工资集体协商存在的问题及其改进之策

开展切实的工资集体协商，是需要一定条件的。工会自身存在的一些问题，在影响着工资集体协商制度发挥有效作用。必须在工资集体协商的实践中积极推进工会自身改革与建设，以使工会能切实担负起代表职工参与工资共决的时代使命，从而为促进劳动公平、构建和谐劳动关系作出应有贡献。     

浅谈辩诉交易制度

辩诉交易制度是20世纪在美国发展起来的,到现在已成为美国刑事诉讼制度的基石,其采用了当事人主义诉讼程序、检察官享有广泛的自由裁量权、完善的辩护制度、成熟的证据开示制度以及沉默权,使越来越多的国家对该制度进行借鉴和移植。     

辩诉交易在我国适用的困境——以美国辩诉交易的基础为视角

美国的辩诉交易是为了应对高犯罪率、刑事案件大量积压以及普通程序比较繁琐的弊端而产生的,它的产生有其特定的理论和制度基础。我国不能盲目移植美国的辩诉交易制度,应结合我国的具体情况分析。     

刑事诉讼中的“审辩交易”现象研究

刑事诉讼中的"审辩交易"是一种客观存在的现象,从法官的视角出发,可以将其分为三种类型,即基于事实疑罪、法律疑罪以及案外因素进行的交易。压力驱动与大权在握的法官,在主动与被动之间的被告方,作为旁观者的公诉方以及被和解或者不知情的被害方的理性选择促成了"审辩交易"的达成。审判权力行政化的运行机制、不合理的诉讼真实理念、案件分流机制的匮乏以及不当的绩效考评机制导致法官承担巨大的压力,法官选择进行交易是转移压力的一种方式。目前,"审辩交易"的存在有一定的合理性,但也存在大量的弊端,要改变这种压力后置型的司法模式,需要对导致"审辩交易"现象发生的诸多因素进行改革。     

Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence

Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars choose to fight one another? This article models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of incomplete information with an outside option. The game-theoretic model explores the relationship between the status quo distribution of power among rebel groups, the costs of fighting, and the likelihood that one rebel group will opt to unilaterally end bargaining over a set of goods, such as access to supply routes, natural resources, and control over civilian populations. We show that the likelihood of violent conflict between rebel groups is lowest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the existing distribution of power.     

Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments

Over 30 years ago, Eric Browne and Mark Franklin demonstrated that parties in a coalition tend to receive portfolio payoffs in almost perfect proportionality to their seat share. Even though this result has been confirmed in several studies, few researchers have asked what the underlying mechanism is that explains why parties receive a proportional payoff. The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanism linking party size and portfolio payoffs. To fulfil this aim, a small-n analysis is performed. By analysing the predictions from a statistical analysis of all post-war coalition governments in 14 Western European countries, two predicted cases are selected, the coalitions that formed after the 1976 Swedish election and the 1994 German election. In these case studies two hypotheses are evaluated: that the proportional distribution of ministerial posts is the result of a social norm, and that parties obtain payoffs according to their bargaining strength. The results give no support to the social norm hypothesis. Instead, it is suggested that proportionality serves as a bargaining convention for the actors involved, thus rendering proportional payoffs more likely.     

Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining

Charge bargaining is a potentially important form of discretion in criminal sentencing that is obscured in many studies of sentencing outcomes. Our procedure to measure the difference in sentencing outcomes caused by plea bargain emphasizes the amount, in months, that the sentence length is reduced. Using this measure, we compare prosecutorial discretion across counties in two different states. We conclude that charge bargaining plays an empirically important role in determining sentencing outcomes. Furthermore, we find that measuring the distance (in months of prison time) moved during a charge bargain may provide a very different estimate of the discretion than is given by the rate of bargaining, which is the usual measure used. Although the rate of charge bargaining was higher in the voluntary guidelines state, its impact on sentences was greater in the presumptive guidelines jurisdiction, as predicted by Reitz (1998). We further observe a dramatic difference in predictions from shifting the case characteristics underlying the summary measure. This result reveals that distributional differences (either due to the underlying criminal activity or due to the overall level of severity of punishment) can easily obscure the inferences necessary for understanding the operation of the systems. Our finding of differential charge bargaining in these two jurisdictions should provide a caution when comparing the results of studies of disparity in sentencing across jurisdiction types.

浅析辩诉交易制度及其在我国的确立

辩诉交易是美国刑事诉讼文化的重要组成部分。有高效、实用、民主等特色。当今世界各国都面临着社会犯罪压力巨大和司法资源有限的两难处境，众多国家，包括一部分大陆法系国家转而借鉴美国的辩诉交易制度，并在实践工作中取得了良好效果。在社会转型时期，中国具备了适用辩诉交易制度的司法环境，建立一套适应我国国情的行之有效的、具有中国特色的辩诉交易制度是极为重要的。     

Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining

Plea bargaining has become a central feature of criminal procedure in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. This paper explores an area seldom discussed in the economic literature on plea bargaining: the influence of the defence lawyer's fee contract on the terms of the bargain. In particular, it uses data from one jurisdiction of the impact on case trajectories of changes in publicly funded defence lawyers’ contracts to test the proposition that the nature of the lawyer's contract influences how cases are managed. An event study methodology on a pooled time-series cross-section data set of case trajectories before and after the change in the nature of the contract is used to examine whether the new payment regime significantly changed the trajectories of cases through the summary criminal justice system. Overall the results seem to suggest that the behaviour of defence lawyers may be influenced by financial incentives. This implies that the terms of plea bargains reached between prosecution and defence lawyers may be affected by the defence lawyer's remuneration contract. Consequently, the authors conclude that the role of defence lawyers has been under-researched in the literature on the economics of plea bargaining.     

采矿权并非用益物权的法理辩析——与中国政法大学李显冬教授商榷

《物权法》颁布，一贯主张采矿权属准物权的专家转向采矿权属最完整的用益物权，以矿产资源是劳动对象，开采中即时消耗不须返还为采矿权客体的被处分作辩解。但是，法律关系的客体和经济关系的劳动对象不可能相通，而且客体没有在开采中即时消耗，完全可以速还，客体被处分误为标的物被消耗。采矿权是财产权、行政权、行为权三个不同层面整合的多面体，不同层面的性质不同。应重构采矿权为独立的矿产权和采掘权（开采权），矿产权是国有特定矿产所有权的让渡，属自物权。