完善我国工资集体协商立法之我见

工资集体协商制度,是市场经济国家协调劳动关系重要机制在中国的发展,但其全部效应并未全面发挥出来,立法不完善是其重要原因之一。因此,应着力提升立法理念,完善法律制度建设,加强对工资协商代表的保护,明确规定违反工资集体协商的法律责任,以充分发挥该制度在促进社会分配公平公正中的作用。     

国外三方协商机制及其对我国的启示与借鉴

三方机制是市场经济条件下工业化国家通过政府、雇主和工会组织对涉及经济社会发展等重大问题进行平等协商,达成一致的一种制度。它是平衡劳资力量对比、解决社会矛盾特别是劳动争议的有效手段,是确保经济社会平稳、可持续发展的制度性安排与保障。研究和借鉴工业化市场经济国家的有益经验,对于进一步完善我国三方协商机制,有效解决我国当前日趋增多的劳动争议,维护我国劳动关系长期和谐稳定,促进我国经济社会长期平稳可持续发展,具有十分重要的作用和意义。作者对进一步完善我国三方协商机制及其作用,提出了若干具体建议。     

Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining

We attempt to open a path to the comparative analysis of criminal procedure by superimposing the efficiency principle onto an adversarial system characterized by an aversion to false convictions and an inquisitorial system characterized by a desire to justly punish the guilty. We begin with a general model of plea bargaining, embed it in a larger framework that addresses the costs of adjudication, the value of punishing the guilty and the costs of false convictions, and then link the desirability of plea bargaining and compulsory prosecution to the weights given these costs and benefits in the objective function. We examine the judicial endorsement of plea bargaining in the United States and the debate over European analogs to plea bargaining in light of the model, and conclude that plea bargaining will increase social welfare in adversarial systems but not in inquisitorial ones.     

关于集体协商中强制性行政规范的设定问题

通过在地方性法规和行政规章中设置约束性惩戒性的行政规范，难以解决集体协商中拒绝或拖延集体协商问题，也不利于集体劳动关系的和谐稳定及健康发展。完善规范建立在“劳工三权”基础上的集体协商机制，利用市场机制和法律制度，协调劳动关系主体相互间的利益关系，化解矛盾冲突，这不仅是劳动者与工会的最佳选择，也应当是政府确立和发展和谐稳定劳动关系的途径和目标。     

工资集体协商存在的问题及其改进之策

开展切实的工资集体协商，是需要一定条件的。工会自身存在的一些问题，在影响着工资集体协商制度发挥有效作用。必须在工资集体协商的实践中积极推进工会自身改革与建设，以使工会能切实担负起代表职工参与工资共决的时代使命，从而为促进劳动公平、构建和谐劳动关系作出应有贡献。     

浅谈辩诉交易制度

辩诉交易制度是20世纪在美国发展起来的,到现在已成为美国刑事诉讼制度的基石,其采用了当事人主义诉讼程序、检察官享有广泛的自由裁量权、完善的辩护制度、成熟的证据开示制度以及沉默权,使越来越多的国家对该制度进行借鉴和移植。     

辩诉交易在我国适用的困境——以美国辩诉交易的基础为视角

美国的辩诉交易是为了应对高犯罪率、刑事案件大量积压以及普通程序比较繁琐的弊端而产生的,它的产生有其特定的理论和制度基础。我国不能盲目移植美国的辩诉交易制度,应结合我国的具体情况分析。     

刑事诉讼中的“审辩交易”现象研究

刑事诉讼中的"审辩交易"是一种客观存在的现象,从法官的视角出发,可以将其分为三种类型,即基于事实疑罪、法律疑罪以及案外因素进行的交易。压力驱动与大权在握的法官,在主动与被动之间的被告方,作为旁观者的公诉方以及被和解或者不知情的被害方的理性选择促成了"审辩交易"的达成。审判权力行政化的运行机制、不合理的诉讼真实理念、案件分流机制的匮乏以及不当的绩效考评机制导致法官承担巨大的压力,法官选择进行交易是转移压力的一种方式。目前,"审辩交易"的存在有一定的合理性,但也存在大量的弊端,要改变这种压力后置型的司法模式,需要对导致"审辩交易"现象发生的诸多因素进行改革。     

Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence

Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars choose to fight one another? This article models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of incomplete information with an outside option. The game-theoretic model explores the relationship between the status quo distribution of power among rebel groups, the costs of fighting, and the likelihood that one rebel group will opt to unilaterally end bargaining over a set of goods, such as access to supply routes, natural resources, and control over civilian populations. We show that the likelihood of violent conflict between rebel groups is lowest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the existing distribution of power.     

Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments

Over 30 years ago, Eric Browne and Mark Franklin demonstrated that parties in a coalition tend to receive portfolio payoffs in almost perfect proportionality to their seat share. Even though this result has been confirmed in several studies, few researchers have asked what the underlying mechanism is that explains why parties receive a proportional payoff. The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanism linking party size and portfolio payoffs. To fulfil this aim, a small-n analysis is performed. By analysing the predictions from a statistical analysis of all post-war coalition governments in 14 Western European countries, two predicted cases are selected, the coalitions that formed after the 1976 Swedish election and the 1994 German election. In these case studies two hypotheses are evaluated: that the proportional distribution of ministerial posts is the result of a social norm, and that parties obtain payoffs according to their bargaining strength. The results give no support to the social norm hypothesis. Instead, it is suggested that proportionality serves as a bargaining convention for the actors involved, thus rendering proportional payoffs more likely.