The predicament of elections in war-torn societies

Why do elections held in the shadow of civil wars sometimes generate more violence in already war-torn societies, while in other circumstances they do not? This article develops a conceptual framework based on three clusters of factors to analyse the conflict-generating aspects of elections in war-torn societies: the key actors in the electoral processes; the institutions of elections; and the stakes of the elections. Two types of war-related elections are distinguished: elections held during an ongoing civil war, and elections held in the post-war period when peace is to be implemented. While different in many respects, the two contexts share critical characteristics through their association with the legacy of warfare. Several important implications emerge from the analysis. First, relating to militant and violent actors, incentive structures need to be altered by addressing both the opportunities and means of violence. Second, to prevent inducements for violent behaviour, institutional arrangements – including electoral commissions – have to be crafted with consideration given to local conflict dynamics and the history of violent conflict. Finally, the stakes of elections in war-shattered societies can be reduced through, for instance, constitutional pact-making and the oversight of external actors in electoral processes.     

Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa

A growing body of evidence holds that citizens support democracy when they believe the regime has provided individual freedoms and political rights. Put simply, citizens develop legitimacy attitudes by learning about democracy. These findings, however, are based on citizens' evaluations of the procedural elements of democracy. Democratization also entails substantive reforms that likely impact legitimacy attitudes. This article provides the first test of how the success – and failure – of substantive democratization shapes legitimacy attitudes. Using data from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys, I find surprising results. Citizens who judge the regime to be more successful in substantive democratization are actually less likely to be committed democrats. I conclude with possible explanations of these surprising findings and reflect on the challenges for both future research and for the new democracies facing this situation.     

The African national congress and its critics: ‘predatory liberalism’, black empowerment and intra-alliance tensions in post-apartheid South Africa

Post-apartheid South Africa is characterized by centralized, neo-liberal policymaking that perpetuates, and in some cases exaggerates, socio-economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid era. The African National Congress (ANC) leadership's alignment with powerful international and domestic market actors produces tensions within the Tripartite Alliance and between government and civil society. Consequently, several characteristics of ‘predatory liberalism’ are evident in contemporary South Africa: neo-liberal restructuring of the economy is combined with an increasing willingness by government to assert its authority, to marginalize and delegitimize those critical of its abandonment of inclusive governance. A new form of oligarch power, combining entrenched economic interests with those of a new ‘black bourgeoisie’ promoted by narrowly implemented Black Economic Empowerment policies, diminishes prospects for broad-based socio-economic transformation. Because the new policy environment is failing to resolve tensions between global market demands for increasing market liberalization and domestic popular demands for poverty-alleviation and socio-economic transformation, the ANC leadership is forced increasingly to confront ‘ultra-leftists’ who are challenging its credentials as defender of the National Democratic Revolution which was the cornerstone in the anti-apartheid struggle.     

Namibia: Consensus institutions and majoritarian politics

This article assesses the utility of Arend Lijphart's classification scheme of democracies by means of a case study of Namibia. In particular, the article examines whether Namibia represents a case of consensus democracy, based on institutional criteria within the power-sharing and power-division dimensions, as developed in Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy (1999). The application of the ten criteria results in a mixed outcome, with an overall modal value of ‘moderately consensus’, a modal value of strongly majoritarian for the executive-parties dimension, and moderately consensus for the federal-executive dimension. The highly varied scores for each of the criteria, particularly within the first of Lijphart's two dimensions, present several problems. It is argued that the statistical modal value represents a distorted image of Namibian politics. Namibia scores consistently on the majoritarian side for criteria which conceptually concern the essence of the consensus modal. Moreover, apparent consensus features such as tripartite institutions, bicameralism, and a rigid constitution do not ‘behave’ as such due to one-party dominance, and neither does proportional representation produce consensus politics. Lijphart's criteria are too formal, and should not receive equal weight. The article concludes that power-sharing is better investigated by focusing on just two criteria, namely the party system and the strongly related criterion of government coalitions. Moreover, it is essential to examine political behaviour, in particular of governing elites, to look for the presence of cooperation and compromise, paradoxically issues which were more prominent in Lijphart's earlier work.     

Conflict Resolution through Democracy Promotion? The Role of the OSCE in Georgia

This article qualitatively and empirically analyses the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy after intra-state war in Georgia. This regional organization is rooted in a comprehensive approach to security that directly links security to democratic values. Therefore, the OSCE is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the issue of democracy promotion in the context of conflict-resolution processes. Georgia provides a difficult environment for such a goal. Given that its two secession conflicts are ‘frozen’, democracy can, especially in this context, be considered a well-suited means to indirectly contribute to conflict resolution. By contrasting the democratic development in Georgia with OSCE activities since 1992, this article will assess OSCE democracy promotion efforts. When these efforts are measured with regard to progress in peace and democratic quality, the effectiveness of external democracy promotion by the OSCE has to be called into question. However, the article argues that democratization is a long-term process in which internal factors play a decisive role. The OSCE, like other international organizations, can only reach its normative goals to the degree of the reform orientation and political will of the target state's government. The potential for impact is limited, but can be increased by commitment and context sensitivity.     

War and Democratization: Legality,Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Promotion of democracy in post-war and post-conflict societies became a hot topic during the 1990s. External actors linked their peace-building efforts to the promotion of democracy. Four modes of promotion of democracy by external actors can be distinguished: first, enforcing democratization by enduring post-war occupation (mode 1); second, restoring an elected government by military intervention (mode 2); third, intervening in on-going massacres and civil war with military forces (‘humanitarian intervention’) and thereby curbing the national sovereignty of those countries (mode 3); and fourth, forcing democracy on rogue states by ‘democratic intervention’, in other words, democracy through war (mode 4). In this special issue we consider the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the four modes where the international community of states not only felt impelled to engage in military humanitarian or peace-building missions but also in long-term state- and democracy-building. All cases analysed here suggest that embedding democratization in post-war and post-conflict societies entails a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. If external actors withdraw before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail.     

Burnt into the Brain: Towards a Redefinition of Political Culture

The current US administration has made the promotion of ‘political and economic freedom’ overseas a cornerstone of its foreign policy doctrine. The underlying notion that human beings all over the world can be chiefly motivated by a desire for personal liberty seems a noble but hardly realistic ideal. Such motivation is fostered by processes of social modernization and individualization. These changes are linked not only to structural transformations and the spread of new values and ideas, but also to the gradual rewiring of the brains of individuals involved in them. New findings in neuroscience point to clear parallels between changes in social and personality structures (individualization, self-discipline, sense of agency, time orientation, trust, and the like), and modified patterns of brain wiring in individuals. The cultural changes sometimes seen as a precondition for democratization and democratic consolidation are therefore likely to be slow and to escape deliberate political orchestration. Moreover, diffuse processes of brain rewiring conducive to democratic political development, which can be seen as creating favourable neurocultural preconditions for democracy, may be hampered by the rapid spread of the market economy over new regions and areas of life in both developing and Western countries. These processes can be studied by the new sub-field of political science called neuropolitics, to be consolidated over the next few years.     

USAID,Population Control,and NGO-Led Democratization in Egypt: The Fate of the ICPD Programme of Action

Critics of US democracy-promotion strategies of the last 20 years ask: what kind of democracy is promoted by US public agencies and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), how is it promoted, and for what purpose(s)? This paper draws on interviews with NGO, USAID, and UN representatives, gathered in Egypt in 2001, to describe the fate of Egyptian women's advocacy NGOs seeking to implement the pro-democracy platform of action of the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). It offers some support for critics' contentions both that external (here USAID) pro-democracy interventions may actually obstruct democratization, and that the instrumental nature of US democracy promotion may mean that such activities are quickly eliminated or downgraded when they conflict with more primary US policy goals.     

Ties that bind? The rise and decline of ethno-regional partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009

In the first three elections following Malawi's return to democracy in 1993, voting patterns displayed a clear ethno-regional pattern. Then in 2009 the regional pattern broke down in dramatic fashion, with the incumbent President, Bingu wa Mutharika, attracting majority support across all three regions. This article first examines whether ethnic identities were at the root of Malawi's ethno-regional electoral pattern. Our tests show that while ethnic identities were associated with partisan attachments in some areas, regional patterns were more consistently related to other factors, particularly views of the government's performance and the inclusiveness of the ruling party. We then examine the breakdown of the regional pattern, drawing on trend analysis of public opinion data from 1999 to 2008. We show that by 2009 the majority of Malawians in all three regions had come to hold positive views of Mutharika's performance and had come to see his government as inclusive. We conclude, therefore, that shifts in patterns of partisanship had more to do with political factors – Mutharika's symbolic and substantive policies during this first term – than ethnic identities. Malawi reminds us that incumbents, when faced with incentives to construct multi-ethnic support bases, can use the power of the state to reach out across ethnic political boundaries and re-order supposedly entrenched patterns of partisanship.     

De-idealizing the democratic civil peace: on the political economy of democratic stabilization and pacification in Argentina and Ecuador

In the liberal concept of a ‘democratic civil peace’, an idealistic understanding of democratic stabilization and pacification prevails: democracy is seen to guarantee political stability and social peace by offering comprehensive representation and participation in political decisions while producing outcomes broadly in accordance with the common interest of society. This contrasts with the procedural quality and the material achievements of most, if not all, really existing democracies. South America is paradigmatic. Here, the legitimation of liberal democracy through both procedure and performance is weak and yet ‘third wave democracies’ have managed to survive even harsh economic and political crises. The article presents a conceptual framework to analyse historically specific patterns of democratic stabilization and pacification. Analyses of the processes of socio-political destabilization and re-stabilization in Argentina and Ecuador since the late 1990s show how a ‘de-idealized’ perspective on the democratic civil peace helps explain the viability of democratic regimes that systematically deviate from the ideal-type conditions for democratic survival that have been proposed in the literature.