Getting Out the Vote With Voting Advice Applications

This article investigates the mobilization potential of online voter information tools known as “Voting Advice Applications” (VAAs). We argue that an observational approach utilizing survey data constitutes the best available method for causal inference where VAAs are popular—and we are thus most interested in VAA turnout effects—because randomized experiments are likely to run into double cross-over problems. We suggest that matching offers key improvements over existing methods to tackle self-selection into VAA use in observational studies. To improve confidence in selection on observables, we complement matching estimates with an extensive sensitivity analysis, including a placebo test. Empirically, we study the effect of smartvote, a popular VAA from Switzerland, on turnout in the 2007 Swiss federal election. We find that smartvote usage significantly increased the individual-level probability to vote. Our results suggest that smartvote was, on the aggregate, responsible for about 1.2 % points of the total tally with an estimated cost of nine Swiss Francs (7.5 U.S. dollars or 1.4 “Big Macs”) per additional vote. Promising as well, we find that the mobilization effect was more pronounced among younger voters. Our findings point to the value of VAAs compared to traditional get out the vote tactics.     

Measuring re-election prospects across electoral systems: a general approach applied to Germany

This research note presents a general approach for measuring the electoral safety of individual MPs across electoral systems that is based on predicted re-election probabilities estimated from multilevel logistic regression models. In contrast to existing measures, this method yields estimates on an intuitive and readily comparable probability scale, captures the higher sensitivity of re-election prospects to electoral change in the range of close races, and can accommodate regional differences in context conditions such as volatility. The paper implements the approach for two archetypical electoral systems – first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and closed-list proportional representation (PR) – and estimates re-election prospects for the FPTP and PR tiers of the German mixed electoral system in all Bundestag elections since 1957. While the empirical data presented here is mainly illustrative, the concluding section highlights various questions that future research can address with the new measure.     

Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems

The existing literature on ideological congruence has typically looked at congruence immediately after elections when governments are formed. This article goes beyond that comparative static approach by examining changes in citizen-government ideological congruence between two fixed points in time, namely at the beginning and end of government mandates. Building on a veto player approach and dynamics of party competition under majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the results indicate, first, that government positions are more stable in between elections, as the number of parties and their ideological distance increase in cabinet. Second, it appears that single-party and homogeneous coalition governments decrease ideological congruence between elections under low levels of polarisation, while they increase congruence under very high levels of polarisation. Third, it was found that governments under majoritarian systems slightly decrease congruence between elections while congruence stays stable on average under PR systems. The different levels of party system polarisation across majoritarian and PR electoral systems mostly explain this difference.     

Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently.     

When do electoral institutions trigger electoral misconduct?

Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like proportional representation. However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms.     

Battleground: candidate selection and violence in Africa’s dominant political parties

ABSTRACT

This article develops a theory – rooted in the experience of the African National Congress in South Africa – to explain how, and why, a dominant political party is less likely to conduct orderly elections to select its political leadership. First, I demonstrate that canny party leaders – operating in the space between a divided society and a weak state – make an ideological turn to a “congress-like” political party, which is clever (in the short term) because it provides party leaders with an in-built electoral majority. It is, however, also a dangerous manoeuvre because it essentially endogenizes social competition for state resources inside the dominant party. This displacement of social competition away from the public sphere towards the partisan organization increases the likelihood of disorderly competition for party candidacies. Second, I demonstrate how this competition need not necessarily become the basis of violent competition inside the dominant party. The party leadership can use intra-party elections to stabilize competition, but only if the party invests in an organization that applies impartially the rules that govern the election.     

The Purpose and Perception of Learning Objectives

Much of existing assessment and instructional design strategies revolve around the use of learning objectives. Learning objectives are used by faculty, by instructional designers, by accreditors, by assessment offices, and by students. But even as the use of learning objectives becomes more widespread, the definition and purpose have remained unclear. Instructional designers argue that learning objectives exist to provide a focused mindset for students engaging in the content, while faculty often view learning objectives as an administrative requirement that has little impact on teaching or student performance. Existing research on the subject is primarily normative and/or qualitative in nature (Harden 2002 Harden, Ronald M. 2002. “Learning Outcomes and Instructional Objectives: Is There a Difference?” Medical Teacher 24 (2):151–155.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Torrance 2007 Torrance, Harry. 2007. “Assessment as Learning? How the Use of Explicit Learning Objectives, Assessment Criteria and Feedback in Post-Secondary Education and Training Can Come to Dominate Learning.” Assessment in Education 14 (3):281–94. doi:10.1080/09695940701591867.[Taylor &; Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). In this article, the researchers seek to use empirical evidence to examine the definitions, purpose, and impact of learning objectives on student performance. We find that there is no shared understanding of definitions and purpose, and using an experimental design, we find that learning objective wording and use in the classroom does not affect student performance.     

Norwegian parliamentary elections, 1906–2013: representation and turnout across four electoral systems

Since gaining full independence in 1905, Norway has experienced more than a century of democratic elections, and has reformed its electoral system three times, most notably with the switch from a two-round runoff system to proportional representation in 1919. This research note introduces a new dataset featuring all candidates running for parliamentary (Storting) elections from 1906 to 2013, and documents the patterns over time and across electoral systems in the development of the party system; candidates’ gender, age, occupation, and geographic ties; and voter turnout. Scholars interested in using the dataset can gain access to it through the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.     

Conflict,choice or geography? Explaining patterns of democracy in continental Europe

The ‘character’ of democracy is regularly summarised using political‐institutional measures of, for instance, ‘consensus’ or ‘majoritarian’ democracy. Yet, there is little quantitative‐comparative research on the origins of such configurations. Drawing on literature on endogenous institutions and constitutional design, this article proposes a model for the explanation of empirical patterns of democracy. Using a novel database of 26 continental (neighbouring) European democracies and Bayesian spatial modelling, the results indicate that while today's empirical patterns of democracy in terms of proportional power diffusion can be traced back to waves of democratisation rather than historical partisan power configurations, decentral power diffusion can partially be explained by socio‐structural factors, and spatial dependencies exist for all variants of power diffusion.