Wage differentials and social comparison: An experimental study of interrelated ultimatum bargaining

Equal pay for equal work is discussed in many different legal and political contexts. Our study explores one consequence of this formula, the effect of social comparison for wage acceptance, in multilateral ultimatum games. The results of our laboratory experiments indicate that the availability of information concerning ultimatum offers to other responders influences acceptance behavior even if responders have differing outside options. Particularly, behavior is only partly influenced by self-regarding social comparison; that is, the probability of acceptance decreases significantly for offers that put responders at a substantial disadvantage compared with others. On the contrary, responders are also partly concerned about unfavorable discrimination against others. However, we find that in our setting, i.e. in a setting where the wage offer relation is endogenously chosen, a slightly unequal relation maximizes the joint acceptance frequency for both responders.     

辩诉交易中的检察权基础

辩诉交易制度在美国经历了百余年的发展,形成了一整套行之有效的司法制度体系。该文认为,辩诉交易在美国绝非是检察官和辩护律师之间的讨价还价,但检察官和辩护律师之间的交易是辩诉交易的核心环节,而此时检察官手中的权力对辩诉交易的形成和发展则有着决定性的影响。     

"集体协商"与"集体合同"词义辩

从中国集体合同制度创建以来的实践看,所谓的集体合同实质上是集体协议.协议与合同属于可以分清的两个概念.一般情况下,协议多数是没有法律强制力的,而合同多数是有法律上的强制执行力.劳动法领域中的"集体合同"是中国特色制度,这一用词并不科学,甚至产生负面影响.     

我国集体谈判法律制度构建障碍及克服设想

市场经济国家一直将集体谈判视为协调与处理劳资关系的重要方式与手段。在社会主义市场经济体制建立过程当中,我国劳资纠纷逐年上升,各种各样的群体性事件不断出现,协调集体劳动关系显得尤为重要,而集体谈判制度在规范与协调集体劳动关系方面的作用随之凸现出来。本文从集体谈判和集体谈判权的基本含义入手,对构建我国集体谈判法律制度的障碍进行分析,并提出构建我国集体谈判法律制度的几点设想。     

试析“辩诉交易”的运作条件

"辩诉交易"作为一种日趋普适的制度现象已引起我国学术界与司法实践部门的广泛关注.就移植"辩诉交易"制度所必须关注的外围层问题,即支持其正当运作的观念条件和制度条件.观念条件包括协商观念和人文观念;制度条件包括控方自由裁量权的扩大和检察官素质的提高,赋予被告人沉默权、确立非法证据排除规则、侦查警察与看守警察分离、加强律师的诉讼参与、建立证据开示制度以及审方中立的要求.     

The Origins of Parliamentary Agenda Control: A Comparative Process Tracing Analysis

This paper aims to explain the origins of the rules of parliamentary agenda control, which can be regarded as the single most important institutional determinant of parliamentary power. Based on the premises of distributive bargaining, the paper develops a causal mechanism for the delegation of agenda control to the government majority. Given that only anti-system or anti-establishment parties strictly prefer to participate in plenary proceedings, these ‘anti’-parties potentially obstruct legislation. Such legislative obstruction by ‘anti’-parties causes establishment parties to commit themselves to procedural reform and thus triggers attempts to centralise agenda control. The delegation of parliamentary agenda powers is successful if opposition to procedural reform is confined to anti-system parties. The causal leverage of this mechanism is assessed in a process-tracing of three reform attempts in two most different cases: the initially ineffective, but then successful introduction of a closure procedure in the United Kingdom and the failed attempt to facilitate the closure in Germany.     

当前我国有限责任公司发展对法定资本制的依赖

我国目前正处于转型期,社会信用短缺。在此情境下,若法定资本制缺位,则由于其具有使投资者以有限责任公司为交易欺诈工具的诱因,故极可能导致有限公司整体信用趋劣。倘如此,则其潜在交易者的交易热情会因其对前者所产生的预期利益减少而下挫,这无疑将制约前者的发展;而若法定资本制严格施行,则能使上述情形得到相当改观。这凸显出当前我国有限公司的发展对法定资本制的依赖。因此,宜对其加以完善而不是以授权资本制或折衷资本制取而代之。     

初探辩诉交易制度的引入和改造

辨诉交易制度是一项起源于美国的刑事司法制度,目前已被西方国家广泛采用.我国是否可以将这项司法制度作为他山之玉加以引入,理论界和司法实务界存在较大争议.从辩诉交易制度包含的公正和效率的辨证关系分析,在我国引入该制度有一定的必要性.我国对辩诉交易制度的移植不能全盘引入,而应当是取其精华进行借鉴,使之本土化,对不足部分采取必要措施加以防止.