The Iraq War and the Responsibility to Protect: Uses,Abuses and Consequences for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention

Before the 2003 Iraq war, the political leadership of the United States and United Kingdom had to sell the case for war to their people and the world. This was attempted through a number of speeches that employed rhetorical justifications for the war. Two prominent justifications used during this period involved the employment of security and humanitarian narratives. The security narrative focused on claims regarding Iraq's undermining of international law, possession of weapons of mass destruction and threat to the world. The humanitarian narrative revolved around claims about human suffering in Iraq and the need to liberate its people. While it is widely assumed that security is the dominant casus belli in the post-9/11 world, there is much evidence to suggest that the humanitarian justifications that played a critical role in the military interventions of the 1990s were still important after 9/11. The use of humanitarian justifications for the Iraq war clearly has implications for the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement, which has gained prominence since the December 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report. Based on an extensive content analysis of speeches by the US and UK political leadership before the war, this article will quantify the relative importance of each narrative and analyse what the findings mean for the ongoing debates within the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement.     

The Practice and Theory of US Statebuilding

Abstract

The United States has employed three models of statebuilding over the last century, each animated by a different political theory. Statebuilding 1.0, developed and used from the late 1890s through the end of the Cold War, emphasized building loyal and politically stable subordinate states. Privileging American geopolitical and economic interests over those of local populations, the model was premised on the theory of realpolitik. Statebuilding 2.0 arose under and, in many ways, came to characterize attempts by the United States to construct a New World Order after 1990. The key shift was from seeking loyalty to building legitimate states. Under this model, the United States attempted to build broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms. In this ‘end of history’ moment, liberalism reigned triumphant in statebuilding practice and theory. Statebuilding 3.0 is now being ‘field-tested’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. This new model seeks to build legitimacy for new states by providing security and essential public services to their populations. It rests on social contract theory, and its core tenet that legitimacy follows from providing effectively for the basic needs of citizens. Successive sections summarize the practice of statebuilding under each model and discuss its implicit political theory. A critique of each model then flows naturally into the practice and logic of the next. The conclusion outlines why a statebuilding 3.1 is necessary, and what such a strategy might entail.     

Writing about Rwanda since the Genocide: Knowledge,Power and ‘Truth’

This debate article reflects upon four articles recently published in this journal as part of a special Forum on Rwanda (Volume 8, Issue 4, 2014)—released to coincide with the 20-year commemoration of the 1994 genocide. In doing so it highlights what this author considers to be a crisis in contemporary ‘Rwanda studies’. This crisis—referenced and reproduced to some extent in all four articles—combines methodological (‘how can we write about Rwanda?’) and epistemological (‘how should we write about Rwanda?’) uncertainty against a backdrop of highly polarized, partisan and sometimes personalized research agendas. In exploring this phenomenon, the study explores not only the role of academics (mainly European and Rwandan) but also of the Rwandan government itself, highlighting the rise of ‘activist polities’ such as that in contemporary Kigali. These regimes consider knowledge production to be an aspect of their own sovereignty and this poses fundamental challenges, as yet largely unacknowledged, to parts of Western Africanist scholarship.     

Continuity or Change?: Intervention and Statebuilding after Kosovo

ABSTRACT

The significance of Kosovo can only be understood by first situating the intervention in 1999 and the subsequent statebuilding process in a historical context. While there is a profound difference between 1999 and today, we should not conclude that this means the practice of humanitarian intervention has gone into decline as a result of waning western power. Decisions on intervention at that juncture, as indeed they are today. I conclude by arguing, however, that the theory and practice of statebuilding, has changed markedly since 1999; expectations as to the capacity of international administrations to transform post-conflict societies have declined markedly.     

Turkey in Somalia: challenging North/Western interventionism?

Turkey’s humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey’s intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’ of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia.     

From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ exacerbated the conflict in Somalia

Abstract

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. This article examines how the earlier Ethiopian policies towards Somalia has reshaped the (post)-Cold War politics of the Horn. In doing so, it traces the roots of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia vis-à-vis new non-state armed groups to chart the changing political dynamics of the conflict in Somalia. By using historical approach, the article argues that Ethiopia’s agenda is central to understanding why the ‘War on Terror’ has strengthened and subsequently midwifed armed militant movements (e.g. new insurgency groups) in Somalia, starting from Al-Itihaad to today’s Al-Shabaab. In focusing upon various regional actors and groups, the article moves from the emphasis of internal systems to external power structures, considering the wider historical and political factors in the region that must be closely examined if the regional and local conflicts are to be deeply understood. While it is a context-specific study, the article aims to contribute fresh perspectives and insights to ongoing discussions on the consequences of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.     

External Democratization after War: Success and Failure

In post-war societies external actors promote democracy within a broad framework of state- and nation-building, rule-of-law building, and economic development. But not all democracy promotion efforts succeed in an equal way. A closer look at cases of intervention and democratization since 1945 helps us to account for this variation. Cases of democratization can be differentiated according to their level of post-war socio-economic development, the level of social trust versus the level of inner-societal violence, the character of remaining stateness, the potential erosion of the nation, and the terms of peace. In order to explain the democratization successes of the post-World War II period on the one hand, and the apparent democratization failures of the 1990s and after 11 September 2001 on the other, the strategies external actors use in post-war transformation must be considered. Sometimes, external actors differ significantly in their ability and willingness to deal with the five issues mentioned above. Given differences in both structural conditions and actor engagement, external actors should be more careful when using some of the early democratization cases as blueprints for democracy promotion today.     

Democracy through War?

This article brings together three strands of democracy research which have thus far seldom been informed by one another: the empirical research associated with the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, the juridical-normative questions of legality, and moral-philosophical reasoning about just war. Linking the statistical analysis of the democratic peace to the findings of comparative research on democratization and to the normative debates occurring in law and philosophy on just and legitimized wars, there is an inescapable conclusion that: jus ad bellum and jus post bellum criteria must be closely tied. The protection of people threatened by mass murder and brutal violations of human rights requires not only a short-term military intervention, but also the intensive support to establish sustainable rule of law and democracy. External actors intervening for humanitarian reasons equally have a duty to contribute to long-term sustainable state- and democracy-building. Forced regime change and an international trusteeship protectorate can become legitimate and necessary means to guarantee justice after war and to reconcile jus ad bellum principles with duties post bellum. A premature withdrawal of intervening forces, for example in Afghanistan or in Iraq, would amount to a flagrant violation of external actors' post-war duties.     

Passenger or Driver? A Cross-National Examination of Media Coverage and Civil War Interventions

Existing research on civil war interventions provides contradicting evidence about the role that the media plays in affecting the likelihood of intervention. To date, studies often focus on specific cases (frequently by the United States) leaving it unclear whether the media's influence extends more broadly. In this article we examine this question cross-nationally and argue that we need to account for the possibility that interventions also lead to increases in media coverage. We test our hypotheses using cross-national data on civil war interventions and media coverage. These data include a new measure of media coverage of 73 countries experiencing civil wars between 1982 and 1999. These data allow us to determine whether media coverage is more likely to drive leaders’ decisions or follow them. Toward this end we employ a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model to control for potential endogeneity between media attention and interventions. The results suggest a reciprocal positive relationship between media attention and civil conflict interventions. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in media coverage raises the probability of intervention 68%.     

A Changing Mediterranean: Regional Organisations and North Africa during the Arab Spring

This article discusses the role played by the European Union, African Union and Arab League in the recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. It focuses in particular on the use and impact of political and economic conditionality, the decision-making processes within each organisation and the inter-regional forums created to deal with the crisis. The analysis acknowledges the increasingly active and vocal role played by regional organisations in the so-called ‘Arab spring’, but it highlights not just that they had few legal powers to intervene in these crises, but also that they seemed very reluctant to use any form of political or economic conditionality. It also reveals that the main purpose of inter-regional forums was arguably not to generate consensus internationally but rather to manage dissent. As such, the article encourages a reflection on the specific challenges and opportunities that North Africa and the Mediterranean region pose to regional conflict management.