略的斗争中逐步形成了全国抗日民族统一战线的雏形。     

“I’m awfully fed up with being a prisoner”* Australian POWs of the Turks and the Strain of Surrender

Nearly 200 Australians were captured and held as prisoners of war (POWs) by Ottoman Turkish forces during the First World War. They have largely been overlooked in Australian history and memory of the conflict with the result that little is known of their time in captivity or of its wider ramifications. In examining the emotional impact of their capture and imprisonment, this article offers intimate insights into how these Australian POWs felt about their captivity, from the moment of surrender until long after the war had ended. The humiliation of capture and confinement at the hands of a culturally, religiously and linguistically different enemy and the restrictions imposed by wartime imprisonment exacerbated the prisoners’ private feelings of shame and failure, feelings that were publicly reinforced in the aftermath of the war as the two dominant narratives of the conflict—the heroic Anzac fighter and the Turks as the honourable enemy—excluded or, at best, marginalised their experiences. Such analysis tells us much about the psychological dimension of wartime captivity, and adds to our understanding of the legacy of this POW experience.     

Proxy agents,auxiliary forces,and sovereign defection: assessing the outcomes of using non-state actors in civil conflicts

Abstract

This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the South-East (mixed direct and indirect – proxy – intervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and South-East, sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in South-East Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict.     

Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons From the Eritrean Independence War

This article uses data from the Eritrean war for independence to refine existing theories of rebel fragmentation. The author argues organizational performance affects the emergence of factional infighting within rebel organizations in unique and novel ways. While battlefield losses increase the likelihood of internal fragmentation, so do battlefield gains. The implication is battlefield stalemates possess unique properties that promote organizational cohesion in war, a relationship this study refers to as “cohesive stalemates.” The article extends an emerging literature on the internal politics of insurgent groups that has linked the coherence of rebel organizations to rebel losses.     

How Can Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Insights From Nepal

How can insurgent groups that are militarily far weaker than the state survive and grow? Influential accounts drawing on Kalyvas' “control-collaboration” model argue that limited state reach can make this possible by allowing rebel groups to carve out pockets of control where they can elicit collaboration. I suggest that this account is inadequate. Even states with limited reach are likely to transfer sufficient forces to rebel-affected areas to establish at least partial control. Weak rebels therefore often face the challenge of building capacity without local control to begin with. I identify two broad factors that can make this feasible: first, strong pre-existing rebel networks, which facilitate collaboration through solidarity, norms of reciprocity, and social incentives; and second, counterinsurgency policies and practices that fail to exploit the opportunities that control offers for incentivizing collaboration and shaping political preferences. These arguments are grounded in a fieldwork-based case study of insurgency processes in a hamlet of Rolpa, Nepal.     

(Non)-lethality and war: tear gas as a weapon of governmental intervention

This article attempts to think through the relationship between lethality and war through the object of tear gas from its invention to contemporary uses. First, I examine the way in which tear gas migrates from a zone of lethal/non-lethal conceptual indistinction, to one where the same rationalities operate but the intent of their use is opposed in relation to life and death. Second, from this biopolitical distinction, I trace its use in the governing of colonial populations and populations under occupation, and its recent weaponisation in “domestic” spaces. These contemporary uses of tear gas, I argue, can be seen as what Sloterdijk would call “atmosterror” which contribute to blurring the lines between war and peace.